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Afghanistan’s future uncertain three years after Taliban takeover

Taliban fighters carry rocket launchers as they celebrate the third anniversary of the withdrawal of US-led troops from Afghanistan, in Lashkar Gah, Helmand province, southwestern Afghanistan, Wednesday, Aug. 14, 2024. (AP Photo/Abdul Khaliq)

On Aug. 14, the Taliban marked the third anniversary of their return to power in Afghanistan with a public holiday and a televised military parade at the former U.S.-run Bagram airbase. Dubbed “victory day,” the celebrations occurred against the backdrop of global condemnation of the Taliban regime for creating what many call “the world’s most serious women’s rights crisis” and for making Afghanistan the only country where girls are banned from education beyond sixth grade. 

Afghanistan is now a breeding ground for uncertainty. With a fragile power base and an escalating economic and humanitarian crisis, the Taliban face internal and external threats.

Neighboring countries, wary of a possible influx of international terrorist groups such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province, view the situation with increasing unease. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s foreign assets remain frozen, sanctions persist and humanitarian aid has been largely cut off. The U.S. withdrawal, far from the political settlement many hoped for, allowed the Taliban to seize power almost by default.

The absence of a comprehensive diplomatic effort has left Afghanistan’s neighbors in a precarious position, watching as the country teeters on the edge of deeper crisis. The implications of this power vacuum, particularly for global security, are profound.

Last month, the third round of UN-led talks on Afghanistan ended in confusion, revealing a persistent deadlock between the international community and the Taliban. Notably, this marked the Taliban’s first participation in these UN-sponsored negotiations. Yet despite diplomatic efforts, the talks produced no reform pledges or concessions from the Taliban. International organizations and special envoys from nearly two dozen countries convened in Doha, Qatar, to meet with Taliban officials after a prolonged hiatus. UN Undersecretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo described the discussions as “constructive” and “useful,” while the Taliban echoed similar sentiments, emphasizing their counter-narcotics programs.

However, the glaring omission of women from the talks prompted outrage from civil society and human rights activists, who criticized the UN’s approach as contradictory to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The outcome of these Doha talks leaves little doubt: The international community, especially Afghanistan’s neighbors, remains eager to engage with the Taliban, despite understanding that no immediate flexibility on contentious issues will be forthcoming.

The global community finds itself caught between pragmatism and principle, tackling an increasingly complex Afghan reality. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ conspicuous absence from the third round of talks was no accident. Having attended the first two rounds, Guterres deliberately opted out this time, signaling his own diminished expectations for any breakthrough. His decision appeared strategic — a clear attempt to avoid lending the Taliban any semblance of indirect recognition.

In recent months, the Taliban have exhibited a newfound optimism about their international recognition. Kazakhstan has already removed them from its list of prohibited groups, and Russia seems poised to follow suit. In June, a Taliban delegation made an appearance at the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum in Russia. For the Taliban, participation in the Doha talks was not just a diplomatic move; it was a symbol of their growing status as Afghanistan’s de facto rulers. 

Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi captured this sentiment, proudly announcing their participation while emphasizing the regime’s strengthening ties with neighboring countries, as well as with Western and U.S. governments. His words hinted at a swelling confidence within the Taliban leadership, suggesting they believe their gradual acceptance by the international community is inevitable. But beneath this confidence lies a more troubling reality – one where pragmatism collides with principle, as the world grapples with how to engage a regime still largely unrecognized.

Central to the Taliban’s strategic calculus is the contentious matter of unlocking roughly $7 billion in Afghan central bank reserves currently frozen in the U.S. This financial impasse underscores a larger issue: Afghanistan’s isolation from the global banking system and the SWIFT network. Western banks’ hesitation to engage with Afghan financial institutions has severely impeded the country’s economic integration, amplifying the difficulties it faces in reconstructing its financial framework amidst persistent international scrutiny and sanctions.

This financial estrangement has not only stifled economic prospects but also exacerbated the challenges of addressing the pressing needs of the Afghan people. The Taliban’s adherence to their hard-line policies has been a major obstacle. Despite mounting international pressure and extensive discussions during the Doha talks, the regime remains resolute in its exclusion of women and girls from public life. This refusal to amend its policies reveals the deep-seated resistance to reform that continues to define the Taliban’s approach.

With foreign development aid suspended, Kabul faces mounting difficulties in addressing the nation’s spiraling economic troubles. In April, the World Bank reported that the sharp decline in international assistance following the Taliban’s takeover had left Afghanistan without internal growth drivers, resulting in a staggering 26 percent contraction in real GDP. This economic collapse highlights the devastating consequences of the Taliban’s isolation on the country’s already fragile economy. 

If the Taliban hopes to forge constructive global relationships, adaptation is not just advisable – it’s essential. The reality is that they have little choice but to heed the demands of the international community, particularly on women’s rights. However, expecting the Taliban to bow under the pressure of more sanctions and boycotts is futile, especially after what they perceive as their victory over the United States following two decades of war. 

The Taliban might be more responsive to a credible offer of recognition from a U.S.-led coalition, but such an offer is now virtually impossible. If U.S. foreign policy’s primary objective were to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan, it would require cooperation with key regional players — China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, India and the UN — to establish a common platform for engagement.

Unfortunately, cooperation with Russia and Iran is off the table. Ties with China and Pakistan remain strained. India, balancing its interests between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine, is equally unlikely to complicate its delicate diplomatic equation by engaging more deeply in Afghanistan.

Imran Khalid is a physician and has a master’s degree in international relations.