Measures Needed to Prevent Weapons From Falling Into Terrorist Hands (Rep. Ed Royce)

Our enemies conspire to hurt us in many ways.  We know that hostile governments, including Iran, and terrorist organizations are determined to acquire U.S. military technology.  As at least one witness will testify, frustrating their attempts is an urgent matter.

I have studied the A.Q. Khan network over the last two years.  We have heard about its sophisticated attack on export controls worldwide, using front companies, false documentation and diversion.  We can be sure that others are using similar means in seeking technology, including American technology, to harm us.  This makes it critical that we have in place an effective export control system.

Unfortunately, we’re not at that point.  The GAO has reported poor coordination between the Departments of State and Commerce as they control the export of military technology and dual use items.  There are persistent and problematic disputes over which export control lists particular items belong on.  End use monitoring is weak in many cases, including in China.  One expert has said that “the safety net is full of holes.”  Indeed, as we’ll hear, the GAO has designated the effective protection of technology critical to national security as cause of immediate concern.  So I commend the Chairman for calling this hearing.

An effective export control system –while denying technology to those hostile– facilitates the export of technology that poses little threat.  Our national defense relies upon our technological edge.  Maintaining that edge in the face of increasing global competition requires vibrant manufacturers, which requires robust exports and cooperation with foreign governments and companies, which is also important to our joint military operations.

At the State Department, the number of export license cases are up, many of which are increasingly complex.  So while we may need to commit added resources to administering our export controls, we have been upping these resources, filling more licensing positions.  It would be more helpful to the system, and reduce processing times, which have reached an unacceptable number of days, if key reforms were made.  Resolving disputes over lists would be a start.  We don’t want to drive American manufacturers off-shore because of inefficient bureaucracy.

The A.Q. Khan case also highlighted the fact that many other key exporters of military use technology have weak and shoddily enforced export controls.  While some progress has been made internationally, the system is only as strong as the weakest country.  In this day of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation, it’s critical that we work with others to bolster their controls of dangerous technology to minimize the chances of it falling into the wrong hands.  This is a long-term project, which we should lead.