The Biden administration has held power for over two years but still lacks an Iran policy built for 2023. Meanwhile, Tehran is not standing still. The Islamic Republic is arming Russia with drones for use against EU candidate country Ukraine, the consensus among the P5+1 — which produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — no longer exists, and neither does the basic bargain undergirding the 2015 agreement.
These trendlines and the rapidly approaching October expiration of U.N. restrictions on the Islamic Republic’s missile program under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA, necessitate an urgent rethink of a broader U.S. policy on Iran. The way to start would be to impanel a bipartisan committee to advise on a durable strategy.
The Biden administration began its tenure in office focused on a return to mutual compliance with the JCPOA, which it then promised to use as a launchpad for a longer and stronger agreement. Many analysts, including this author, doubted that this deal could be revived and asserted that endless diplomacy without credible coercive options would fail. That has proven correct.
In November 2022, the president was caught on tape saying the JCPOA is dead, but “we are not going to announce it.” Yet it is this reluctance to formally declare that the JCPOA era has ended coupled with the president having made no substantive set of remarks on Iran policy since taking office that has inevitably provoked criticism and confusion. Congress is not blameless here either, as to date there has not been one public oversight hearing specifically focused on Iran policy since the U.S. special envoy testified last May despite the rapidly shifting landscape. In the end, there has been more silence than substance coming from Washington on Iran.
But the Biden administration and Congress have options, and one would be looking to U.S. China policy as a model. Ironically, American legislators have had an easier time finding bipartisanship over the threat from Beijing, the most strategic challenge Washington faces, than from Tehran. Recently, the U.S. House of Representatives formed a Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. Its charge is to develop a holistic, whole-of-government approach as a framework to guide U.S. policy.
Members of the U.S. Senate have likewise proposed the creation of a Grand Strategy Commission on China with a similar mission. If formed, it would be comprised of 20 members, including two co-chairs selected by Congress and the president; six members of the executive branch; two U.S. senators and two members of the House of Representatives; and eight members of the private sector.
This kind of framework should also be developed for Iran policy. A bipartisan, bicameral joint select committee or commission could be established to guide U.S. policy in how to counter the Islamic Republic comprehensively — both on nuclear and non-nuclear matters. Experts and activists should also be consulted, including the Iranian American community, which has demonstrated an unprecedented degree of activism on Iran policy amid the demonstrations in Iran over the last year.
This can be seen in its rallying around the MAHSA Act, which could eventually see the U.S. government impose human rights- and terrorism-related sanctions on Iran’s supreme leader and president. The diaspora amassed over 100 co-sponsors of the legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives — from progressive to conservative. Likewise, both the chairman and ranking member of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee have just lent their support to the new Fight and Combat Rampant Iranian Missile Exports Act.
While these measures do not involve the hard choices with which a committee or commission would have to grapple — including red lines for military action — they show the interest and promise of more bipartisanship over Iran exists. Unanimity will not be possible. But a healthier margin of cross-party support is possible. There now needs to be a structure to harness its potential.
One of the main reasons the JCPOA did not survive was a lack of bipartisan consensus over an acceptable Iran strategy. U.S. diplomats who negotiated it were more aligned with European views than with a majority of elected lawmakers in America, not to mention traditional partners in the Middle East.
However, history is sadly repeating itself in 2023. On May 4, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan delivered remarks stressing that the Biden administration is “flanked by allies and partners who are fundamentally bought into our strategy. And that includes our European allies and partners who have joined us on both the deterrence side and the diplomacy side.” But what about the U.S. Congress? It was not mentioned even once, and many legislators have not bought into the strategy. Even more telling is that just this month, senior Biden administration officials held its first Iran-focused classified briefing for all U.S. senators since taking office over two years ago.
A key lesson that should be learned from the JCPOA’s demise is failure to engage and do the political legwork in Washington before committing the United States to major international agreements is a recipe for collapsed diplomacy. This has resulted in the familiar recriminations in the Iran debate of name-calling and slogans but no strategy. The Biden administration and Congress have an opportunity for a reset on Iran policy. They should use it.
Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute’s Iran Program. His research focus includes Iranian leadership dynamics, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its proxy and partner network, and Iran’s relationship with Israel.