The consequences of retreat II

In March, after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, I wrote for the Congress blog, “The consequences of retreat.” The argument made was that Russia and China have become increasingly aggressive in the vacuum created by the retreat of U.S. power.

The close relationship between Syria and Russia should be a source of concern in the U.S-led campaign to degrade the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The possibility of Russian involvement is among the most serious risks of the action in Syria (Iran is another story).

Russian President Vladimir Putin has formed a view of American power based on his dealings with two American Presidents and Congress. The pattern is the United States only fights the small kids on the playground of international politics, like a crippled Iraq in 2003, ISIL, and Khorasan. U.S. counterterrorism strikes in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen are other examples of the kind of intervention that typifies recent U.S. policy dating back to after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The United States is far more cautious in approaching stronger states.

For decades the United States muscularly deterred many of the dangerous developments taking place, be it nuclear weapons proliferation (North Korea and Iran) or territorial revisionism (initiated by Russia and China). Soft power of diplomacy and foreign assistance are now the primary policy tools of persuasion. With the retreat of the U.S. role as a power balancer, the emboldened states of Eurasia are competing with greater intensity.

Russia has exploited the shifting geopolitics more than any other major power. It invaded the Ossetia region of Georgia in 2008, annexed Crimea earlier this year, and continues to destabilize eastern Ukraine. It is undoubtedly watching the events unfolding in Syria closely. It could offer the next opportunity for Putin to make a statement to the world, as he did in brokering an agreement to avoid U.S. strikes against Syria last year.

Russian interests in Syria are strong. The relationship between Moscow and Damascus dates back decades. Russian military equipment comprises the back-bone of Syrian defenses. The hesitance of European allies to participate in the Syrian theater of operations, while willing to partner in Iraq, may also be a tacit acknowledgment of Russian interests in Syria.

Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad has thus far consented to the U.S. air campaign to destroy ISIL. It will weaken one of his internal enemies in the ongoing Syrian civil war. How Assad responds over time to the unintended results of the air campaign is key. History shows that civilian casualties, destroyed public infrastructure, and, possibly, mistaken targeting of military forces are almost unavoidable even with modern air power. Assad may well decide to end the air campaign before the United States is ready to stop.

Russia doesn’t need any more pretext to get involved, but the United States ignoring Assad’s request is a potential trigger for Russia entering the conflict more directly. Russia could broker another diplomatic solution as it did last year. The second option would be to provide Syria with more advanced air defense systems to defend its airspace. The White House and Congress have thus far not armed Ukraine to fight Russian separatists, it is less clear whether Putin and the Duma would show the same restraint when it comes to Syria. 

There are no real facts in international relations, only perspectives. Putin sitting on the sidelines as the United States and a few Arab states bombard its long-time ally seems more like wishful thinking than a realistic perspective given the clear direction of Russian foreign policy.

Windle is a former associate dean at the National Defense University and staff member on House Appropriations. The views expressed are his own.