Over the past decade, Southeast Asia has become an increasingly important geostrategic region for the United States. With four member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) now among America’s top 20 bilateral trade partners, more American companies than ever-before relocating their supply chains to countries like Vietnam, and military threats across the region growing in intensity, Southeast Asia’s strategic importance is becoming undeniable. Yet, despite the region’s growing importance, the Biden administration’s foreign policy toward Southeast Asia has left much to be desired.
During his first year in office, Biden and his team demonstrated little commitment to bolstering ties with the ASEAN regional bloc. In May 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken even famously snubbed ASEAN leaders by canceling their first-ever meeting due to a ‘technical glitch’ while he was en route to the Middle East. The move raised questions among Southeast Asians about how committed the United States truly was, especially in the face of other issues “distracting” policymakers such as the Biden administration’s haphazard withdrawal from Afghanistan. With new and arguably more pressing foreign policy challenges such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine having emerged over the past year, these doubts remain strong.
While the Biden administration arguably “stepped up” its game in Southeast Asia over the past year, claiming key victories including a historic defense cooperation deal with the Philippines, officially elevating U.S. ties with ASEAN to that of a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” and hosting a successful U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in Washington, D.C, Southeast Asian leaders remain skeptical of the sustained and long-term commitment of the United States to Southeast Asia.
The U.S. Congress can help to quiet some of these doubts.
On March 23, 2023, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the “Providing Appropriate Recognition and Treatment Needed to Enhance Relations (PARTNER) with ASEAN Act”, a bipartisan piece of legislation that seeks to formally upgrade the diplomatic status of ASEAN, bringing the regional bloc in line with other regional groupings such as the European Union. The Act is intended to underscore U.S. respect for ASEAN centrality, while also establishing a legal framework that would better allow the United States and ASEAN to explore new areas of cooperation.
While not mandating it as law, the House version of the bill recommends the establishment of an ASEAN Delegation to the United States to “enhance cooperation between ASEAN and the United States at all levels.” This recommendation is particularly significant as the U.S. remains the only ASEAN dialogue partner without a home-based delegation or other dedicated institution committed to bolstering bilateral ties with the regional bloc. Both adversaries and allies of the United States including China, Russia, Japan, India, South Korea, and Australia have all established such institutions, further demonstrating the need for one.
By using its constitutional authority to establish and allocate funding for a new independent institution with a mission to bolster U.S.-ASEAN ties, the U.S. Congress can effectively assist both Biden’s team and future U.S. policymakers “step up” America’s game by demonstrating a more enduring U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia that could be sustained across presidential administrations. Establishing such an institution would partially address a key complaint expressed by Southeast Asian leaders with respect to the U.S. approach — that foreign and economic policies seem to unpredictably shift whenever a new presidential administration comes into power.
The transition from the Obama to Trump administration, for example, led to the unexpected withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal, an agreement which many Southeast Asian countries were a part of and relying on to gain market access to the United States. While the deal was eventually rescued by Japan under its new name, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the U.S. has not signaled its intention to rejoin the agreement, and some argue that Washington will remain economically hamstrung in the Indo-Pacific until it does so.
While the Biden administration has attempted to articulate an economic vision of its own known as Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), Southeast Asians remain skeptical of its longer-term efficacy. The new framework, broken into four “pillars” and negotiated directly by the executive branch, was explicitly designed to skirt congressional approval, and thus lacks the market access provisions that make it unlikely to be sustainable over the long term.
Another tool at the disposal of the U.S. Congress to assist the Biden administration ‘step-up’ its engagement with Southeast Asia would be the implementation of congressional reporting requirements that track progress in areas relevant to the U.S.-ASEAN relationship including trade and investment flows, cultural exchange, and bilateral and multilateral engagement with ASEAN member-states.
One idea would be for the U.S. Congress to institutionalize the U.S.-ASEAN Summit that took place last May on a biennial basis, ensuring that regular high-level exchanges between ASEAN leaders and the executive branch continued on at least a semi-regular basis. Over the past year alone, at least three new leaders have assumed power in Southeast Asia in places including Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, demonstrating the need for the United States to continue regular engagement at the leader-to-leader level.
Moreover, although the Biden administration has made efforts to conduct outreach to key Southeast Asian leaders in recent months, including hosting Philippine President Bongbong Marcos at the White House, high-level engagements between the United States and ASEAN countries have historically been low.
The PARTNER with ASEAN Act and its potential to establish an ASEAN-U.S. Center in Washington, D.C. presents a unique opportunity that could substantially improve America’s relations with an increasingly critical geostrategic region. After years of neglecting Southeast Asia, it should behoove lawmakers to enact the bill into law, and in doing so, help to demonstrate the sustained and long-term commitment of the United States to the region.
Sam Baron is the inaugural Policy Fellow at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS). He previously worked as an analyst of Southeast Asian Affairs based in Washington, D.C.