Why new sanctions against Iran would backfire

Proposed legislation in the Senate that would impose additional “triggered” sanctions on Iran during ongoing nuclear talks relies on flawed logic and ignores Iranian history.  The legislation would be more likely to blow up the negotiations than to achieve its stated goal of pushing Iran toward an agreement.  Some proponents of the legislation are explicit in hoping new sanctions will derail the talks, but others appear to believe in good faith that threatened sanctions will strengthen the position of the U.S. and its negotiating partners.  They claim that if sanctions brought Iran to the table, more sanctions will force them to agree to a nuclear deal.  Yet a clear-eyed look at past Iranian actions and the dynamics of negotiations shows that this is mere wishful thinking not grounded in a realistic assessment of likely outcomes.  

First, the assumption that additional sanctions or the threat of sanctions would force the Iranians to capitulate to P5 +1 proposals has no basis in fact.  Such threats, which the Islamic Republic has faced for over three decades, are more likely to push the Iranians to toughen their positions, not make them more pliant.   We should not dismiss Iran’s Foreign Minister statement that “a deal is dead” if expanded sanctions are passed, even if implementation is delayed.  So far during the negotiations, the Iranians have been looking to identify possible compromises with P5+1 proposals and have continually expressed their commitment to the process.  As that sensitive bargaining continues, a perception that the U.S. will not be able to bridge gaps and deliver on its promises of sanctions relief will not lead to surrender by the Iranians but to skepticism and rejection.  Even if we image the unlikely scenario in which the threat of new sanctions forced the negotiations to a conclusion and Iran simply accepted the P5+1 view of a deal, would such a coerced agreement be worth anything?  The Iranians would be likely to immediately seek a way out of this kind of coerced agreement.  If any deal is expected to hold for 10 to 15 years, it needs to be reached willingly by partners who both have a stake in the deal, not enforced by one side that gets the upper hand in the short run by pressuring the other party.  

{mosads}Second, while negotiations based on strong-arming and not on persuasion are unlikely to produce good long-term outcomes, this result is even more probable in the case of Iran given the country’s history with the West.   Iran’s modern history is filled with grievances toward Western countries over real or  perceived injustices.  Going back to the late 19^th century, oil concessions were granted to Britain and other countries which were subsequently seen as unfair to Iran’s interests.  In 1919, Britain drew up a plan, never put into effect, that would have turned all of Iran into a British protectorate, outraging the Iranian Parliament.  And, of course, the U.S. and Britain have acknowledged a role in the 1953 coup that overthrew the nationalist Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq.  Throughout this history, Western powers were seen as trying to dominate and humiliate Iran rather than reach any mutually acceptable or beneficial agreement.   As Khomeini once famously said, “What can the wolf negotiate with the sheep?”   Any agreement reached now on the nuclear issue has to been put into this context and meet strongly- held Iranian expectations that an agreement would protect their rights and preserve their national dignity.  President Obama has called for the United States to move beyond this past and seek a relationship with Iran that is based upon mutual interests and mutual respect. 

Third, the reality of the negotiations shows that patience and forbearance is what is needed now, not more sanctions.  Most existing sanctions will stay in place and will only be lifted slowly as Iran complies with the terms of an agreement.  With oil prices dropping dramatically, Iran has powerful incentives to repair relations with the West and reintegrate into the global economy.   Additional sanctions will do little to increase the economic pressure they already feel from both declining oil income and chronic economic mismangement.   

Reaching agreement on such a highly-charged issue is difficult and time-consuming.   Negotiators must deal with decades of mistrust as an inescapable part of the reality of current relations. Both sides have made great progress in learning to communicate with each other through now talks that both sides (for the first time in decades) call “productive”.  But this budding level of trust and understanding could easily collapse if new sanctions were to raise in Iranian minds their deep-seated skepticism about the West’s intentions. To create a long-lasting, verifiable deal, the parties need to see each other as partners, not players in a zero sum game.   Without a realistic recognition of how Iranians are likely to respond to new sanctions, the U.S. Congress risks destroying a historic opportunity to prevent Iran from moving toward a nuclear weapon and also begin what would be a long path toward reconciliation.   

Bradshaw, a former Foreign Service officer, is the executive director of the National Security Network; Limbert, former deputy assistant secretary of State for Iran, is a professor at the U.S. Naval Academy and a former hostage in Iran 1979-81.  ​