The Palestinian Authority in transition

Change is coming to Ramallah. Over a decade since Yasser Arafat’s passing, and the last presidential election, talk of transition is common currency on the streets of the de facto Palestinian capital. Perhaps not tomorrow or even next year but through resignation, natural order or some other form of selection, Palestinians expect that they will soon have a new face (or faces) at the top. The process of change, they know, is both inevitable and irreversible. And while the streets of Ramallah may be awash with rumors of competing aspirants, for the average Palestinian, with little expectation of a say in the succession, there is less worry about who and more about “what” comes next.

From an external policy perspective – in terms of the “what” – the preference would appear to be the preservation of the status quo. The situation – at least in the West Bank – looks relatively stable. There has been a dramatic reduction in terrorist incidents originating from the West Bank over the past decade and thus fewer incursions by and confrontations with Israeli Defense Forces – cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli intelligence services as well as U.S. mentoring deserves much of the credit; and Ramallah itself seems to be booming – construction everywhere and new shops, restaurants and cafes sprouting up almost weekly. Looking out over the horizon towards what were once Syria and Iraq, supporting the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) continued viability would seem a natural policy priority in an otherwise unstable region.  

{mosads}Such a policy would find ready support amongst a Palestinian public overwhelmingly behind the Palestinian Authority’s institutional survival, according to recent polling. This is not surprising given the alternatives but also the fact that approximately a third of Palestinian households are dependent on PA salaries. Nevertheless, the majority of Palestinians in the West Bank, headquarters of the PA, have serious reservations about the so-called status quo.

An October 2016 survey by the Ramallah-based research firm AWRAD found just one third of respondents having a positive view of current domestic trends. Correspondingly, only 30 percent in the West Bank say they would vote for the ruling party Fatah if legislative elections were held today; awareness of the party’s declining popularity suspected of influencing the High Court’s recent cancellation of municipal elections despite the majority of the electorate having registered to vote.

National issues undoubtedly factor into the public’s attitude towards Fatah after two-decades at the helm of the PA. 20-odd-years after Oslo, with peace talks ground to a halt and lack of clarity about “where-to-next,” Palestinians are conflicted. Polls show that a plurality still supports President Mahmoud Abbas’s current policy line (the other option being that of Hamas), but the public is otherwise split on the future: Return to armed conflict? Resume negotiations? Two-states? Not surprisingly, the street would like to know what solutions the crop of would-be successors has to offer. Until this is known, there is an apparent unwillingness to take any option off the table.

Compounding matters for Fatah and the PA at present is the internal state of Palestinian society with perceptions of official corruption, creeping authoritarianism, and erosion of civil liberties spiking upwards over the past decade in the all-too-familiar downward spiral of regional one-party rule. If this were not enough to damper enthusiasm for the ruling establishment, 60 percent of respondents in AWRAD’s October survey cite economic issues (jobs, prices) as topping their list of daily concerns with 50 percent reporting a decline in family finances from a year ago. If current leadership has any strategies to address such matters, the Palestinian public is unaware, and if pretenders to power have answers, the street is listening.  

While the public overwhelmingly wants a deciding vote in what comes next (79 percent in recent polling favor immediate elections in case of a presidential vacancy), Palestinians are looking to Fatah’s party congress, currently scheduled for November 29 in Ramallah, for indication of what they can actually expect, at least in the short term. Meant to be a unifying event and an opportunity for organizational renewal, this will be the first all-member gathering since 2009. So far, the signals are not promising.

In the weeks leading up to the congress, internal tensions unresolved and simmering since the Arafat era (old guard vs. young guard, insiders vs. returnees, refugees vs. non-refugees, reformers vs. establishment etc.) – often too simplistically distilled down to two rival personalities and their camps – are reaching a boiling point. In a series of what appear to be disciplinary actions, including summary dismissal of “disloyal” members and shows of force in West Bank refugee camps portrayed as lairs of “criminals,” the current leadership is sending a clear signal to the cadre of its vision for Fatah’s big day: a display of obedience, rather than internal comity.

Despite its monopoly of the PA’s institutional assets of persuasion and coercion, the West Bank leadership’s behavior of late towards internal foes, real or imagined, may have other than its intended effects. Concerned about further division, and cognizant of the party’s declining popularity and perceived disconnect from the street, Fatah cadre may opt to deny any quorum required to further entrench “old guard” interests at the congress; thus denying a smooth glide path to succession for current favorites. What impact this could all have on the PA’s continued stability is, of course, a source of concern and not just on the Palestinian street. 

Acutely aware of the long term dangers posed by political stagnation in the PA to both their domestic security and regional stability, neighboring Jordan and Egypt – backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE – have long been encouraging reform and reconciliation within Fatah (and by extension, the PA). But they are not sitting back and watching things play out given the high stakes, including the Muslim Brotherhood’s (read: Hamas et al) readiness to fill any void. Out of understandable self-interest, both have taken steps construed as favoring one faction against a PA leadership that from an ideological perspective neither has issues with, but which from an Amman and Cairo standpoint is on a self-defeating path.  

What comes next is yet unclear. Fatah’s congress, if it goes ahead, may provide an answer. Even if the leadership’s worst instincts are on display at the event, it is still too early to count out the current system over the near term, given the formidable advantages offered to it by the agencies of the PA to dispense or retract favor, or, if necessary, enforce obedience.

Notwithstanding Fatah’s congress, the question for policy makers at this time should be whether the PA’s current path is sustainable or even conducive to regional security objectives in the medium term. In other terms, whether the PA’s internal state of affairs is a matter of any importance? If the answer to the latter is in the affirmative, then there may be some rare common ground with the Palestinian street in that the “who” of Palestinian transition may not be nearly as important as “what” comes next.

Owen Kirby served as senior advisor in the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs during the Administration of George W. Bush and is a regular visitor to the West Bank, including as part of a pre-election assessment in the Palestinian Authority in advance of October’s municipal vote, returning in the aftermath of its cancellation.