Will the QDDR prioritize changes necessary to make prevention possible?

As prevention advocates anxiously await the delayed release of the 2014 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)—expected next month—now is a good time to take a look back at the first QDDR, its impact, and lessons learned to ensure that the 2014 QDDR can be as impactful as possible.

The first QDDR, released in 2010, was a major undertaking that sought to review and fine tune priority areas for the State Department and USAID as well as to determine how to make their efforts as effective and efficient as possible. The QDDR also provided an outline for how to strengthen the ability of the State Department and USAID to advance United States (US) interests abroad.

{mosads}One of the main focal points of the first QDDR, “Preventing and responding to crisis, conflict and instability”, placed an emphasis on expanding the US’s capacity to effectively deal with the entire conflict spectrum—from prevention to recovery—and with particular attention being paid to atrocities prevention and fragile states. It is expected that the 2014 QDDR will also place an emphasis on conflict and atrocities prevention as it remains a stated priority for the Obama administration. Looking back at the impact the first QDDR had on prevention and the current climate of US foreign policy, the 2014 QDDR must focus on a few key areas if it is to affect meaningful changes to the US’s ability to prevent and mitigate violent conflict and atrocities.

First, the State Department must retool the Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations (CSO) to act as the center of all diplomatic conflict and atrocities prevention and mitigation efforts. The original stated intent of creating CSO in the 2010 QDDR was to “Provide expertise and operational guidance to inform policies and strategies to prevent and respond to crisis and conflict.” In this role CSO was to take the lead on institution-wide response to crisis and conflict while providing experts to regional bureaus and other offices to act as advisors to inform policy and devise strategies. While some of that has happened, CSO’s role has also become conflated with providing ad hoc transitional operation efforts, or in the case of Syria—CSO’s longest running program—prolonged operational efforts.

Additionally, following CSO’s creation many throughout the State Department were uncertain of CSO’s role and purpose and the Inspector General’s report on CSO, released in March of last year, showed that the bureau, its counterpart at USAID—the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)—, and other offices within State were sometimes duplicating efforts. CSO should be reorganized to fulfill the role it was originally created for and it is imperative that top-level leadership be provided to ensure, that department wide, CSO’s role is clearly understood and both regional and functional bureaus recognize CSO’s value add to their work.

Second, short-term ad hoc interventions must be connected to long-term engagement strategies. Viewing the 2013 elections as a possible trigger for violence, as was seen in 2007, the State Department and USAID stepped up their prevention initiatives and employed a civilian surge. Despite the debatable impact efforts by the State Department and USAID had on preventing election violence in Kenya, some within the US government laud it as a prevention success. While ad-hoc surge initiatives may be necessary under certain circumstances, these short-term efforts must be connected to a long-term engagement strategy by the State Department and USAID. If ad-hoc surge efforts are not connected to a long-term plan then State and AID will be perpetually reacting to trigger events—the symptoms—as opposed to addressing the underlying root causes that drive violent conflict—the cause.

Third, upstream conflict prevention must be incorporated into the DNA of civilian power. Related to the above point, the prevention efforts undertaken by the State Department and USAID should be made with an eye towards creating stable, equitable, and just societies that respect human rights and the rule of law. There are two levels of prevention: 1. active prevention in which you are addressing a specific trigger or event that could spark violent conflict and 2. passive prevention which seeks to address the grievances and deep-seated drivers of violent conflict so as to prevent an outbreak of violence. Upstream conflict prevention places an emphasis on passive prevention and is by far the more effective, efficient, and sustainable approach to prevent violent conflict and mass atrocities. If civilian power can be used to effectively address the causes it will drastically mitigate the symptoms or episodes of violent conflict.

Lastly, the QDDR should take the opportunity to address—at least in part—the ability for embassy staff to do their jobs beyond the compound. The 2014 QDDR must address the need for expeditionary diplomatic and development engagement beyond the walls of embassy compounds and major cities. With civilian staff operating in chaotic and dangerous environments and attacks on embassy compounds like was seen in Benghazi the US government has been very risk averse and has kept much of its civilian staff on a tight leash. This makes it exceedingly difficult for Foreign Service Officers to do their jobs effectively if they cannot get to the field. Relying solely on short-term consultants and officers who can go out to the field drastically limits the visibility embassy staff have on evolving issues and inhibits their ability to effectively conduct preventive diplomacy. The QDDR should find a way to address this issue while reasonably balancing the safety and security of civilian staff.

In the four years since the release of the first QDDR there have been some positive developments as well as major spoilers to the best laid plans outlined in 2010. If Secretary Kerry and Special Representative Tom Perriello—appointed to lead the quadrennial review and its implementation—are serious about the 2014 QDDR having an impact on how US diplomacy and development is carried out, then an emphasis must be placed on overcoming the above issues. These issues cannot be addressed without top-level leadership and an increased emphasis on implementing and effecting a change in the “attitude and mindset” of the State and AID. If that leadership occurs and the necessary changes are made the U.S. may get closer to making prevention a reality.   

Brand is a human rights and atrocities prevention professional with over seven year’s experience who holds a Master’s in International Peace and Conflict Resolution from American University.