Victory in Ukraine could mean a stalemate

One of the key challenges of making smart policy is having an end-state in mind. What is it that policymakers want to achieve or what is the desired outcome? It is, of course, not necessarily a fixed point in time or space. It could be a set of conditions or the avoidance of negative results.  

In the absence of a defined end-state objective, policy is a lot of motion, but little movement. The present situation in Ukraine is tacking dangerously close to that absence of objective. Instead of an end-state, words such as “win,” “victory” or more extreme suggestions of “decolonization of Russia” or “regime change” are appearing. It is imperative that moral opprobrium be jettisoned, and rational calculations take its place.  

Right now, the West is rushing arms and materials of increasing sophistication to Ukraine. This is neither unexpected nor without merit. The Ukrainians are fighting for national survival against Russian aggression and the West should stand and support Kyiv’s efforts. It’s not surprising that the West wants Ukraine to preserve its territorial integrity and political independence. But what does that look like in practice? What is the desired end-state of this aid and, more importantly, what is an achievable end-state for the war? The two are not necessarily compatible and may well differ from the United States, Ukraine and its allies.  

Deciding an outcome can then guide the application of policies and tools from the national arsenal. This will, naturally, change. Early in the war, and quite rightly, the West was leery of providing too much aid or implementing policies that could lead to escalation. Russia’s battlefield performance and Ukraine’s military success changed that calculus as evidenced by calls for increasingly capable long-range artillery systems.   

This is also seen in the ongoing calls for expanded sanctions on Russia. One wonders how much of the Russian economy has escaped sanction in one form or another and whether the West has entered a wholly performative aspect of economic warfare — making Russia’s economic rubble bounce. This is particularly acute as the effects of the sanctions take time to reach maximum intensity and, unfortunately, high energy prices sustain Russia’s economy and war efforts — particularly as China and India pick up the West’s slackening purchase of Moscow’s exports.

Here, it is important to temper expectations. Some have suggested that Ukraine take back the territory lost in 2014, including retaking Crimea. This is an unlikely prospect — particularly the latter — no matter how much arms and material the West provides. Such maximalist objectives will only create unrealistic expectations and, potentially, serve to lengthen the conflict.  

At the same time, the West must be wary of underestimating Russia’s broader military capabilities. Its conventional performance fell well short of expectations, but it has regrouped and is achieving a measure of success in Donbas. Moscow still possesses a formidable cyber arsenal, the world’s largest nuclear weapons stockpile, space-based capabilities and other offensive options. Russia’s poor performance to date should not lead to Western hubris that it is wholly toothless.  

It is also important to recognize that despite the best hopes of insta-pundits and social media armchair generals, this conflict will not resolve itself within the time equivalent of 240 characters. Conventional wars are violent, long and grinding processes, more so with the tactics to which Russian forces have returned — sustained large-scale conventional artillery bombardments. Unfortunately, in the U.S., attention on the war in Ukraine is already ebbing as other news enters the cycle and premature Western public exhaustion takes effect — something which Russia appears to be seizing upon in its propaganda efforts. This is driving increasingly hyperbolic calls about the prognosis of the war’s execution — Ukrainian victory, Russian defeat, negotiated settlement, et al.   

While the ultimate outlines of the war’s end will be decided in Kyiv and Moscow, suggestions that the West does not have agency in the process are misguided. The West, in providing weapons and financial support, enables Ukraine’s operational success and is as much a party to the conflict as Kyiv or Moscow. Suggesting that the West hand Kyiv a gun and bullets but have no say in how the war ends is fatuous at best and dangerous at worst. The West’s actions can either prolong the war or help guide it to a satisfactory end once that end is decided upon.  

War and diplomacy occur simultaneously and are mutually reinforcing. Having an end-state in mind helps to guide the efforts to set conditions on the ground for resolution. The West should begin to recognize that this war will not end in the near future either on the battlefield or at the negotiating table. 

Both Russia and Ukraine appear to be heading toward a point of exhaustion where neither will be able to achieve significant progress. Ukraine will not, nor should it, relinquish its right to independence or survival. Russia appears to be unwilling to acknowledge Ukraine’s history or right to its own course of governance and is determined to bring it back into its orbit, to say nothing of its consistent violation of past accords. An unstoppable force meeting an immovable object. The likely outcome is a stalemate — indeed the war may halt temporarily, but it is doubtful a lasting peace is achievable. 

It is without question that the West should and must support Ukraine’s fight for survival. But it must also be candid about what it wants to achieve and what is viable to achieve in the present fight. Failing to define an outcome and resource that outcome accordingly is a disservice to the brave Ukrainians fighting on their country’s battlefields.  

Joshua C. Huminski is the director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress. There he co-chairs the center’s program on strategic competition, with a specific focus on Russia. He is a fellow at George Mason University’s National Security Institute. He can be found on Twitter at @joshuachuminski.