Almost a year in: Is the president’s National Counterterrorism Strategy working?

In October 2018, President Trump issued a new National Strategy for Counterterrorism. The plan appeared to be functional, pragmatic, and achievable. Since the Strategy’s release, complementary national security strategies have been released such as the National Intelligence Strategy and the National Cybersecurity Strategy. To the credit of the administration, counterterrorism (CT) policy has been functionally integrated into these doctrines.

The president and national security advisor have indeed prioritized CT by: focusing on protecting American interests at home and abroad; building some coalitions where and when appropriate; respecting CT-related rule of law; and, importantly, partnering with American industry to safeguard critical infrastructure. The Strategy’s hallmark statement, “America First does not mean America alone,” remains an important tenet of the plan.

However, threats of terrorism have become materially more complex and volatile, less defined and more dangerous since the Strategy was promulgated. The environment is pivoting and the devastating March attack in Christchurch and the April Easter attacks in Sri Lanka – in addition to an emergence of enterprising domestic terrorism, still yet to be fully grasped – have created a new paradigm.

This paradigm proves that terrorists of varying demographics – either inspired or loosely directed and persuaded – can plan and execute substantial violence with little to no material support from a central source. New iterations of ISIS and al Qaeda, in addition to previous, conventional state-sponsored terrorists, now rely on this modus operandi, making prevention challenging for global security services.

So, what is needed now for success? I’ll address three enabling objectives building from central imperatives of the Strategy, noted in italics.

First, we stick with the Strategy, but we move more nimbly and innovatively. Its key policies of prioritization and resourcing; isolating terrorists from financial, material and logistical sources of support; modernizing and integrating a broader set of tools and authorities; strengthening the CT abilities of international partners; countering terrorist radicalization and recruitment; and pursuing terrorist threats to their source—represent the “toolbox” of American CT power. 

This toolbox, containing instruments of strategic intellect, diplomacy and levers of military and law enforcement capabilities, represent our country’s CT umbrella and include everything needed to counter what we are seeing today and tomorrow.

Notably however, our exceptional career, government CT professionals must be given broader authority to use these tools. The National Security Council – specifically, CT-dedicated leadership who know the landscape the best – must continue to lead in this space and advance strategic implementation plans. It is critical that these policy experts be empowered to determine prioritization, access substantive resources, and direct all agencies to execute. Focusing, streamlining and reducing bureaucracy will lead to success.

Second, to achieve abilities to modernize and integrate a broader set of CT tools and resources, Congress must appropriate significant funding to attract and retain talent in a completely unconventional manner. A business-oriented compensation model, above federal pay caps, should be implemented to source and capture the brightest Americans willing to join the fight; many of whom will bring innovative strategies to bear. Large technology companies moving into Washington pose a tangible risk to the national security human resources pool. The government needs to be competitive.

Third, judicial sentencing guideline reform prohibiting or extending the release of terrorists convicted of attacking or attempting to attack American interests should strongly be considered. How do we counter terrorist recruitment otherwise? How do we prevent the erosion of deterrence? The release of “Detainee #1,” John Lindh Walker, emboldened terrorists who absolutely play the long-game. It sent a strong signal that the risk of killing is manageable, even if captured along the way.

These objectives fall under the umbrella of the 2018 Strategy, but via alternative forms of action. A whole of government approach is key. Politics cannot be part of the equation, and neither can unilateral CT or foreign policy decisions, made in a vacuum. Our entire government must rally together around the President’s Strategy and take bold new steps to realize its success.

Cameron Burks is a Visiting Fellow at Georgia Mason University’s National Security Institute and the Head of Global Security, Crisis Management and Health & Safety at Adobe.