The US Navy offers China a choice: cooperation or confrontation

The United States Navy just delivered a multilayered message to the political leadership of the People’s Republic of China and the military leadership of the People’s Liberation Army.

In unprecedentedly frank public remarks by such a high-ranking military officer, Adm. John Aquilino, commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, laid down some important markers for his PLA counterparts and their Chinese Communist superiors.

First, he repeated the oft-spoken assurance by U.S. officials from the president on down that “the U.S. seeks only peace and prosperity and stability, not confrontation” with China.“The service members in INDOPACOM and our civilian warriors spend every day working to prevent conflict, not provoke it. And they do that to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific for all nations,” the admiral said in his prepared speech.

Aquilino offered an open hand of professional cooperation with his Chinese counterparts to avoid miscommunication and accidents between American and Chinese naval and air units operating in close proximity in the East and South China Seas. He recited a litany of close calls and near misses between PLA and U.S. forces caused by “an increasing number of dangerous and escalatory actions against the U.S. and our allies and partners,” including “an event with a J-11 fighter that flew within 20 feet of the canopy of an RC-135, forcing the aircrew to take action to avoid collision.”

Aquilino then expressed frustration at the lack of response from the Chinese side. The cold shoulder treatment has risen all the way to the top of the military command, with China’s defense minister refusing to accept Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s call after the Chinese spy balloon incident.

Aquilino chose the annual meeting of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations — a group that has a reputation for pushing engagement with China at virtually all costs — as the forum for his stern message to Beijing. Stephen Orlins, the chairman and chief spokesman of the group, responded with challenging, semi-hostile questions. On the matter of Chinese harassment of U.S. ships and planes in international waters and airspace, for example, Orlins posed this to Aquilino:

“You say we have more dangerous intercepts by the Chinese. Well, the Chinese say, ‘Well, there’s an easy answer. Run fewer surveillance flights, then there’ll be fewer dangerous intercepts.’ Given the capability of our satellites, do we need to run as many surveillance flights as we do? And can you give us a sense as to how many are actually run these days?”

Aquilino responded: “I understand the argument that says, “If you would just leave, I would be happy.” That’s an interesting argument. That said, it’s just not going to happen. […] [T]here are [other] interests. Two-thirds of the global economy runs through the South China Sea. So, if we would just leave, I’m sure that would be okay for China, but it’s not okay for the United States.”

Regarding the refusal of China’s defense minister to talk with Austin, Aquilino noted, “They’re fraught with a say-do mismatch. So, in the Global Security Initiative, in the PRC’s words, ‘It’s designed to resolve disputes through dialogue.’ That’s what they say. But here’s what we see. That when there is an issue of concern, and specifically I’ll highlight the most recent surveillance balloon that violated the sovereignty of the United States and 40 other countries, Secretary Austin’s counterpart wouldn’t take the call. That hardly allows you to resolve disputes through dialogue.”

Orlins offered this defense of China’s stonewalling: “The Minister of National Defense is sanctioned by the U.S. government. Can our military take a position on whether that’s good policy? In other words, if he’s sanctioned, it’s highly unlikely he’s going to answer the phone.”

But Aquilino was having none of it. He delivered his — and America’s — own bark-off warning to China’s strategic thinkers and military planners.  

“The United States is working diligently” to deter a conflict. “That said, we’re postured in the appropriate places. The United States does not choose to escalate. We are not being provocative [but] I’m confident that we’d be able to fight and win wherever it went.”

He then went beyond the general language of deterrence as a strategic goal and painted a more specific picture of the U.S. response to China’s aggressive actions.

“There’s no one trick pony here that we utilize to both deter and then if we were to, unfortunately, get in any kind of conflict. For the United States, it’s the synchronization integrated efforts of the entire joint force under sea, on the sea, above the sea, in space and cyberspace. So, if anyone were to choose to take on the United States, they’re going to get the full Monty.”

If China attacked Taiwan, it would indeed be “taking on the United States,” and Aquilino’s “full Monty” would come into play. The problem is that because of Washington’s policy of strategic ambiguity on defending Taiwan, Beijing retains serious doubts about American will, exacerbated by the Biden administration’s actions on Afghanistan, Ukraine and elsewhere.

Aquilino said that, despite current tensions, war with China is “not imminent, and it is not inevitable.” Yet he also noted that China and the West have different value systems, with China’s informed by “Marxist” thinking. The admiral didn’t say it, but unless Beijing’s approach to the world changes — among the fundamental objectives of Richard Nixon’s opening to China —conflict will indeed be inevitable.

Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in Department of Defense discussions about the U.S. response. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA.