US-Israel relations are at a crossroads

In the wake of Iran’s unprecedented retaliation against Israel, following the latter’s attack against Iran’s embassy compound in Damascus, Syria, a major effort is being made to contain the conflict from expanding into a wider war.

The Biden administration has stated that it is not seeking escalation, and that its actions are defensive, but that then there must be a return to “the issue at hand.” Specifically, that means securing and ending the Gaza conflict, obtaining a ceasefire, the release of the hostages, and providing humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians in Gaza. In other words, focus on resolving the Israeli Palestinian conflict that sparked the Iranian-Israeli confrontation.

There is a growing gap between the policies of the U.S. and Israel toward the conduct of the war in Gaza and possible endgames to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The time has come to face the divergences directly and to craft a path forward from conflict management to conflict resolution.

To do so will take a long-term strategy, statecraft and strong and courageous leadership on the part of all the parties involved. In the wake of Hamas’s brutal attacks on Israelis on Oct. 7, 2023, and Israel’s massive retaliation causing a major humanitarian disaster in Gaza, the risk of the conflict expanding is ever-present.

In Israel, there is widespread opposition to Prime Minister Netanyahu remaining in office, leading to a call from cabinet minister Benny Gantz for early elections. In a March 2024 Gallup poll, 55 percent of Americans said they oppose Israel’s conduct of the war in Gaza.

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer’s (D-N.Y.) unprecedented critique of Netanyahu and his government’s policies is a clear indication of a troubled bilateral relationship. An earlier statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin was prescient: “In this kind of fight, the center of gravity is the civilian population. And if you drive them into the arms of the enemy, you replace a tactical victory with a strategic defeat.”

Prior to Oct. 7, both the Trump and Biden administrations perceived the Palestinian issue to be less central than in the past. The Abraham Accords did not prioritize the principled position of “land for peace.” 

In the aftermath of Oct. 7, the price of diplomatic and economic normalization has increased exponentially for Arab Gulf states. This price is exemplified by recent statements from Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan. “All of the Arab states have indicated that they are willing to talk about a resolution or a solution that includes how we manage the situation in Gaza as long as it’s part of a bigger picture,” he said. “What we feel is necessary is some form of credible, irreversible path to a Palestinian state.”

Therefore, any future progress on normalization must be linked to ending the war in Gaza and moving ahead on Palestinian rights and self-determination, leading to an independent Palestinian state.

The chimera of Israel’s policy of deterrence and containment of Hamas, a hallmark of Netanyahu’s policy, collapsed on Oct. 7. Netanyahu has long been playing Hamas against the Fatah leadership in the West Bank to weaken Palestinian leadership and thereby diminish the prospects for any serious negotiations for peace.

Also, Netanyahu’s policy of prioritizing the Iranian threat to Israel and the region and actively working against United States policy on the Obama administration’s nuclear deal with Iran has fallen short. Iran is now technically closer to producing a nuclear weapon and it is actively influencing regional affairs through its proxies in the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” Indeed, resolving the Palestine issue will help marginalize Iran’s and its proxies’ threats to the region by removing a major rallying cry of their policies and actions. 

Concerning the Palestinians, their leadership in the West Bank under Fatah and President Mahmoud Abbas is weak and systemically corrupt. The continuing occupation has taken its toll. There have not been presidential elections since 2005. The leadership is perceived to be aiding and abetting the occupation by its security coordination with Israel. 

A cosmetic “revitalization” of the Palestinian Authority will not address the challenges ahead. According to its former prime minister, Salam Fayyad, what is needed is to prepare for a transition period leading to elections with a specific date, during which time the younger generation must be engaged to accede to leadership positions, to get Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to agree to non-violence, and to manage pluralism in the Palestinian body politic.

In the first instance, every effort must be made to achieve and declare a sustainable ceasefire, obtain the release of the hostages, and end the war and the humanitarian crisis. This will also require enhanced security arrangements on Israel’s southern border with Gaza and its northern border with Lebanon. A massive humanitarian assistance program in Gaza can only be executed in the aftermath of a sustainable ceasefire and a realistic path forward to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The U.S. should continue to make clear that it will oppose efforts not only to expand the war, but also any efforts to drag it into such a war that may serve the interests of another party but not that of the U.S. In this context, a determined effort should be made to secure the Lebanese-Israeli border under the aegis of UNSC Resolution 1701, which calls for the full cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory, the disarmament of armed groups including Hezbollah, and the deployment of Lebanese and UNIFIL forces to southern Lebanon.

The U.S. should put forward a political horizon, its vision and concept for Israeli-Palestinian peace in a comprehensive statement of policy that goes beyond rhetorical support for a Two State Solution, and contains an outline for the path forward. Such frameworks have been presented in the past and can be built upon to reflect current realities.

A vision that the parties could adhere to would give some hope for realizing the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with future implications for the unfinished business of peace agreements on the Lebanese and Syrian fronts.  

As the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin told me in 1994 when I was the U.S. ambassador to Israel, “There is no military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, only a political one.”

Edward Djerejian is a senior fellow with Middle East Initiative at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and former U.S. Ambassador to Israel.