Defense Department lacks technical expertise in nuclear weapons

A striking fact about today’s Department of Defense (DOD) is its critical lack of technical expertise in nuclear weapons.  An immense loss has taken place over the last 25 years.

Throughout the Cold War DOD had thousands of military and civilian nuclear weapons professionals.  Leading the organization was the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA).  DNA’s scientists and engineers managed an immense research and development program on the effects of nuclear weapons, using underground nuclear tests, nuclear weapons simulators, high-explosive tests, exo-atmospheric tests, and high-dosage radiobiology research.  DNA’s “SAGE” (Scientific Advisory Group on Effects) – composed of America’s top nuclear weapons experts – helped guide the Agency’s science. 

{mosads}DNA also exercised strong leadership and oversight over Army, Navy, and Air Force nuclear weapons activities.  DNA’s leaders and scientists constantly visited military nuclear weapons units worldwide to discuss the warfighters’ nuclear needs, problems, solutions, and ideas – which DNA would turn into tomorrow’s programs. 

Each military service had had its own nuclear weapons laboratories staffed by professionals h having nuclear doctorates.  As in DNA, many of these specialists had put in a tour as Research Associates at the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) nuclear weapons labs.

DOD maintained highly effective career patterns for these nuclear specialists.  They rotated among DNA; service labs; Army, Navy, and Air Force assignments in nuclear weapons units; NATO; Joint and Unified commands; Secretary of Defense, JCS, and military department staffs. They managed underground nuclear weapons tests; they established hardness and survivability standards for U.S. weapons systems; they investigated vulnerabilities of Soviet systems; they created targeting doctrines for each type of weapon and target; and they developed military strategy and tactics for battlefield use of nuclear weapons.

Almost all of this is now gone.  For a generation America’s political leaders have actively prevented DOD from maintaining the nation’s nuclear weapon readiness.  DNA was disestablished in 1997, and without its leadership, one activity after the other throughout DOD was closed down or greatly reduced. 

Today, DOD does not need this same broad capability; but it certainly needs vastly more technical nuclear expertise than it has!  Nuclear weapons are the most powerful military force in existence, and America expects DOD – as the “warrior class” of the nation – to be at the apex of professionalism in their understanding and use.  We’re a far cry from that now.

Worse, this creates even more serious problems.  DOD today doesn’t have the technical expertise necessary to make wise decisions on vital nuclear issues.  This is untenable!  The Secretary of Defense absolutely must be able to give the President a DOD position — independent from DOE’s – on nuclear weapons issues of great national importance.  Two examples (of many):

New Nuclear Weapons.  Today – a generation after the Cold War – the nuclear threats facing America have changed dramatically.  Yet DOD’s nuclear thinking and planning has been on permanent hold.  Our weapons are over-age and untested.  Our nuclear deterrent will not deter most adversaries.  New nuclear weapons of many types are needed.  But the DOD expertise needed to create advocacy for these decisions and develop the persuasive politico-military rationale essential for sustained support by White House, Congress, and the American people doesn’t exist.

Resumption of Underground Nuclear Testing.  In the near future the nation will reach numerous critical decision points on nuclear test resumption.  These may be triggered by warhead problems; by numerous warhead modifications, by production readiness of replacement warheads, by foreign nuclear tests, by nuclear weapons’ use in a regional conflict; by terrorist WMD use, etc.  DOD’s leaders tend to regard nuclear test resumption as a political issue which is “above their pay grade,” and they’re dead wrong!  Testing does have political overtones; but it has equally important technical, military, and strategic overtones.  History will certainly condemn DOD if it doesn’t provide the President with a strong, reasoned, independent position when test resumption is at issue. But DOD doesn’t have the technical expertise to meet these responsibilities

In sum, although most of the Pentagon’s near-term efforts must be focused primarily on conventional warfare, it cannot ignore its responsibilities for the nation’s nuclear deterrent.  The need is urgent and lead-times are immense.  If we start today it will still take twenty years to make any significant change in the stockpile.  The future is unknowable, but it’s highly likely to involve use of nuclear weapons; and our existing stockpile will be of little use in deterring many of the growing threats.  Our wisest course today is to rebuild our expertise in DOD and DOE by robust programs in R&D, design, testing, and production of advanced nuclear weapons.  

Robert R. Monroe, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), is former director of Defense Nuclear Agency.