Are Russians again dizzy with success? Putin would have us believe so
Judging by Kremlin-backed studies of public opinion, life in Russia in 2023 has become as it was in 1935, when Joseph Stalin proclaimed, “Life has become better. Living has become better, comrades. Living has become happier.” Already in 1930, he had praised collectivization, but cautioned not to become “dizzy with success.” Somehow Stalin overlooked famine, the gulag and upcoming treason trials.
Vladimir Putin’s official polling organization reports that citizens’ attitudes to everything political became more positive after the “special military operation” in Ukraine began. If we can believe the reports, from February 2022 to January 2023, domestic support for the war increased from 65 percent to 68 percent. Indeed, 75 percent of respondents supposedly approved of incorporating annexed territories into Russia’s borders.
Other findings, according to the Kremlin: Trust in Russia’s leader increased from 65 percent to 78 percent; approval of Putin’s actions rose from 60 percent to 75 percent; and acceptance of his legitimacy rose from 53 percent to 73 percent. Acceptance of the Russian Federation’s legitimacy, however, was lower. It reportedly increased from 35 percent to only 49 percent.
In 2023, the Kremlin claims, some 79 percent of respondents expressed their willingness to assist citizens in the new territories and Russian soldiers (two rather distinct categories lumped into one), and 73 percent of respondents approved of their school-age children writing letters of support to soldiers. Another 73 percent welcomed sending soldiers “Christmas” gifts (by whom and to whom was not specified).
How did respondents feel about protests alleging a decline of living standards or unjust government actions? Critical attitudes declined from 21 percent in 2021 to 12 percent in 2022, even after the partial mobilization. On the positive side, the share of respondents supposedly satisfied with their own circumstances rose from 48 percent in 2021 to 57 percent in 2022. Only 8 percent wanted to move abroad; a good 90 percent said “nyet” to emigration. Satisfaction with things in their region increased from 49 percent in 2021 to 60 percent in 2022.
Note that these surveys do not break down responses by region. Non-Russian republics such as Bashkortostan, Dagestan and Komi are known to resent the mobilization and high death rates of their young men in the war.
Can Russia cope with the exodus of foreign companies? Seventy percent said yes, according to the Kremlin. Respondents seem to think that Russia can cope better in the airline industry and with industrial equipment (68 percent and 67 percent, respectively) than with everyday electronics or automobiles (59 percent and 52 percent). They ignore the appeal for an international division of labor by Sergei Chemezov, boss of Russia’s largest military-industrial complex Rostekha, according to the business publication PBK.
Does Russia now have a large influence in international affairs? Positive opinions among Russians rose from 62 percent in 2021 to 78 percent in 2023. What will be Russia’s place in 15 years? The answers were muddled.
Does the Russian government have a long-term strategy for development? In 2021, only 40 percent of Russians polled said yes; in 2002, that rose to 54 percent. What share of your friends and family believe the government has a clear, long-term development plan? Only 29 percent answered affirmatively in 2021, while nearly half — 46 percent — were positive in 2022.
The All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research shows that Russia today, as in Stalin’s 1930s, is practically giddy with success. But it tells us nothing about the age, gender or locations of respondents. And it does not reveal how many people refused to answer questions. How many were simply afraid to say anything negative about their situation or Russia’s?
The surveys make no effort to square findings with the annual Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, which shows Russia has long been one of the most corrupt places in the world. The Russian Interior Ministry reported that the average bribe amounted to 9,000 rubles in 2008 and 236,000 rubles in 2011, and that Russia’s rank deteriorated from 90th place in the world in 2004 to 137th in 2022 — worse than Belarus at 91st place and Ukraine at 116th.
Nothing to protest? In January 2021, in support of opposition leader Alexey Navalny, there were protests in 198 towns and cities across Russia — the largest anti-government demonstrations since the legislative elections in 2011 and Putin’s reelection in 2012. On March 6, 2022, 10 days after the war in Ukraine began, police arrested more than 4,600 protesters. According to the Russian human rights group OVD-Info, in 2022, more than 21,000 Russians were arrested (many of them beaten and tortured) for anti-war actions, and more than 370 now face criminal charges under the new “false information” law.
The claim that most Russians are content with the quality of their life is not credible. The World Happiness Index, based on Gallup World Poll data, shows that Russians rank 78th in the world in that regard — one place lower than Turkmenistan and 14 places behind Belarus. Not surprisingly, the report shows Lebanon and Afghanistan to be the least happy, while people in Finland and Denmark, the most honest, are also the most content with their quality of life. By comparison, the United States and United Kingdom rank 16th and 17th, respectively.
These somewhat contradictory surveys give mixed answers to big questions: To what extent do the citizens of Russia approve of Putin’s leadership and his war? If he were challenged by someone claiming to do a better job, would the crowd stand by Putin or choose a fresh face? Might the Russian public be just as polarized as Americans?
Walter Clemens is an associate of Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and professor emeritus of political science at Boston University. He is the author of several books, including “Can Russia Change?”
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