U.S. support of Palestinian security forces and the politics of succession

Since the Quartet’s Roadmap for peace was introduced in 2002, the United States, European Union, and other players have devoted substantial resources to building a professional Palestinian security sector. The approach envisaged in the Roadmap focused on enhancing the Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) through providing training and equipment, as well creating a professional nonpoliticized structure under which these forces would operate. Over time, and with crucial U.S. support, the PSF has become capable of professionally performing its security functions in the West Bank. Efforts to politically insulate the PSF, however, have not fared as well.

With Palestinian leadership succession looming and no clear mechanism available to ensure a smooth transition, the combination of politics and PSF potency threatens to undo a decade-plus in international investment. If international donors do not engage Palestinian leaders to remove the ambiguities surrounding succession, the PSF might become embroiled in transition politics either because of the messy structure of the succession process or by some security chiefs’ opportunism.

{mosads}Building a Professional Force

The Quartet Roadmap proposed security reforms, later incorporated into Palestinian Basic Law, were designed to increase the PSF’s capacity and professionalism. This mission was entrusted to the Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC), headed by a three-star U.S. general officer. The USSC has thus led the decade-plus effort to train and equip Palestinian forces to maintain law and order in the Palestinian territories and prevent terrorist attacks against Israel. The PSF has received training worth over $400 million from the United States, with an additional $35 million requested for 2017. Over the years, the force has, with increasing effectiveness, interdicted terrorist plots emanating from the West Bank and improved its policing ability. Israeli security officials’ willingness to consider ceding Area A operations to Palestinian forces attests to PSF performance.

International attempts to depoliticize the PSF have been less successful. Though the Roadmap initially shifted control of the PSF to an “empowered interior minister” under a technocratic prime minister, President Mahmoud Abbas gradually redirected control of the forces to his remit. The Palestinian Authority remains without a designated interior minister, as PSF commanders report directly to Abbas. This erosion in security reforms may have been averted had U.S. and international officials countered with more high-level pressure.

PSF and Succession

Succession looms for all Palestinian political actors. Abbas has reached age eighty without any clear successor in place and without a legitimate process for selecting one. In recent months, Abbas has continued to accumulate power and centralize PA institutions under his control, exactly the opposite of what would be needed to empower potential successors. Without a clear succession process, Abbas’s departure could cause prolonged political infighting that would cripple PA governance or else actual clashes between factions that would undermine West Bank stability.

The PSF will play a crucial role in any succession process. As one of the few functioning PA institutions, and possessed of weapons, it will have the opportunity to either stabilize or destabilize proceedings. With the emergence of a clear transition plan and commitment to remaining apolitical, the PSF could oversee the handover of power to Abbas’s replacement(s). Even with such a clear plan, some PSF heads may make a bid for power, but a structure would empower international actors and the Palestinian political system to more easily restrain such personal ambition.

Yet because no plan exists to date, PSF leaders will be stuck with bad choices once a transition begins. Whereas apolitical PSF leaders may remain in the barracks, what happens if demonstrations backing one candidate are interrupted by the thugs of another? What if candidates’ competing militias clash? The PSF would struggle to respond cohesively to such events.

Indeed, the PSF could restore law and order without choosing sides, but it would be acting under its own authority, given the sudden absence of a legitimate PA government. The forces could claim to be acting on the people’s behalf, but that justification would be inherently political. In such a scenario, the PSF would be on a slippery slope toward a coup or junta that controlled the West Bank, presumably until civilian rule could be restored. Without a succession plan or PA leadership to delimit the political sphere, any PSF action would take on political meaning.

A leadership vacuum may tempt PSF leaders regardless. Sensing a wide-open field to succeed Abbas, some may throw their hats—and security units—into the ring as lone candidates or in support of others. As suggested already, this could spur open, and eventually violent, competition between different security services. In either case, the international community’s decade-long effort to build an apolitical security force will have failed.

Full Quartet Press

U.S. policymakers can engage Abbas to avert the darker potential scenarios described here by laying the groundwork for succession now. Crafting a legitimate process will give the PSF a clear role to play and avoid presenting its leaders with impossible choices. Reviving Palestinian political life in a way that would allow presidential aspirants to start emerging would clarify the post-Abbas situation and prevent jockeying that could spiral out of control. Such measures could also define the political realm and delegate political power after Abbas. Additionally, the international community should pressure Abbas to depoliticize the PSF by appointing and empowering an interior minister to supervise forces. A clear sense of what is political is a prerequisite for ensuring that the PSF behaves apolitically.

High-level attention from Washington, in coordination with the other Middle East Quartet members and regional actors, will be needed to push Abbas to take these steps. Though U.S. representatives in Israel and the territories can engage counterparts on issues relating to PSF professionalism, moving Abbas to both clarify succession and return the PSF to nonpolitical control will require higher-level engagement. Such steps reflect U.S. interests. The United States has devoted a series of three-star officers and millions of dollars to training the PSF for over a decade, with remarkable success. This success can be consolidated, rather than forfeited, by helping the Palestinians build a process to choose their next leader and by clearly delineating the realm of security from that of politics.

Ghaith al-Omari is a Senior Fellow in the Irwin Levy Family Program on the U.S.-Israel Strategic Relationship at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Mitchel Hochberg is a Research Associate at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.