In a few days, South Korean president Moon Jae-in will meet with Kim Jong Un in Panmunjom for a historic summit meeting. In late May or early June, another summit is tentatively planned between President Trump and Kim Jong Un, though this meeting is less certain. A year ago, no one would have thought any of this possible with tensions as high as they have ever been.
The goal of these meetings is denuclearization, and Kim Jong Un has agreed to discuss this objective in return for a security guarantee and an end to hostile policy against the North. He has also announced an end to testing, maintaining the work has been completed on North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs. Finally, he dropped a demand for the removal of U.S. forces from Korea as a condition for denuclearization.
{mosads}At first glance, these developments appear to be cause for guarded optimism. The chance for dialogue and reducing tension levels on the peninsula is welcome, particularly given the threats of military force aired on both sides of the Pacific just months ago. Yet in the end, it is unlikely that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons.
It is important to continue seeking denuclearization and these summits are a good start. But it is essential that expectations be managed. The denuclearization of North Korea, if it ever occurs, will be a long, slow process and these summits are only the beginning.
But do recent statements from North Korea indicate that Kim Jong Un has changed his mind about nuclear weapons? I doubt it. Pyongyang long has touted the importance of nuclear weapons for its security and has poured billions of dollars into this program. Once called the “treasured sword of justice”, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, especially the ability to reach the continental United States, provide the ultimate deterrent to secure the Kim regime and place North Korea in an elite club of other nuclear weapon states.
Despite the recent assurances that denuclearization is on the table, there is little to explain why Kim would suddenly reverse his determination to build a nuclear deterrent. It is difficult to imagine that Kim would ever be sufficiently reassured of his own security to follow through on a pledge to denuclearize.
What, then, to make of Kim’s willingness to discuss denuclearization and his other recent concessions? Meeting with a U.S. president is a huge win for Kim, and he understands that a willingness to denuclearize is a prerequisite to meet the U.S. and South Korean condition of complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization. But once talks begin, it is unlikely Kim will share this definition of denuclearization and instead will push for an alternative that will be unacceptable to Seoul and Washington.
Kim’s announcement that the nuclear program is complete and he no longer needs to test is a declaration that North Korea is a full-fledged member of the nuclear club. As a result, he is sitting down with the United States as equals in that regard. Further testing also would put North Korea in the crosshairs for increased sanctions and possible military action.
It is likely that the increased sanctions of the past year have had an effect in bringing North Korea to the negotiating table. Assessments indicate sanctions are starting to bite and forcing North Korea to find new ways to cope. In 2013, Kim Jong Un announced the Byungjin line, declaring his intention to simultaneously pursue nuclear weapons and economic development. Kim stated recently that he now intends to shift to economic growth; obtaining some degree of sanctions relief is necessary to advance that goal.
The willingness to talk is a way to change the narrative from the past few years that North Korea is the unruly rogue state, unwilling to seek peace. It also is designed to drive a wedge in the U.S.-South Korean alliance. Moreover, the more time that elapses with North Korea having nuclear weapons, the easier it may be for a nuclear North Korea to become part of the regional status quo.
Denuclearization may be unreachable for the time being but dialogue is well worth pursuing nonetheless. Talks are an important way to test the veracity of North Korean policy positions and establish regular lines of communication. These negotiations will be difficult and the North will be well-prepared, but talks should not be viewed as rewarding bad behavior. Dialogue helps to reduce tensions and lessen the chances of miscalculation on both sides. Also, we have little direct knowledge of Kim Jong Un and the inner workings of the regime; talks provide an opportunity to address this shortcoming.
South Korean officials have been raising the possibility of a peace treaty to replace the armistice and Trump has given his “blessing” to the proposal. It is possible that Moon and Kim will lay the groundwork for a treaty that could be concluded during the Trump-Kim summit, but all of this remains to be seen. The likelihood of a large-scale, comprehensive deal coming out of the two summits is low, since there will be many issues that require further negotiation and work by lower-level officials. Moreover, all sides feel they have been burned in the past, so any deal will be a phased-in process requiring demonstrations of good faith and a verification protocol.
These summits could be important first steps in lowering tension levels and reducing the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula. But they are only the first steps in a long process, and the best hope for progress is diplomacy coupled with continued sanctions. It will be important to maintain a strong U.S.-South Korea alliance and robust deterrence posture to ensure a stable security environment. Even if denuclearization is unreachable, we must keep trying. Instead of North Korea being a problem to solve, it is one that will need to be managed.
Terence Roehrig is professor of national security affairs and director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the U.S. Naval War College. He was a research fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University and a past president of the Association of Korean Political Studies. He has published several books, including “Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War” with Columbia University Press. Follow him on Twitter @tjroehrig.
[Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author, expressed in an unofficial capacity, and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy or the U.S. government.]