Xi will not be pushed on climate by Biden, but a deal is possible

After almost a year’s delay, U.S. climate envoy John Kerry’s recent trip to Beijing to meet his counterpart Xie Zhenua was a welcome step toward engagement between the world’s two biggest emitters of greenhouse gases.

With substantive negotiations on key issues such as energy transition to renewables, methane emissions, COP28 and the two countries’ respective long term climate targets, the talks managed to re-establish the bilateral climate hotline. In subsequent planned meetings, the two sides will hopefully deliver a joint “product” over the coming months.

All of this underlines the residual willingness in the Chinese system to get the two countries’ climate engagement back to 2021, before China imposed a suspension of cooperation on climate as a result of former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit.

Kerry’s visit avoided further deterioration, which already represents progress. At times, before the current “thaw” in U.S.-China relationship, it felt as if the two countries were more committed to fighting each other than climate change.

The scorching Beijing summer heat reminds us that much more needs to be delivered from U.S.-China climate talks. With time, the rescued climate talks can serve as a bridge to a stronger U.S.-China relationship, which moves both countries beyond their narrow focus on immediate tensions. Climate is often seen as a divide, but the fast-developing green economy gives both superpowers a common interest, given the huge investments that both are pouring into wind, solar, battery technology and electric vehicles.

But for this renewal to spark real ambition on climate, there are some pitfalls for both sides to avoid.

The first is inflated expectations. Headlines reporting that Kerry came back empty handed reflect detachment from the reality of Kerry’s visit, its circumstances and its goal as a conversation starter. This visit was a starting point, which should be evaluated by what it initiates, not what it concludes.

Related to this narrative is the view that China can easily be pushed around on its climate ambitions. China has never been an ATM for withdrawing quick U.S. diplomatic wins, and this is even truer today than in the past as the Chinese domestic view toward the U.S. hardens.

U.S. domestic politics also play a role in China’s hesitation. Wang Yi, China’s foreign policy chief who met with Kerry, stressed that joint progress needs to be supported by the peoples of the two countries — a thinly veiled complaint that climate action lacks bipartisan support in Washington, in turn deterring China from taking action. Right in the middle of Kerry’s visit, Chinese President Xi Jinping also stated that his country’s climate discourse will not be dictated by others.

Observers quickly took Xi’s comment as proof that Kerry’s trip was hopeless. This creates the second pitfall of defeatism, which dismisses the value of diplomacy.

Climate negotiations between the world’s two largest emitters will never be pain-free. But persistent engagement is needed because climate change is one of the rare areas where the U.S. and China truly cannot decouple. And here, engagement delivers.

One need not look back further than 2021 to realize the value of engagement. That year did not see a rosy U.S.-China relationship. But with two China visits by Kerry during the height of the COVID pandemic, Washington and Beijing still delivered two joint statements, and by doing so, helped ensure a strong outcome at COP27 in Glasgow. In the same year, China also decided to stop supporting overseas coal projects, a longstanding U.S. demand.

U.S. policymakers would be unwise to underestimate their own agenda-setting power. They also risk being seen as the immature partner if they dismiss China’s concrete responses to U.S. engagement.

Xi’s tough stance should therefore be seen in a more solution-oriented light. Beijing can meet Washington on climate, but there needs to be recognition they are doing so as equals. By committing to deliver on earlier promises and taking action in a self-defined manner, he is signaling to global climate diplomats China’s willingness to move, so long as it is in the country’s self interest.

If anything, this only strengthens the case for diplomacy. Isn’t engagement always the art of convincing the other side that taking certain actions are in its own best interest?

The third and final pitfall laments the un-innovative and uninspiring nature of the Kerry-Xie model. Proponents of this view correctly point out the fundamental shifts in the U.S.-China relationship. This requires the two sides to find different ways of solving the climate problem.

To these voices, competition is the answer to the dynamics of the modern U.S.-China reality. While the value of competition should be recognized in incentivizing the domestic actions of both countries — in particular in the clean tech sector — one could argue that the competitive gene has always been there in companies of both countries. A politically-charged competition framing would not add value at best, and will fuel unnecessary and already overloaded hostility at worst.

The more dangerous result of this pursuit of a new strategy is that it distracts us from a basic act required to solve any conflict — the act of talking to each other. So while practitioners should always dare to try new things before they produce concrete outcomes, they should allow Kerry and Xie to be old-school.

These are the narrative pitfalls that the U.S. and China must avoid.

The good news is the two countries have just found a new point of departure. Their relationship remains fragile, but with a clear eyed approach in the coming months, progress is possible.

Li Shuo is a global policy advisor for Greenpeace East Asia.