For both the US and Qatar, strong allies are better than no allies

The way that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Yemen cut ties with Qatar last week was surprising in both severity and scope. But for those who have been following the delicate relations among Persian Gulf countries, especially in the wake of the Arab Spring, the writing was on the wall.

The tension between the moderate (Sunni) axis and the Qatari “bad boy” is not news. Qatar’s activist policies, global ambitions, and huge income have turned the tiny country into a regional influence, and it does not shy away from involvement in any conflict in the Middle East.

For years, the young Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani has enjoyed provoking moderate Arab states led by older, mature rulers. Qatar is having a passionate affair with Iran, which is intensifying the Shiite foothold on the other side of the Persian Gulf. It also supports global jihadi organizations (mainly Al-Qaeda and its affiliates), the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and the ISIS branch in Sinai. Qatar also assists the Muslim Brotherhood, the nemesis of the Egyptian regime, and until recently allowed Hamas leadership, including its military wing, to take refuge in its capital, Doha. And a special Al-Jazeera media account for Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which was initiated and funded by Qatar, challenged the traditional regimes and served as a major catalyst in the events that led to the outbreak of the Arab Spring.

{mosads}In addition, Qatar is involved in the internal conflict between the Palestinian Authority’s leadership and Hamas – to Egypt’s dismay, which see itself as the eternal mediator – and in the Libyan civil war. Qataris have also invested large sums in East Asia, Europe, and the United States.

It was only a matter of time before relations between Qatar and the moderate Arab states disintegrated. In 2014, the Saudis, the Emirates, and the Bahrainis temporarily recalled their ambassadors from Doha to protest Qatar’s involvement in local affairs. Egypt has been in dispute with Qatar for more than 20 years, and for the past six months they have not maintained diplomatic ties.

The determining factor was the election of a new American president. Donald Trump’s simplistic division of “good” and “bad” in the Middle East perfectly suits Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In their view, President Trump understands the array of forces in the Middle East well: The “good” are all those who fight against the various types of radical Islam (i.e., Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan), and the “bad” are those who support it (i.e., Iran, ISIS, Damascus, Hezbollah).

Moreover, President Trump is not interested in “trivialities” such as democratization, executions, or women’s rights, which frequently led to clashes with the Obama administration. Saudi Arabia and Egypt now recognize Washington as a staunch ally in their regional confrontations and are willing to set aside previous disputes over Trump’s harsh positions on Muslims.

It is hard to believe that such a dramatic move, which took place just two weeks after Trump’s visit to the region, was not coordinated with the Americans. True, the United States has its interests in Qatar, but Trump seems to be willing to go out on a limb, believing that the crisis will end positively for Saudi Arabia and Egypt (and therefore the United States).

Like others, Trump believes that the crisis will not send Qatar into the warm but poor Iranian fold. Instead, the parties will find a compromise within days or weeks: Qatar will significantly reduce its support for the regional radical elements, cool its relations with Iran, moderate the tone of Al-Jazeera’s criticism of Saudi Arabia, banish the Muslim Brotherhood, and continue to align with the Saudi camp in OPEC. Qatar has no choice – the withdrawal has heavy implications for its economy, which is already suffering a slowdown due to falling oil and gas prices. The situation could also undermine Sheikh Al Thani’s stability, which would be a nightmare for the Qataris.

The ones who lose the most are the organizations affiliated with political Islam, spearheaded by Hamas. Since political Islam’s moment of weakness in 2012-13, Hamas only continues to deteriorate; the rift between its advocates and the moderate Sunni world is deep and indestructible. Hamas’s only remaining evident source of support in the Middle East is Erdogan’s Turkey. Such support is likely to become a significant point of friction between Ankara and Washington.

With all that has been said about President Trump, it should be noted that the current administration has quickly comprehended something that Obama could not internalize for eight years: A limited Arab-American alliance with a defined set of states and actors based on clear guidelines and consistent U.S. backing is preferable to attempts at containing and cooperating with all actors in the region. In the Middle East, this is almost a natural law: a policy of “zero problems” essentially translates to “zero friends.”

Shay Hershkovitz, Ph.D., is chief strategy officer at Wikistrat, Inc. and a political science professor at Tel Aviv University specializing in intelligence studies. He is also a former IDF intelligence officer whose book, “Aman Comes To Light,” deals with the history of the Israeli intelligence community.

The views expressed by contributors are their own and are not the views of The Hill.