A path to peace: The UN administration of Crimea

The absence of the United Nations’ (UN) involvement in mediating the Russian invasion of Ukraine is glaring, notwithstanding plaintive speeches in the General Assembly. As in the era of 19th century diplomacy, leaders of “great powers,” such as French President Emmanuel Macron, try to broker a solution — so far unsuccessfully. But the UN can still play an important peacemaking role by offering to administer Crimea as an “international” territory.

There is a precedent. In 1947, the UN proposed to administer Jerusalem as a neutral “international city” in its partition plan of Palestine. Had Jerusalem been granted this status, much of the conflict there may have been averted. Given that Russia will likely defend its illegal occupation of Ukraine to the last man, even threatening nuclear strikes, against Ukraine’s equally determined attempt to regain it, the proposition should be considered.

The Ukrainian military advances against Russian forces in eastern and southern Ukraine have transformed the debate about peace negotiations. Although a ceasefire is not an immediate option while both sides seek territorial advantage, the Ukrainian success raises the question of where third parties, including the UN, can steer the conflict away from further escalation with its inherent dangers.

Diplomats are confronted by invidious choices. If the U.S. and most European countries continue to arm Ukraine, the war could continue indefinitely, with further terrible consequences for civilians and soldiers, including the many millions in Africa and elsewhere who rely on the grain, vegetable oil and fertilizer produced both in Russia (the world’s largest wheat exporter) and Ukraine (the world’s fifth-largest grain exporter). Russia’s missile attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure in reaction to the bombing of the Kerch Strait Bridge indicates the further coarsening of the Russian mode of warfare.

Meanwhile, the civilians under Russian occupation are enduring massacre, deportation, filtration and forced assimilation. Aiding Ukraine in its liberation and resisting Russian imperial expansion is necessary and legitimate. Any future international tribunal could indict Russian leaders and military personnel for the crime of aggression, crimes against humanity and war crimes; some commentators also mention genocide.

And now there is the Russian nuclear threat. Commentary is divided on how seriously to take this saber-rattling. Some observers point out that nuclear powers have neither threatened nor deployed such weapons when losing wars in the past: the Americans in Vietnam and the Russians in Afghanistan, for instance. But those wars were far from their core territory, and Putin has repeatedly stated that Ukraine’s status as part of the Russian sphere of interest, and even as part of Russia itself, is a matter of existential security: that an “ant-Russia” on its doorstep is an intolerable threat.

That is why he is talking about nuclear weapons, especially now that he is losing ground. President Biden seemed to understand this difference when he invoked the danger of nuclear “Armageddon,” even if he does not share Putin’s appraisal of the legitimate Russian sphere of influence. Nor should Ukrainians. Whether legitimate or not, however, Russian forces can inflict incalculable damage in asserting Putin’s understanding of the national interest.

While Putin may be able to save his rule by losing Ukrainian territory occupied and annexed since January, it is harder to foresee his survival if Ukraine defeats Russian forces in Crimea, annexed in 2014, which most Russians regard as their patrimony.

In that case, is it an unacceptable risk to call his nuclear bluff? Much as I support the UN Charter’s prohibition of annexation and recognize the legitimacy of Ukraine’s campaign to regain all its territory, this prohibition is flagrantly breached when it comes to Western allies — for instance, in the Golan Heights or Western Sahara. When an annexation is regarded as existentially necessary for an ally, the West turns a blind eye.

Given the uneven application of the anti-annexation norm, it is time to rethink the categories of national sovereignty: to consider an alternative to the zero-sum diplomacy of total victory/total defeat that currently structures the peace options.

If Crimea is non-negotiable for both Russia and Ukraine, it is more urgent to negotiate a third option to resolve the security dilemma that control of this territory represents: UN governance of the region as an international territory over which neither party enjoys sovereignty.

The precedent of Jerusalem “under a special international regime … administered by the United Nations,” as the UN General Assembly Resolution 181 in 1947 put it, offers a model in some respects. Resolution 194 in December 1948 called for a UN Conciliation Commission to implement the special international regime. It would be constituted by demilitarization, free access, the right of return for refugees and maximal local autonomy for its “distinctive groups” with the cooperation of a UN representative. A distinctive group in Crimea is the Tartar population that has been mistreated under both Ukrainian and Russian rule. Needless to say, the naval base at Sevastopol would need to be repurposed.

Although the Jerusalem plan failed because some Arab countries rejected partition (Arab Palestinians were not asked) and the new state of Israel repudiated UN involvement, the idea remains compelling. The unrecognized Israeli annexation of the entire city and adjacent land after 1967 has led to systematic inequalities (Palestinian Jerusalemites are increasingly unable to receive Israeli citizenship, for instance) that discredit the ideal of national sovereignty in such contentious circumstances.

Naturally, relinquishing absolute entitlement to territory regarded as historically, economically and strategically significant would be painful for both sides. They would resist it. But this is not just a regional war. It has massive implications for global food and nuclear security. And waging the war is only possible because of the belligerents’ dense web of international military and economic relationships. While the Ukrainian campaign is more dependent on outside support than the Russian one, it too could not hold out indefinitely if China and India told Putin to accept the internationalization of Crimea.

Only the UN and the backers of both Ukraine and Russia can cut the Gordian knot of incompatible nationalist claims that threaten global security.

A. Dirk Moses is the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of International Relations at the City College of New York. He is the author of “The Problems of Genocide” (2021) and edits the Journal of Genocide Research.