This year’s presidential election in the United States could bring about a deep freeze at the highest political levels of U.S.-EU relations. If Donald Trump returns to the White House, his views of the European Union as a “foe” would likely make cooperation between the U.S. and EU executive branches much more difficult.
In the context of a slew of global challenges requiring effective U.S-EU cooperation, the legislative branch must be ready to pick up the slack.
Dialogue can help solve many of the most crucial issues, including the need to regulate both large established technology platforms and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence; address the challenges of climate change and China through measures such as industrial policy and carbon pricing; and plan for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Each of these areas is characterized by preexisting or potential divergence in approaches, but making sure that the officials involved in crafting legislation are talking to each other regularly can help to bridge the transatlantic gap and ensure that issues do not become exacerbated or stuck due to misunderstandings.
But despite claiming to be partners of first resort, the United States and the European Union currently lack anything approaching effective legislative dialogue.
There is no direct connection between the EU and the Senate, where much of the legislation that most directly affects the transatlantic relationship, such as the Inflation Reduction Act, originates. While some channels do exist between the EU and the U.S. House of Representatives, they are largely dysfunctional. The most prominent forum for coordination, the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD), brings together EU parliamentarians (MEPs) and members of the U.S. House every six months. Yet these regular meetings have produced little beyond a series of perfunctory joint statements.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Congressional Caucus on the European Union has so far not delivered on its stated goal as a Congressional Member Organization: to pursue common legislative objectives with fellow members of Congress.
Despite being founded nearly two decades ago, the EU Caucus has failed to gain sufficient traction to make a real difference in U.S.-EU relations. Its impact is generally limited to a “relaunch” reception at the start of each new Congress that draws already committed proponents of the transatlantic relationship to Capitol Hill. But its track record in fostering any concrete legislative momentum leaves much to be desired.
The overarching reason for the inefficacy of these forums is a lack of serious buy-in from members of U.S. Congress.
In advance of TLD sessions, participants from the EU side hold regular preparatory meetings within the format of the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with the United States — a formal body with fixed membership. By contrast, the only fixed participants on the U.S. side, the co-chair and ranking member, select the remaining participants on an ad-hoc basis shortly prior to each particular TLD session. This lack of continuity and preparatory time prevents the U.S. side from coming to the table with any real substantive joint legislative priorities.
The TLD also fails to establish the types of deep personal relationships between U.S. and EU lawmakers that would facilitate greater legislative cooperation. The ad-hoc participation from the U.S. side is one reason for this, but another is the venue for dialogue.
TLD meetings in Europe take place in many different cities — usually in the capital of the country holding the rotating EU presidency — but the United States always hosts its half of the meetings in Washington. This inevitably creates distractions for U.S. participants, who frequently must pull themselves away for other meetings or to vote, as the TLD sessions are held when Congress is in session. Changing the location of meetings hosted by the United States would allow members of Congress to engage more substantially with their EU counterparts both within and on the margins of TLD sessions, while simultaneously showcasing parts of the United States beyond the beltway to MEPs.
However, a change in scenery is not likely to prove sufficient. Congress must fundamentally restructure the way that it engages with the European Parliament through a restructured TLD.
One key alteration should be the inclusion of both halves of Congress, as members of the Senate have longer terms and more opportunity to build relationships. Congress should also draw inspiration from the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with the United States, even if it cannot replicate it entirely, with a formal staff, goals for each exchange, and the committed buy-in of both halves of Congress. Revitalizing the errant EU Caucus could help the U.S. side of the TLD achieve the “more formal and permanent status” that it supposedly aspires to but that has yet to take shape.
The first step could be merging the TLD co-chair and ranking member positions with the EU caucus co-chair positions, thereby instituting clear congressional leadership in managing the U.S.-EU relationship. The EU Caucus could then operate as a preparatory body for joint sessions, giving it a sense of purpose beyond holding periodic receptions and ensuring that the U.S. side has a substantive agenda to present when meeting with EU parliamentarians. Participants for sessions of the TLD would also be drawn from the pool of EU caucus members, as well as senators, creating greater continuity that would help both to develop focus and momentum within the U.S. side and to build relationships with EU participants.
A more ambitious step would be to restructure the TLD along the lines of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, one of the strongest existing mechanisms for transatlantic legislative exchange.
Created in 1955 and institutionally separate from NATO itself, this inter-parliamentary dialogue has facilitated understanding of shared security challenges and is an essential link between NATO and the parliaments of its members. Unlike the TLD, it is especially effective at fostering personal relationships among parliamentarians from different NATO allies, and its work often leads to real legislative impact.
It is also unlike the TLD in that it possesses a permanent staff as well as dedicated financing. In part, the strong U.S. congressional support for NATO is a testament to the work of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s convening power. Formally institutionalizing the TLD in this way could empower it to finally make a real difference in driving joint U.S.-EU legislative priorities such as on trade, technology and climate policy.
The United States and European Union can only tackle their joint challenges through greater dialogue. Key fissures in recent years such as disagreements over the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act, differences in legislative approaches to tackling climate change, and differing views on AI legislation have clearly illustrated how a lack of communication exacerbates transatlantic tensions. It is essential that the U.S.-EU relationship functions more smoothly in addressing future challenges such as technology regulation, Ukrainian reconstruction, and more.
While contact at the highest levels of the executive branch is crucial, it is not sufficient — especially given the possibility of major leadership change in the United States on the horizon. The United States Congress must take legislative relations with the European Union seriously, doing more to steer the transatlantic relationship to its fullest potential and away from rocky shoals ahead.
Nicholas Lokker is a research associate in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. He previously worked for the European Parliament, both in Brussels and at its liaison office with the U.S. Congress in Washington, D.C.
Jason C. Moyer is a fellow at the Transatlantic Leadership Network.