At the Washington summit this July, NATO will reiterate its promise, first made at the 2008 Bucharest summit, to bring in Ukraine. But it will not offer a formal invitation to join or a concrete path to membership. As a consolation, the U.S. has just signed a bilateral security arrangement with Ukraine, which will, however, fall far short of the commitment to collective defense Kyiv desperately seeks.
It is time for NATO to be honest with itself and Kyiv: Membership does not lie in Ukraine’s future. President Joseph Biden has been emphatic: He is not going to start World War III to defend Ukraine. That takes membership off the table as long as Ukraine is fighting Russia. Otherwise, NATO would find itself at war with Russia from the moment it joined, as the president has also vowed to defend “every inch” of NATO territory.
Some Western leaders suggest that Ukraine could join once the war has ended. That is doubtful. Confidence that NATO’s collective defense guarantee would deter Russia from attacking Ukraine is misplaced. Ukraine occupies a unique place in Russians’ political imagination, unlike that of any other country that has joined the alliance since the end of the Cold War. Russian leaders are convinced that their preeminence in Ukraine is essential to their own security.
Russian President Vladimir Putin himself believes that Ukrainians and Russians are one people who should be united in one state.
The likelihood that Russia would test NATO’s commitment to Ukraine would undoubtedly suffice to persuade at least one ally to break the consensus needed to admit Ukraine and accept the looming risk of war with Russia.
That ally might turn out to be the U.S. Indeed, given growing resistance among Republicans to further security assistance to Ukraine, any administration would be hard-pressed to muster the constitutionally required two-thirds of the Senate in support of membership.
The qualms about Ukraine’s membership should not be surprising. NATO’s dirty secret is that since the end of the Cold War, it has never admitted a country it thought it might have to defend against Russian aggression. The first two waves of expansion in 1999 and 2004, which brought in all the former members of the Warsaw Pact, the Baltic States and Slovenia occurred when NATO and Russia were focused on building cooperative relations.
Subsequent waves took in Western Balkan states, which were separated from Russia by other NATO members. They might have been vulnerable to Russian interference in their domestic affairs, but not to an armed attack that would have triggered NATO’s commitment to collective defense.
The recent admission of Finland and Sweden may appear to be an exception. But these two Nordic states had strong military forces and long experience of cooperation with NATO. Unlike the other new members, they have actually fortified NATO from the moment they joined. Rather than being called to defend them, NATO is more likely to call on them to help defend other allies.
If NATO membership is a bridge too far, what should Ukraine do? Sweden offers a model that could be adapted to its current circumstances. During the Cold War, Sweden was formally a neutral country, with a formidable defense-industrial sector and a capable military. But it also enjoyed close security and intelligence cooperation with the U.S. and other NATO allies. That cooperation was kept secret at the time, but the Soviets were doubtless aware of it. And that knowledge acted as a powerful deterrent to military aggression.
Even as the war rages on, the West should be helping Ukraine become an updated version of Cold-War Sweden. That would entail increased support for rebuilding Ukraine’s defense-industrial sector and training its military forces, as well as close security and intelligence cooperation. Such arrangements are included in the bilateral agreements the U.S. and other allies have signed with Ukraine or soon will. They need to be fully resourced to ensure a steady flow of support for at least the next decade.
Helping Ukraine will also entail cooperation in reforming its economy and political system to meet European standards — the Swedish model worked in part because Sweden was a strong democracy with an efficient market economy. In this light, European Union accession talks, which should begin soon, are critical to Ukraine’s long-term security.
With sufficient time and Western help, Ukraine can forge a credible deterrent against Russia outside of NATO. But it never will so long as NATO holds out the illusion of membership and tempts Ukraine to pursue it. It’s long past time to abandon that fantasy and focus on what is feasible and sufficient for Ukraine’s security.
Thomas Graham, a distinguished fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, was senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff during the George W. Bush administration.