Should the under secretariats for research and sustainment be merged yet again 

In the middle of the previous decade, in what it no doubt viewed as a Solomonic decision on its part, Congress oversaw the division in two of the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L). In its place, the legislators called for the creation of two new under secretariats. An under secretary for Research and Engineering would oversee the development of technology strategy and research and engineering activities.  

In addition, the incumbent of this new office was expected to “solve critical warfighting challenges.” The second new under secretary, for Acquisition and Sustainment, would oversee both the acquisition process—with a special focus on cost and performance—and logistics policy. 

The reorganization was driven by a growing perception that, in the words of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s summary of the fiscal 2017 authorization, “the U.S. military was falling behind technologically” while at the same time, “the current acquisition structure and process were significant factors in the inability to access new sources of innovation.”  

In particular, the committee emphasized that “establishing the position of the USD (R&E) is particularly important at a time when U.S. technological dominance is eroding and innovation is increasingly being driven by commercial and global companies that are not part of the traditional U.S. defense industrial base.” 

Ironically, the under secretary for ATL replaced the position of under secretary for Research and Engineering (USDR&E). The title had gone full circle. 

The committee anticipated that with two offices each focusing on different aspects of the acquisition process, that process could be accelerated so as not only to develop new technologies but also to field them in a far more timely manner. Yet not everyone welcomed the congressional instruction, however. Both then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Frank Kendall, then under secretary for AT&L (who currently serves as secretary of the Air Force) argued, in Kendall’s words, “the cost of speed is quality.” Needless to say, Congress ignored their protestations. 

Just over six years since the two offices came into being, a new report by the Defense Innovation Board argues that they should again be consolidated under what the report called an Under Secretary for the Industrial Base. The Board posits that this under secretary would “focus…on innovation research and development, supply chains, production capacity, and access to technologies both domestically and globally.” Moreover, amalgamating the two offices would “address the disjointedness that characterizes current OSD structures while …responding to …known … supply chain vulnerabilities [and] current production capacity limitations exposed by global contingency operations.” Presumably such concerns were exactly what dividing the office of the Under Secretary for ATL was meant to address and remediate. 

There may indeed be a strong case for reuniting the offices of research and sustainment. But it will not address the root cause of the challenges that confront the DoD’s acquisition system. The department’s acquisition bureaucracy is hidebound and operates in an environment that is at least a half century out of date. Organizational changes will not alter that environment. Nor will they address the risk-averse culture that permeates the Pentagon. Instead, the DoD must create a true risk-reward structure that would both stimulate innovation and encourage a more responsive and efficient procurement environment. 

To do so will require bold and hands-on leadership from the secretary of Defense in the mold of Ash Carter, whose most important legacy was the creation of what has become the increasingly effective Defense Innovation Unit. In addition, however, the same commitment to acquisition reform must be transmitted from one secretary to the next. It cannot be simply the priority of a single individual any more than it can be a partisan issue.  

Only then can the United States hope not only to remain the world’s leader in military technology but also to field that technology in both a timely and cost-efficient manner so as to ensure that our forces have available to them the most effective capabilities when and where they might need them. 

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.