Ukraine’s next offensive: How to define success and failure

The discussion over Ukraine’s forthcoming counteroffensive is fraught with insta-punditry and armchair general analysis. This is unsurprising, but rapidly exposes several analytical shortcomings that could affect the public’s understanding of the course and conduct of the war. 

This is unsurprising, but rapidly exposes several analytical shortcomings that have could affect the public’s understanding of the course and conduct of the war. 

First, how success and failure are defined has considerable political implications for Ukraine, but also for the West. Second, and equally as important, the relationship between the success or failure of this counteroffensive and Ukraine’s overall strategic and political objective also remains largely unclear.  

In the case of the former, the commentary and analysis on the forthcoming counteroffensive largely omit what constitutes a success or failure for Ukraine’s forces, as well as what constitutes success or failure for Russia. It is possible that Ukraine’s offensive proves unsuccessful, but that does not mean Russia is in a winning position.

In the case of the former, the commentary and analysis on the forthcoming counteroffensive largely omit what constitutes a success or failure for Ukraine’s forces. Kyiv undoubtedly has in its own mind a set of expectations of the art of the possible. Indeed, Ukraine’s Armed Forces, like many militaries, have a spectrum of possible outcomes for which they have planned. Should the offensive prove wildly successful, they will continue to prosecute operations until a defined limit, be it logistical, air support, etc. Should the offensive stall or fail, the objective will certainly be to prevent further losses or dig into secure gains already made.  

Yet, the definition of success or failure carries with it much greater weight than just for Kyiv. The expectations of Ukraine’s American and European supporters are certainly tied to Ukraine’s battlefield performance and require calibration. While the political leadership of each country is more au fait with the art and science of military operations, the public and the legislatures are often far less so by comparison. Thus far, the White House has largely fallen short in its communication of not just the importance of the war to the American people, but how it could well play out in the months ahead.  

Managing expectations here is vital. If Ukraine’s offensive fails to achieve yet undefined success or incurs considerable losses, it will become increasingly difficult to sustain the political will necessary to back Kyiv. Already questions about the long-term nature of American support to Ukraine are emerging, even prior to any battlefield outcomes. While this is largely political and contained to a particularly populist and isolationist wing of the Republican Party, it is a wing that does not need any additional fuel for its acerbic rhetorical fire.  

It is important to note that there are few, if any, expectations that Ukraine will find its offensive stymied or routed. Russia’s forces are markedly depleted, suffering from high casualties and using increasingly outdated equipment. That said, they are digging in along the front and learning from previous losses. They are likely to be anything but a pushover.  

This, then, raises the second and equally as important factor when considering Ukraine’s offensive activities — their connection to the overall strategic and political picture of the war. While the tactical and operational effects of the offensive may be more immediately clear through the redrawing of maps with shades of red and blue behind an ever-shifting line, the broader impact of these operations will likely be opaquer for months to come.  

Put simply, the war in Ukraine is unlikely to be decided by the success or failure of this offensive. It will not be a decisive battle that will determine the war. 

Important as those lines and shades are, the more important question relates to the ability of Ukraine and Russia to sustain operations in the longer term, a point well made by Rob Lee, an analyst on Russia’s military. Should Ukraine incur high casualties, its ability to continue or expand offensives will likely be more circumscribed. If Russia experiences even higher losses than it already has, its ability to prosecute the war, even in a defensive posture, without significant domestic impact will be in greater question.  

How this offensive and its success or failure is connected to the strategic and political context is important to define. This is a first principle of war. A tactical success — e.g., the retaking of a position or routing of Russian forces — does have value in and of itself. If that tactical success is, however, not translated into an overall theatre or operational success, it is a pyrrhic victory. More importantly, if that tactical or even operational success is divorced from the strategic and political objective, it is rendered moot.  

It is this strategic consideration that is the most unclear. What is Ukraine’s political objective? It is, naturally, the retaking of territory captured by Russian forces. What is, however, unclear, is what is the extent of that objective. Is it a return to pre-February 2022 borders? Is it a return to pre-2014 borders, in which case, this would necessitate the retaking of Crimea, a prospect that carries with it considerable strategic implications for Moscow? 

In the days ahead as Ukraine’s counteroffensive proceeds, policymakers and pundits alike would do well to look to the first principles of military analysis and the definitions that accompany and inform this analysis and its context. Managing expectations and recognizing that this offensive will not determine the outcome of the war is critical to both American and European support to Ukraine, which, in turn, is critical to Kyiv’s ultimate success against Russian aggression.  

Joshua C. Huminski is the director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress. There he co-chairs the center’s program on strategic competition, with a specific focus on Russia and the Euro-Atlantic. He is also a book reviewer for the Diplomatic Courier and a fellow at George Mason University’s National Security Institute. He can be found on Twitter at @joshuachuminski. 

Editor’s note: This piece was updated on April 27 at 1:15 p.m. ET.