There is no military solution to the war in Gaza

For a week, it looked like peace was possible. Then, only a day after the truce between Hamas and Israel fell apart, Israel’s air force pounded Gaza once again, reportedly killing over 700 Palestinian in a day. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has left no doubt about his aims. Calling it “the ISIS of Gaza,” he promised last week “to fight Hamas until we prevail no matter how long it takes.”  

Yet this analogy is deeply flawed. Worse still, it has led Israel’s right-wing government toward a disastrous path of escalation as its leaders draw on faulty historical parallels to defend their actions in Gaza. The historical record tells us that a durable solution to terrorism and insurgency can only be a political one. Continuing the war would not only be a terrible moral failure — it would also be a colossal strategic mistake.

The truth is that Hamas has little in common with ISIS. ISIS wanted a global caliphate and waged a constant war on its enemies; Hamas seeks a Palestinian state and is willing to make tactical concessions to get there. After long rejecting a two-state solution, its leaders have over the past two decades signaled acceptance for a Palestinian state inside 1967 borders. The short-lived truce shows that Hamas, like most armed groups, will negotiate when it is to its advantage.

Public opinion divides the two groups as well: More than 90 percent of Iraqi Arabs had a negative view of ISIS in 2015. While Palestinians in Gaza do not like Hamas, one study before the war found around half to hold a “somewhat positive” opinion of the group. Iraqis overwhelmingly welcomed the anti-ISIS coalition as a liberating force. But Israel’s leaders are delusional if they think Palestinians will greet a foreign military force with open arms.

Instead, Israel should look to the experience of three other armed groups: the Viet Cong, Taliban, and Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). Though Hamas differs from each of these groups—one communist, one Islamist, one republican—it likewise views itself as a national liberation movement opposing foreign occupation. 

All four groups have used deliberate violence against civilians. While the number of civilians murdered on Oct. 7 far outstrips the IRA’s bloody tally, it is still exceeded by the thousands slaughtered in the Viet Cong’s Hue massacre. Each group violated international law, with tactics ranging from bombings to hijackings and torture. 

Also like these groups, Hamas operates chiefly in civilian areas. IRA fighters moved seamlessly among the urban population while the Taliban retreated into their villages. Viet Cong were inspired by Mao’s famous dictum that a guerrilla swims among the people like a fish swims in the sea. Hamas now appears poised to repeat the experience of the Taliban, which governed Afghanistan for five years before reconstituting itself as an insurgent guerrilla group.

The United States failed to destroy both Viet Cong and Taliban while the British government defeated the IRA. What can we learn from their experience? 

First, massive retaliation inevitably backfires. U.S. campaigns in South Vietnam drove civilian populations into the arms of the Viet Cong. The same was true of Afghanistan. As civilian casualties mounted between 2005 and 2009, Afghans turned against the United States, with public support dropping from 83 to 47 percent. In the past, Israeli military crackdowns have been shown to only increase support for Hamas. There is evidence to suggest this time is no different. 

The second lesson is just as important: Military occupation is doomed to fail. The United States fought the Taliban for two decades, only for the insurgents to return to power within days of the American withdrawal. America lost 50,000 men before essentially capitulating to the Viet Cong. 

The United Kingdom chose a different path: in the Good Friday Agreement, the IRA agreed to abandon its armed struggle in exchange for expanded autonomy for Northern Ireland. Britain understood that military retaliation was ineffective against armed resistance.

Israel’s leaders are now repeating the worst mistakes of the United States. Netanyahu has announced that the Israeli military will be in control of Gaza for an “indefinite period.” But an Israeli occupation—or any occupation by a foreign or collaborating force—will inevitably give rise to a violent counterinsurgency. 

Israel’s current path of massive escalation will prove as counterproductive as the American bombing campaign did in Vietnam. Every airstrike, every civilian death, every day of war suffering weakens Israel’s long-term security. 

The faulty logic of eradicating Hamas in the vein of ISIS is blinding Netanyahu’s vision. For if Israel’s government truly intended to find and kill every single Hamas fighter, it would have to kill every Palestinian in Gaza in the process. Calls to eradicate Hamas are thus at best naive and at worst an open invitation to genocidal violence.

Serious statecraft requires uncomfortable compromise. To deliver a lasting solution, a reinstated Palestinian authority will have to bring together a variety of broad coalition of political actors, including Hamas. In the long run, violent groups can only be disarmed at the negotiation table. 

“Hell on earth has returned to Gaza,” a UN spokesperson stated after the recent resumption of violence. Already, 1 percent of all Gazans are dead or missing. Over half of Gazan homes have been damaged or destroyed, more than in Germany during all of World War II. Without an immediate ceasefire, tens of thousands more will die as Israel’s military pushes 2 million into an area smaller than Heathrow Airport.

Israel’s military leaders need to understand that Hamas and ISIS are not the same. Rather than the campaign against ISIS, Israel must learn the lessons of America’s wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Thousands of dead civilians have not led to a change in American or Israeli strategy. Maybe national interest will. 

Johannes Lang, a researcher on democratization and U.S. foreign policy, is a John F. Kennedy Scholar at the Harvard Kennedy School.