A significant part of the picture is being omitted in the widespread coverage of ISIS and other extremist groups, air strikes and counter-terrorism efforts around the world. From ISIS to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda to Boko Haram, seldom do we consider the people behind these extremist groups and why they become radicalized in the first place.
Understanding why Muslim youth join militant groups is crucial in curbing radicalization. Counter-radicalization measures have proved to be ineffective and even counterproductive if they are not based on a clear understanding of what makes individuals susceptible to violent extremism.
{mosads}A recent study conducted by Finn Church Aid in partnership with the African Institute for Security Studies (ISS) gives a clearer picture of the militants who were recruited by al-Shabaab in Somalia. Researchers interviewed 88 former militants, examining young people’s vulnerability to extremist recruitment, the radicalization process and the fighters’ motivations for joining. The study comes at a time when the entire world is looking for strategies to defeat ISIS – and has implications in the worldwide effort to combat terrorism.
We discovered religion wasn’t the main driver of radicalization in the group we sampled; lack of education and unemployment were more likely to play a role in al-Shabaab recruitment.
The formal education system came to a standstill in Somalia when the state collapsed in 1991, leaving an entire generation uneducated. Forty percent of interviewees received no education, while the remaining 60 percent received very limited education. Interviewees defined adverse economic circumstances as a chief recruitment factor and saw al-Shabaab as a potential employer. We concluded that if most interviewees had been given access to other employment opportunities, they would not have joined al-Shabaab.
Education and skills are essential for employment and can break the cycle in which joining extremist organizations is the only viable option individuals have to feed themselves and their families. Better-educated people also tend to participate in conventional political structure.
Our study found young people were particularly vulnerable to radicalization. Al-Shabaab targets teenagers and young adults in their recruitment because this age group is the most impressionable. Young people are more idealistic and reform-minded; they are not used to the realities of political and socio-economic participation. They favor confrontation, are impatient with the compromising methods of their elders and are easily drawn into unconventional political behavior in their desire to change the political system.
Compounding these circumstances, of the former militants we interviewed, 50 percent had lost one or both parents between early adolescence and early adulthood, a time when individuals are particularly vulnerable to losses of this magnitude.
This picture of al-Shabaab recruits is incredibly important. While the name may not dominate today’s headlines as much as ISIS, al-Shabaab is no less dangerous and formidable a force. Over the course of seven years, al-Shabaab has transformed itself from a rag-tag militia to a fully-fledged army that has conquered, controlled and administered most of southern and central Somalia for some time.
But al-Shabaab is not just a Somali problem. Unlike the Somali government, al-Shabaab has invested heavily in its intelligence-gathering capabilities. Today, the al-Qaeda-linked militant group has the capability to gather accurate intelligence and operationalize attacks in Somalia and beyond. The planning and execution of the Kampala restaurant bombing, the daylight attack on the Westgate mall in Nairobi and the siege of the U.N. compound in Mogadishu demonstrates such capabilities, which the Somali government lacks. The al-Qaeda-linked militant group has also successfully brought members of the Somali-American diaspora into their fold, using these recruits to orchestrate suicide bombings and deadly raids outside of Somalia’s borders.
As with ISIS, airstrikes alone will not solve the problem of al-Shabaab. We need to work with religious and traditional leaders on the ground. The Somali government needs to establish partnerships with clan leaders and urgently initiate a nation-building strategy. We need to make education and employment a priority and recognize the key role both play in a stable, thriving civil society.
As we weigh our strategies to combat and defeat ISIS and other terrorist groups, we can’t fall back on one-size-fits-all solutions. Successful counter-terrorism efforts will have to be nuanced and focus just as much on improving the lives of civilians on the ground as they do degrading and destroying the militant groups that plague the area.
Elsanousi is the director of External Relations for Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers hosted by Finn Church Aid (FCA). FCA is an NGO for development cooperation and advocacy and founding member of the international aid alliance of churches, ACT Alliance.