How Tillerson can put State back at the forefront of US foreign policy

Recent commentary has lamented the State Department’s apparent relegation to last seat on the team bench in the conduct of foreign policy, with some particular criticisms for the way Secretary Rex Tillerson is approaching his dealings with the press. The release March 15 of the Trump budget proposal for fiscal 2018, which includes a 28 percent cut for State and foreign assistance programs, underlines this de-emphasis of State’s role in formulating U.S. foreign policy. Tillerson will have to fix the personnel system at State to re-build the department as the central structure in the U.S. foreign policy architecture.

The sharp reduction for State in the budget request was not unexpected — the White House had virtually telegraphed that information over the past months. Also noteworthy was the deliberate leaking of a dissent channel to shame the president regarding his Jan. 27 executive order suspending entry from nationals of seven mainly Muslim countries, confirming the views of senior White House staff that staff at State are disloyal and will seek to sabotage the agenda of the president. Undoing that perception will require strenuous effort over time by State’s more prudent career personnel.

{mosads}For the near term, the White House will keep State on the sidelines, forcing Tillerson to demand much of the small number of those judged reliable in supporting the Trump administration’s foreign policy actions.

In parallel, the press laments its limited access to Tillerson and staff. But the secretary seems focused on conducting foreign policy out of the public eye — this is a good strategy. Restoration of relations with Cuba took place successfully because they were conducted secretly with few senior State officials aware of the negotiations. This lesson on the utility of withholding information about confidential negotiations even from senior State officials may not have been lost on Tillerson.

The Problem

For Tillerson to succeed at putting State back at the center of U.S. foreign policy, several personnel matters must be addressed. Retired Ambassador James Jeffrey argued in a March 3 Foreign Policy essay that “bad habits and stale thinking have subordinated Foggy bottom to the Pentagon and NSC.” He listed seven suggestions to help Tillerson put State back where it belongs: at the center of U.S. foreign policy. Of these, three were personnel issues:

1. putting personnel, or at least Foreign Service personnel, “under a system similar to the CIA’s to ensure that recruitment, assignment, and promotion are responsive to policy needs”;
2. reducing the number of State political advisers (POLADs) attached to U.S. military commands, but increase the quality of those POLADs; and 
3. reworking State training to emphasize diplomatic tradecraft and national security.

I will address these three points in reverse order.

Training: With budget cuts looming, refocusing expenditures for training on core skills — language, cultural studies and diplomatic tradecraft — instead of training that cannot show a direct link to “advancing U.S. interests and keeping America and partners safe” becomes not only wise but unavoidably necessary. State will have to re-examine all its current training programs and prioritize those core skill sets. This will be painful, but unless State personnel are perceived by their interagency colleagues as the “go-to” guys and gals on foreign policy matters, it will be hard for State to regain its status as the premier foreign affairs agency.

Political advisers: Reducing the number of POLADs while increasing the quality of Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) assigned to those positions requires two key actions.

First is to convince Defense/Joint Staff that the function now performed by POLADs can be fulfilled in many cases by Embassy diplomats working cooperatively with the senior defense officer in country. Combatant commanders should still have a Senior Foreign Service Officer as a POLAD, ideally one between ambassadorial appointments, but many lower level commanders would not only be able to make do with an Embassy officer, they would do better in such an arrangement.

The second key action is to reward those who serve successfully as a POLAD with substantive onward assignments. State’s best career diplomats seek demanding assignments with substance and that have real impact; they soon exit if “punished” for a job well done with a less substantive position.

Recruiting, assigning and promoting: I am not familiar with the CIA’s personnel system that Jeffrey holds up as a model for recruitment, assignments and promotions that responds to policy needs. That said, some suggestions on the three aspects he mentions follow.

Recruitment: For several decades, group identity has been a major driver of State’s efforts to recruit, select and hire the “best and brightest.” Recruitment programs that focused on making State, especially the Foreign Service, more representative of the diversity of our country made sense in the past, but it now must shift focus to recruiting personnel for “advancing U.S. interests and keeping America and partners safe.” This effort in no way implies ending programs and policies to ensure State hires a diverse work force, for the best talent of America is present in all the groups that make up the mosaic of America. But a shift in focus is needed to ensure the department recruits those committed to the core mission of State.

Assignment: While listed as generalists, FSOs also must become a particular subject matter or regional expert to be of greatest value to the department and engage with interagency colleagues. Limited budgets could be used more efficiently if officers’ training emphasized a specific region or in-depth knowledge of a discrete subject matter, such as nuclear proliferation or terrorism. Of course, the rare out-of-area and out-of-State assignments to broaden analytical abilities would be valuable, but regular postings to a particular region or in a particular subject matter would give FSOs the depth of knowledge to make them of most use to the State mission. 

Promotion: Tillerson’s emphasis on accountability, a concept he mentioned four times in his Feb. 2 speech upon his arrival at the department, dovetails nicely with the need to implement reforms to State performance evaluation and promotion system. Intended to ensure the most talented officers are placed in positions of increasing responsibility, complaints abound that promotion depends overly much on sponsorship by a senior official instead of measureable performance.  

The Way Forward

Secretary Tillerson must assert himself at State as he did at Exxon and seize the opportunity to replace the department at the center of U.S. foreign policy. With the March 13 issuance of the Executive Order on a Comprehensive Plan for Reorganizing the Executive Branch, President Trump has provided the impetus for Tillerson to reform the personnel structure and way of doing business at State needed to place it back where it belongs — at the center of U.S. foreign policy.

Ed Stafford is a retired Foreign Service officer who focused his career on Political-Military Affairs at the State Department and in overseas assignments, and most recently taught Civilian-Military relations at the Inter-American Defense College.

The views of contributors are their own and are not the views of The Hill.