Take note of China’s non-Navy maritime forces

Much has been rightfully made of the buildup and modernization of China’s navy— also known as the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN)–with its more than 300 warships, submarines, and patrol craft.

While that’s alarming enough, that’s not all.

{mosads}There are two other elements of China’s soaring sea power that are little covered in the mainstream media, but are increasingly important to China’s push for naval power projection: its coast guard and maritime militia.

Beijing’s employment of these forces is something for Congress to seriously think about as it considers U.S. warship building plans, naval policies and maritime programs in the coming defense budgets.

Here’s why:

China’s coast guard (CCG) is the world’s largest with 205 ships in service. On top of that, it’s being modernized, including the introduction of the world’s largest coast guard cutter: the Haijing class. At some 12,000 displaced tons, the armed Haijing is bigger than our Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.

According to the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China’s maritime militia (CMM) is “a quasimilitary force of fishermen that are tasked by and report to the PLA…They are trained to participate in a variety of [civilian and military support] missions.” While there are no firm figures on the size of the CMM, China may have well more than 100,000 vessels available to support Beijing’s interests.

Plainly put: The CCG and CMM are potential PLAN force multipliers.

For instance, they’re capable of providing a Chinese paramilitary presence far off-shore, conducting a variety of intelligence operations, harassing other vessels (e.g., warships) in China’s perceived national waters, among other possibilities.

These maritime assets are also playing a central role in Beijing’s policy of assertiveness in the South and East China Seas involving territorial disputes with Asian neighbors (e.g., Japan and the Philippines).

Indeed, it could be suggested that the CCG and CMM are key to China’s strategy of pressuring other claimants on sovereignty disagreements while seeking to avoid military-looking provocations that could lead to crisis or open conflict.

Since these “white hulls” and commercial vessels aren’t military per se, their employment also seems to be an artful attempt by Beijing to shape perceptions about China—which is an increasing problem for a Chinese leadership not anxious for neighbors and others to “bandwagon” against it.

In wartime, due to their sheer numbers, the CCG and CMM have the potential to seriously confuse an adversary’s situational awareness and battlespace management by “flooding the zone” with vessels, complicating the prosecution of any fight at sea. 

Of course, this also begs the question raised by experts about the rules of engagement for U.S. forces in dealing with these quasi-/paramilitary forces at sea in both peacetime and war, especially the “civilian” CMM.

The issue of the CCG and CMM raises a significant number of other ponderables, too, including our readiness to address the challenges presented by these Chinese maritime forces, especially as Beijing expresses—and more importantly, exercises–discontent over matters of sovereignty in the Western Pacific.

While the quality of U.S. naval forces is currently superior to those of the Chinese, the PLAN’s expected build-up of a blue water navy to assert Beijing’s perceived interests on the high seas seems far from over.

This is important to take note of as the U.S. navy struggles to meet a 70 warship shortfall, according to The Heritage Foundation’s 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength.

It’s also critical to remember that though quality is an incredibly important asset in battle, there’s also a certain quality in quantity–which is something that we need to think about when we look broadly at China’s naval forces, policies and strategy.   

Dr. Peter Brookes is a Heritage Foundation senior fellow, member of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense.