Why Putin finds himself in a much stronger position than the West believes

As Alexei Navalny, the undisputed leader of the Russian opposition, died in an Arctic prison facility Friday, most of the commentators argued that Vladimir Putin’s regime had lost the last remnants of its credibility. Dozens of Western leaders assigned full responsibility for his passing on the Kremlin while President Biden said he “is looking at a whole number of options” in response to this brutal human rights violation in Russia.

These reactions might please many of democracy activists in and around Russia, but I think the time has come to ask oneself why Russia rejected a democratic system in favor of Putin’s lifelong presidency? Unlike many dictators, Putin hasn’t introduced one-party rule or banned the elections, and while there are more people in Russia disagreeing with his policies that the Kremlin insists, just dozens went out to lay flowers in memory of the Kremlin’s most dedicated opponent.

I had predicted Vladimir Putin would rule Russia until the end of his days back in 2013, and I still believe in my forecast. Putin’s strength, to my mind, stems not only from his authoritarianism and terror against the dissenters (the latter started just in early 2020s), but from a combination of historic background and traditions, on the one hand, and of sophisticated policies pursued by the ruling elites, on the other. 

First, it should be noted that Russia’s history has been built around the thirst for territorial expansion and imperial aspirations since Muscovy established itself as an empire well before it had turned into Russia in its contemporary sense. Moreover, the nation has been fueled for centuries by a feeling of its uniqueness — religious, cultural, ideological and military — which has merged with the country’s identity.  From the establishment of modern Russia in the 16th century, it was economically based on the use of its vast natural resources, so the central government’s right to redistribute the nation’s wealth has never been questioned. All this makes the strong centralized political system quite natural for Russia.

Second, Putin’s team have done a brilliant job since he arose as the national leader in 1999 because they orchestrated a very gradual change in the social system, exchanging the economic freedom for political expression. The system, simultaneously proclaiming respect for laws and rules but presupposing massive exclusions and combining business with public service, seemed very common to the Russians so they got accustomed to them quite quickly. And, finally, Putin and his team talked with their people in a much more plain and transparent way than the liberal opposition did.

Moreover, the Kremlin has masterfully used the statist propaganda, which was welcomed by the Russian people. In 2010 I argued that Russia of the 2000s is nothing like the Soviet Union of the 1970s — the new emerging authoritarian order has been built without both the Soviet ban on information and the Soviet sealed borders. To build a largely authoritarian system where people are personally free was an incredible achievement for the Kremlin leadership. I would add that Putin had spent around 10 years, starting by his annexation of Crimea, changing Russians’ priorities: The so-called “Crimean consensus” put geopolitical concerns above economic ones in people’s minds and lay the groundwork for Russia to be able to survive a decade-long economic slowdown without visible political discontent and preparing it to encounter massive outside pressure stemming from President Putin’s Ukrainian adventure. 

The strength of Putin’s regime is based on three pillars. First, he resonates with Russians’ imperial aspirations and their feelings of their country’s uniqueness. Second, he succeeded in building a system beneficial for Russians — not only bureaucrats and silovikis, but state employees of all ranks, entrepreneurs, wealthy city dwellers and even retirees — who are interested in its stability. Third, through pulling his country into war, he transformed all those critical of him into Ukraine’s supporters (the emigrant opposition claims now that Ukraine’s victory means Russia’s freedom) and, therefore, into traitors. All this makes his regime stronger today than it was 10 years ago — and the Western policymakers shouldn’t ignore this fact.

The last point I want to make concerns Putin’s inner circle. For years I believed that such a personalistic regime cannot survive its founder’s death. Today, as during the war almost nobody of the ruling elite has deserted it, I’m not so sure of such a perspective. Putin’s inner circle realizes well that the advantages caused by its position outweigh any discontent that might arise from personal animosities. To the contrary, the anti-Putin forces are now fighting each other more fiercely than they are taking on the Kremlin because they have nothing to defend.

No one knows whether Putin’s fifth term will be his last one. But it might be that after Putin the West encounters another Putin, even his name might be different, and not someone similar to Alexei Navalny.

Vladislav Inozemtsev is special adviser to the Middle East Media Research Institute’s (MEMRI) Russian Media Studies Project and is director of Moscow-based Center for Post-Industrial Studies.