The tricky task of defeating ISIS
On Nov. 13, with Paris hemorrhaging, the world discovered that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is now capable of striking hard at the great capitals of the Western world. In response, European Council President Donald Tusk urged the U.S. to cooperate with Russia to defeat ISIS.
{mosads}Given that the Obama administration rushed into multilateral military action in Libya that destabilized the region and allowed Islamic militia and terrorist groups — including ISIS — to capture entire provinces in North Africa and the Middle East, and given that U.S.-Iranian rapprochement died with the nuclear deal and made Russian President Vladimir Putin “king,” it would behoove the U.S. not to run blindly into the Middle East once again. Instead, we must open our eyes to three important realities on the ground.
First, Russia is now locked into an anti-American military alliance with Iran, Hezbollah and the Syrian regime and their Shiite supporters in a regional Sunni-Shiite war. The U.S. must exploit the vulnerability this creates, rather than empower this alliance.
In the wake of the Iran deal, Putin airlifted military supplies, equipment and specialists to Syria to prop up Syrian President Bashar Assad, Iran’s close ally. Russia thus solidified its military alliance with Iran and positioned itself to become one of the greatest beneficiaries of the billions of dollars in sanction relief that will flood into Iran as a result of the nuclear deal.
On Sept. 30, Putin, while spewing harsh words toward ISIS, instead launched airstrikes against Syrian rebels, including those backed by the United States. President Obama, in what was perceived by some as a cowardly response, backed down from the confrontation, mumbling only something about how Russia would get bogged down in the Syrian “quagmire.”
And yet, Russia’s military commitment to Assad and his Hezbollah and Iranian supporters has indeed created vulnerabilities.
Throughout much of 2015, the Syrian army, Hezbollah militias and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have been losing ground to both Syrian rebels and ISIS (both Sunni). Hezbollah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah’s near-hysterical speeches from his underground bunker in March called all Lebanese Shiite who refused to join Hezbollah traitors. In July, in fact, Hezbollah arrested 175 men for refusing to fight. With Russian support in October, Nasrallah triumphantly emerged from his underground shelter to accuse America of funding ISIS. A week later, ISIS downed a Russian airliner, and just last week, set off bombs that claimed 43 lives in southern Beirut.
Even with Russian airstrikes, Hezbollah and the IRGC continue to suffer heavy losses in Syria, now amounting to over 1,500 fighters and many high-ranking commanders.
If indeed Russia and her allies are getting stuck in a swamp, Obama would do well to heed his own words and let them sink.
Second, ISIS now controls territories in many regions outside Syria and Iraq. The U.S. must support pro-Western partners to defeat ISIS.
U.S. foreign policy in recent years has, unintentionally, destabilized the region. The Obama administration politically and militarily supported the removal of autocratic, but strong and, in some cases, pro-Western leaders during the 2011 unrest in North Africa and the Middle East. Radical Islamic militia and terrorists groups exploited the power vacuum to gain political footholds and even assume control of territorial provinces.
ISIS now has affiliate groups across Africa, Europe and Asia — in Tunisia, Algeria, Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, Bosnia, Chechnya, Dagestan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Gaza and Yemen. The number of people killed in terrorist attacks has skyrocketed, increasing more than threefold between 2011 and 2014.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has been very slow to support pro-Western regimes fighting ISIS, particularly the Kurdish regime, the only force this is effectively battling ISIS, and Egypt, which is significantly less effective.
In Egypt, ISIS dominates the Sinai, launching bloody attacks on Egyptian soldiers and civilians. Yet, until recently, Egypt was not receiving U.S. military aid. Why? Because the Obama administration had opposed the Egyptian army’s removal of the democratically elected, but anti-Western, Muslim Brotherhood from power.
So, in order to defeat ISIS, the U.S. needs to develop the not-so-highly specialized skill of differentiating between pro-Western and anti-Western groups.
The third and final reality is that, for Syria, there is no easy solution. ISIS is not the only radical Islamic group on the ground. ISIS is not the only threat.
Al Qaeda-affiliated and other Islamist rebels in Syria hold territory, as well. There is no strong, secular political force to govern the Sunni areas now held by these groups. Hence, an internationally negotiated settlement between Assad and the rebels that calls for elections within the territory that was once Syria will only perpetuate instability and the Sunni-Shiite regional war.
What would happen if all parties agreed to an election in six months to replace Assad? The Russians and Iranians would support Assad’s forces and work to secure their advantage, while Turkey and Qatar would continue to support the al Qaeda affiliates and other Sunni Islamists‚ both before, during and after an election.
There is no “quick fix” solution that will reunite Syria; no easy politically correct way out for the Europeans.
Rather, a long-term, peaceful solution may need to allow for the breaking up of Syria and Iraq into independent provinces. Such a solution would likely also need to involve the development of stable political institutions in war-torn areas, a difficult task indeed.
And such a task would first require that the U.S. recognizes that there are radical Islamic groups that seek to conquer and destabilize, and moderate pro-Western regimes that have long been deprived of the support they deserve.
Friedman is an American-Israeli writer and editor in the fields of political science, history, and information technology.
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