Tying our hands in the struggle against violent extremism

On an introductory visit between leaders in 2012, Admiral William McRaven, then Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and Rajiv Shah, then Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) agreed that preventing the further march of violent extremists was a chief responsibility of both organizations.  I was there as a senior Administration official working at USAID.
 
The leaders agreed that an opportunity for prevention existed in the Sahel region in Africa.  They asked their respective staffs to focus on this national security effort.
 
{mosads}For a year and a half, USAID and USSOCOM, joined by U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), the Department of State and six other departments of the U.S. government, conducted a deep assessment of conflict drivers and resilience factors in the Sahel.  Followed by gaming that tested the findings of the analysis, the “whole of government” team settled on Niger for further collaboration.  Niger, “a violent extremism sandwich” was being pressed by the incursion of violent extremists across its borders.  What could be done to advance development and security to build resilience among the Nigeriens to prevent the spread of violent extremism?
 
To answer that, USAFRICOM and USAID staff collaborated at headquarters and in Niger.  They formulated a plan to align activities, in consultation with affected communities  The interventions proposed by USAID were less than $10M.  As in the past, USAID had no appropriated funds to execute their component of the effort.  Time was of the essence.  As events unfolded across the Sahel, USAFRICOM sought ways to transfer funds from a variety of appropriations relevant to USAID and DoD shared space.
                                                                                                 
As has been all too common, here is where the story ends.  For a variety of reasons, the Department of Defense was forced to nix the whole of government approach because the funds lacked any “transfer authority” that would have enabled USAID to carry out the part of the plan that U.S.AFRICOM, with the tacit support of the Commander of USAFRICOM, General David Rodriquez, deemed critical.  The U.S. Government agencies involved did everything the Congress and the American people demand from their government.  They assessed, planned and worked together to advance security and prevent expansion of violent extremism.  They sought to leverage, responsibly, tax payer money through complementary efforts. But they were not authorized, ultimately by Congress, to execute this textbook interagency prevention effort.
 
Only the U.S. Congress can fix this problem – and we need a fix now. In a time of deepening crises globally,  when agility and flexibility and teamwork should be the hallmarks of our approach, the Defense Department is still unable to transfer funds to other federal agencies in order to implement vital national security programs.  Even relatively tiny USAID has, ironically, transferred funds to the Department of Defense to the tune of $15M for health programs to both USAFRICOM and US Pacific Command.  The key is to allow any federal department or agency with the resources to transfer those funds to the department or agency with the relevant expertise required for specific interventions.  Our Combatant Commanders need real-time authorities enabling them to partner strategically with other government agencies better placed than DoD for certain programming, but without supporting appropriations, to execute the right programs at the right time in the right place. Why are we deliberately tying our hands?

Cole, is a Special Advisor on Violent Extremism, Conflict and Fragility at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP).  The views expressed here are her own and do not represent the views of the U.S. Institute of Peace.