The revelation that the Biden administration is calling for immunity for Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed Bin Salman in a lawsuit brought over the killing of U.S.-resident and Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi is the latest example of the administration’s unwillingness to hold the Saudi leader accountable, despite his complicity in Khashoggi’s murder and his role in directing his regime’s brutal war in Yemen.
The lawsuit, brought in 2020 by Khashoggi’s fiancée, Hatice Cengiz, and the Washington-based organization Democracy in the Arab World Now (DAWN) alleges that a team of assassins approved by Bin Salman “kidnapped, bound, drugged, tortured, and assassinated” Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, and then dismembered his body.
The Biden Justice Department has intervened on Bin Salman’s behalf by claiming that heads of state have immunity from prosecution under customary international law. But how many heads of state have overseen the murder of a dissident journalist outside their own territory, or presided over a war that has resulted in the deaths of nearly 400,000 people, as has happened in the Saudi-led war in Yemen? If the administration truly believes that immunity applies in this instance, it should be pressing for other avenues of accountability.
President Biden has come a long way from declaring the Saudi regime a “pariah” on the campaign trail to his return to what is essentially a business-as-usual approach to relations with Riyadh. In his first foreign policy speech in February 2021, he pledged an end to U.S. support for “offensive operations” in Yemen, along with “relevant arms sales.”
Biden’s team also suspended a bomb sale to Saudi Arabia and undertook a review of the U.S.-Saudi security relationship. But starting in the fall of 2021, the administration made arms offers to the Saudi military worth billions of dollars. And this summer the president went to Riyadh hat in hand to urge Bin Salman to increase oil output to offset the effects of sanctions on Russia on gasoline prices.
Not only did Bin Salman rebuff Biden’s plea, he slapped him in the face by collaborating with Russia and the rest of OPEC+ to reduce oil output. The decision sparked a furor in Congress and prompted the Biden administration to say that there would be “consequences” for Saudi Arabia’s warming of relations with Moscow.
Members of Congress have called for concrete measures to be undertaken, but the administration has since indicated that it wants to “deliberate” before deciding how to respond to Saudi actions. Proposals include a call by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) to suspend sales of offensive weapons to the regime; a legislative initiative by Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) to suspend sales, spare parts, maintenance and other military support to the regime; and an ongoing effort to end U.S. military support for Saudi Arabia under the War Powers Act, a move supported by over 100 members of Congress.
One obvious question is what the administration thinks it will gain by cozying up to one of the world’s most reckless and repressive regimes. Possibilities include a hope that the Saudi regime will do an about-face on oil prices; tilt towards Washington rather than improving ties to Russia and China; and serve as a loyal ally in efforts to contain Iran. None of these rationales hold up to scrutiny.
Saudi Arabia is likely to continue to set its own course on oil prices. Bin Salman has staked his reputation on transforming Saudi society. He needs to keep oil prices high if he hopes to achieve the ambitious goals laid out in Vision 2030.
China is Saudi Arabia’s biggest customer, while Russian and Saudi interests are aligned on maintaining high oil prices. Although the Saudis depend on the United States for the bulk of their military arsenal, this alone will not override Riyadh’s growing ties to Moscow and Beijing. For now, Saudi reliance on U.S. military hardware gives Washington considerable leverage in persuading it to refrain from restarting its attacks on Yemen. The Saudi government is currently negotiating to help end its involvement in the conflict there.
As for containing Iran, a diplomatic approach to Tehran is likely to yield better results than supporting an anti-Iran coalition comprised of the U.S., Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the Saudi regime. Such an alliance is more likely a recipe for war than a step towards stability in the region.
If the Biden administration is truly going to rethink the U.S.-Saudi relationship, it should start by cutting off arms sales and military support for the regime until it joins global sanctions against Russia by halting purchases of Russian oil and definitively ends its involvement in Yemen. If it fails to do so, Congress should act.
Time is of the essence, as the new Congress that will take office in January may be more resistant to enforcing real consequences on Saudi Arabia.
The next few months will tell whether Mohammed Bin Salman and his regime will pay the price for their crimes or once again be let off the hook under the illusion that a close relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia serves a useful purpose.
William D. Hartung is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Annelle Sheline is a research fellow at Quincy.