The nuke deal is improving relations

The past month has produced a flurry of activities in the U.S.-Iranian relationship. Contacts achieved through grinding nuclear negotiations have opened new possibilities of cooperation. The possibility of such collaborative problem solving has many seeking greater engagement both domestically and abroad.

There are however many who still argue that this Iran is to be viewed as America’s enemy in the region not as a partner and that the nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is doomed to fail. There are also others who approve of the JCPOA as necessary for preventing Iranian attainment of nuclear weapons, but maintain that, despite the positive engagement, the U.S. should redouble its hostile posture towards Iran to counter its influence, effectively making any future fruitful cooperation unlikely to say the least.  

{mosads}The divergence of these assessments lies in an inherent disagreement over how Iran’s power structure and factional politics are perceived; it is a question who are truly in power and what do they seek to achieve. Most of these assessment regards President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif as moderates fending off opposition towards engagement from the “deep state“. The deep state being a term used in such literature referring to Iran’s Supreme Leader as well as certain power centers under his direct auspices.

The most ardent critics of Iran, mostly from neoconservative and pro-Israel circles, generally see Iran as a personalistic dictatorship effectively controlled by the Supreme Leader or a small group of clerics (any analysis referring to Iranian leadership as “the Mullahs” likely involves this narratives). They claim that moderates like Rouhani and Zairf who championed much of the diplomatic efforts are either dishonest agents trotted out by scheming forces in order to charm a few concession from Western powers before they reveal their true selves, or pitiful pones who will be flicked away by as soon as they are no longer useful.

To many that supported the JCPOA but nonetheless shun further cooperation, the nuclear deal was a one-off transaction that must be enforced aggressively, even confrontationally, and there is no reason to expect more positive outcomes on other issues. The Iranian simply want their sanctions relief they say, and so the diplomacy so far is not a harbinger of things to come. In the meanwhile both groups argue, the U.S. should align itself ever more closely to aggressively anti-Iranian Arab states.

But what has transpired in the last few weeks, the release of the sailors, the prisoner swap and the JCPOA reaching implementation, should challenge such interpretations of Iranian partisanship on foreign policy and the intransigence of the “deep state”.

What is particularly remarkable about these episodes is that they touch almost every organ of the State. Communication between Secretary Kerry and Minister Zarif may have been critical but it was Iran’s military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), which responds directly to the Supreme Leadership, that promptly acknowledged America’s explanation and agreed to relinquish the sailors — and even their vessels. Iranian intelligence is said to be primarily responsible for negotiating the prisoner swap and the judiciary ordered the release of the 4 US citizens in deference to the Supreme National Security Council. Of course the Supreme Leader oversees all of the aforementioned and the ability of Rouhani and Zarif to influence both events and other centers of power in Iran demonstrates influence beyond what many has ascribed to them.

The level of comfort and cohesion with which these power centers worked through these complication encounters with an American power they have long seen as an unwelcome presence in the region was itself interesting. Political uproar and hostile dissent is hardly unheard of in the Iranian political system, particularly on Iranian ties with the West. The Iranian Parliament held a series of special hearings while considering the JCPOA that regularly featured tense and sometime antagonistic exchanges between disinclined parliamentarians and the nuclear negotiating team. At the end, however, the opponents were in the minority and the JCPOA was sustained by a relatively comfortable margin.

Some claimed that certain aspects of these encounters, like the picture and videos of sailors, show how Iran is untrustworthy. But while these cases caused American officials aggravation and some unnecessary suspense, neither had a tangible effect on US goals or stated interests.

What does have a long-lasting tangible effect is the progress that has been made. Iran shipping out its enriched fuel, shelving two thirds of its centrifuges, removing the core of the Arak facility and filling it with concrete, releasing the 4 US citizens in the swap and the sailors in less than a day.

This is not to say political currents inside the country do strongly disagree on a variety of policy positions, including foreign policy and approach towards the West. But after the events in the last few weeks, one must consider if the Iranian State, and not just Rouhani and Zarif, are more inclined towards working with Western countries, including the U.S., to deal with the litany of problems that currently face both their bilateral relationship and the series of intractable conflicts that define the Middle East today.

U.S. and Iranian cooperation may be transactional in nature and conducted in the cloud of a deep mistrust that still exists on both sides. But as prospects of Iran-U.S. cooperation expands to peaceably settling the many conflicts in the region today, it is worth considering that countries can have a productive relationship based on converging interests and open communication even if they don’t share values or alliances.

Ahmadi is a New York-based writer and analyst focused on U.S. policy towards Iran and Middle East geopolitics.