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Putin’s Afghan gambit — what’s behind Russia’s pivot toward Central Asia?

SAINT PETERSBURG, RUSSIA - JUNE 07: (RUSSIA OUT) A participant from Afghanistan attends the plenary session of the 2024 Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, June 7, 2024, in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Vladimir Putin arrived to Saint Petersburg with a three-days trip to attend an annual Economic Forum. (Photo by Contributor/Getty Images)

Is Russian President Vladimir Putin up to something big in Afghanistan? Apparently, yes.

Recent developments indicate that Putin’s policy towards Afghanistan and Central Asia is realigning its strategic pivot. From engaging with the Houthis in Yemen to the Taliban in Afghanistan, Putin is seriously trying to expand Russia’s influence from the Middle East to its own backyard — Central Asia. 

Recent reports suggest that Moscow is moving to toward officially recognizing the Taliban as Afghanistan’s legitimate government, which could shift regional dynamics. Ahead of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum last month — attended by a Taliban delegation — the Russian foreign and justice ministries proposed removing the Taliban from Russia’s list of designated terrorist organizations. The Taliban has been on this list since 2003 for supporting North Caucasus separatists.

Ever since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, Moscow has been constantly engaged with the Taliban to counter ISIS and safeguard its interests, while remaining wary of the group’s inherent ideology and potential threats to regional stability. 

In recent months, Russia has facilitated talks involving the Taliban and other Afghan stakeholders but stopped short of formal recognition. However, this stance seems to be evolving rapidly because of Putin’s strategic interest in the region.

Last September, Taliban representatives held meetings with Russian officials to discuss regional threats and the creation of an inclusive government. Following these talks, Russian officials pledged continued support for Afghanistan, both independently and through the UN’s World Food Program. Similarly, last month, a delegation from the Taliban participated in the “Russia-Islamic World: Kazan Forum,” hosted by Russia in Kazan. This forum was projected by Russia as a platform to enhance economic cooperation with Islamic countries.

When considering recent developments, alongside Moscow’s intention to remove the Taliban from its list of designated terrorist organizations, there remains little doubt about Putin’s new strategic calculations in Central Asia. 

Since the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, no foreign state has recognized its government. This hesitancy largely stems from the Taliban’s ongoing erosion of women’s rights and broader human rights issues. The Taliban is desperately seeking the removal of international sanctions, restoration of Afghanistan’s UN seat and the release of frozen assets to boost the country’s economy.

Both Afghanistan and Russia stand to benefit significantly from the development of the Lapis-Lazuli trade corridor, linking it to Istanbul and Europe, and the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway line. However, these projects hinge on the withdrawal of international sanctions. 

Russia’s potential removal of the Taliban from its terrorism list will be the first crucial step toward the international recognition of the Afghan government. That move could pave the way for broader economic engagement and development, setting a precedent for other nations close to Russia and China. Neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazkhstan are likely to follow Moscow immediately.

Russia would gain immensely from its ties with the Taliban and acquire the role of “patron.” By positioning itself as the region’s security provider, especially in contrast to America’s failure to stabilize Afghanistan, Moscow has rejuvenated its historical and strategic interests in Central Asia.

Russia is deeply concerned about its regional influence, drug trafficking and threats from Islamist terrorism, particularly following the March terrorist attack on Crocus City Hall in Moscow. Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K), a Taliban rival based in Afghanistan, is believed to be responsible. This incident has prompted Moscow to enhance security measures in former Soviet Central Asia, a region that supplies a significant portion of migrant workers crucial to the Russian economy.

Russia aims to bolster its southern defenses and is seeking support from the Taliban against ISIS-K. The rationale behind this strategy is rooted in the perception that the Taliban poses a lesser threat than ISIS-K. Thus, Moscow sees building relations with the Taliban as a pragmatic step to mitigate regional security risks.

To bolster its economic and geopolitical influence, Russia is leveraging alliances like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This alliance strengthens its presence and facilitates cooperation across the region. Russia’s 2023 foreign policy plan even envisions integrating Afghanistan into the broader Eurasian cooperative space. This strategic approach is designed to enhance Russia’s influence and credibility in Central Asia, further solidifying its role as a key regional power. 

So far, the Taliban have proven to be trustworthy allies. They have reportedly honored their promise to curb opium production, resulting in a palpable decrease in narcotics transiting through Russian territory. With Western influence seemingly gone from Afghanistan, opportunities are emerging for the Taliban to align with Russian and Chinese-led political and economic regional entities like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This shift could pave the way for Afghanistan to forge new business ties and strengthen its regional integration, potentially altering the geopolitical landscape in Central Asia.

Beyond security concerns, Moscow is eyeing economic opportunities with the Taliban. There have been loud murmurs in Moscow about using Afghanistan as a transit hub for exporting Russian natural gas to India and other goods to Pakistani ports. This ambitious project requires significant infrastructure development, including a gas pipeline through the mountains and a railroad extension from Mazar-i-Sharif to Pakistan.  

Furthermore, the increasing cooperation between the Taliban and Russia will certainly have significant implications for the ongoing rivalry between Russia and the West. Since the onset of the Ukraine War, Moscow has sought support from other nations to offset the impression of its diplomatic isolation. 

Economically and politically, the Taliban find it essential to cooperate with Moscow. For now, having Moscow as an ally is strategically advantageous, offering critical support and resources. Yet it is too early to predict how this strategic alignment will provide Putin with additional room to maneuver.

Imran Khalid is a geostrategic analyst and freelance writer. He is a physician and has a master’s degree in international relations.