Space norms of responsible behavior will not protect, defend or deter attack

Over the past several years, proponents of space security have stated that norms of responsible behavior will help “protect,” “defend,” and “deter” attacks upon U.S. and allied critical space systems. This view, coupled with that of “resilient space architecture,” has been advanced in high-level policy documents within the Department of Defense, State Department and the White House. While it is true that norms of behavior, as a list of best practices, could reduce orbital debris and other second- and third-order effects of national and commercial space activities, history shows it is wholly inaccurate to think that norms of behavior and related arms control efforts will “protect” against an adversary attack. 

America needs the insurance policy that an armed, offense-capable Space Force can provide when — not just if — norms and arms limitations are broken or ignored altogether.

Ideology has played a role in national security debates for decades, if not centuries. Theories on what can prevent conflict and war between states abound in both Western and Eastern writings. Many of these have ended up in national policy and strategy. A few examples include the first Hague Convention in the 1890s that sought to ban specific types of weapons such as chemicals, aircraft and submarines; the Kellogg-Briand Pact that banned the use of armed force as an instrument of policy; and the United Nations Charter, which also states that armed aggression will not be tolerated. 

Norms are not legally binding. The above documents are. Yet, conflict and war still occur. Why would norms that are both unbinding and not created from the bottom up by the practitioners themselves do what legally binding international law cannot do? In the 21st century, space power has become an integral instrument of defense — but also a vulnerable one to various modes of attack by capable adversaries such as China. Yet, for this situation, space security and arms control, not space superiority, appear to be the objective and we ignore lessons of history to our peril.

Space security is a term that, while sounding martial, has nothing to do with “the interests of particular national or commercial entities, but [rather] the security and sustainability of outer space as an environment… .” Thus, what needs to be secured — strategic interests, political sovereignty and the international order — is not being secured. As such, when faced by any formidable, multi-layered attack architecture, designed to exploit the vulnerability of our critical space systems upon which our military and economy rely, the concern of space security policy is not that there is a gun pointed at the heads of the American people in space, but that such weapons might cause a mess that harms the space environment itself. 

As a result, rather than building up an armed force capable of truly defending, protecting or deterring the attack in the first place, the solution put forth is reliance upon non-legally binding norms of responsible behavior, unilateral bans on debris-causing anti-satellite (ASAT) tests, and resilient architectures capable of “taking a hit.” Despite all the evidence that this approach is and will be ineffective against China’s intent to deploy systems capable of “system destruction” of “resilient” designs like proliferated low Earth orbit (LEO), or deep magazines of ASAT missiles and a will to use them on vital dual-use space infrastructure, space security proponents and current policy that are influenced by such ideas continue to point to how norms and resiliency will provide security and keep our systems safe from attack.

Norms are a useful tool, one that should be leveraged diplomatically, but they do not provide coercive or denying effects in and of themselves. The Hague Convention did not prevent aircraft, submarines or chemical weapons from being used in warfare; the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not stop war from being an instrument of policy for aggressor nations; and the UN Charter has not prevented nations such as Russia or China from sending in armed forces to claim territory that, by international law, belong to others. While pursuing norms, we must ensure that our Space Force is armed and superior to what our adversaries have.

We must be able and willing to use offensive and defensive weapons systems to deter and, if needed, win a war in space. We don’t have that now — and we cannot rely on diplomatic instruments such as norms to protect our vulnerable space systems from attacks that are already occurring “every single day,” albeit reversibly, according to Space Force leaders. We cannot continue to expect that countries that flout formal agreements suddenly will abide by informal norms. We must have an armed Space Force to serve as an insurance policy against such states. 

As former Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson once intimated, it’s not the job of the military to advocate for norms; it’s the job of the military to enforce the norms. History shows that being unprepared invites aggression, and in this space-enabled world, that could mean defeat in a critical warfighting domain.

Christopher Stone is the former special assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The thoughts, opinions and analysis presented here are his own and do not reflect the position of the Department of Defense.