“Look around our world. Are there greater security threats than those posed by Russia and China to America, its friends and allies, and our values of peace and freedom?”
That was an imaginary but realistic expression of the U.S. commitment to Ukraine and Taiwan, but they are not the words of Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-Fla.), who opposes U.S. support for Ukraine. What he did say was: “Look around your house. How much stuff is made in Ukraine, or even Russia, for that matter?”
It was the ultimate trivialization of the stakes in Europe’s most destructive military conflict since World War II — even more short-sighted than Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis’s initial dismissal of Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine as a mere “territorial dispute.” (Widespread censure compelled DeSantis to correct that naive mischaracterization.)
At least Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.), another member of the new but still small Republican “peace” bloc on Ukraine, had the good sense to make a geostrategic argument. He correctly identified Communist China as a greater existential threat to the West than revanchist Russia, but incorrectly concluded that we cannot successfully resist both aggressors.
In February, 11 other House Republicans signed Gaetz’s “Ukraine Fatigue” resolution urging a peace settlement and calling for an end to all military and financial assistance to Kyiv.
The criticisms of the GOP’s neo-isolationist grouping pretty much mimic those of the Democrats’ House Progressive Coalition, which earlier wrote to President Biden complaining about the costs and risks of the U.S. commitment to Ukraine. Their letter was quickly withdrawn after White House blowback.
The minority dissidents in both the Democratic and Republican parties share the idea that the choices facing the U.S. and the West are simple and straightforward. They evidently believe America has the risk-free option of stopping the flow of arms to Ukraine — even beyond Biden’s present policy of withholding its most potent weapons, such as the consistently-denied fighter aircraft and Abrams tanks that were reluctantly promised but remain undelivered.
But, just as it took U.S. leadership to get other NATO members to provide their own high-end military technology to Ukraine, any serious reduction in U.S. arms transfers would serve as a negative example of flagging will. America’s catastrophic Afghanistan withdrawal haunts Biden’s foreign policy credibility among allies and adversaries.
Other national security commentators acknowledge the strategic folly of abandoning Ukraine, but also recognize the need to prepare for the looming confrontation with China. To meet the two-front challenge, and maintain our own weapons stocks, they urge ramping up U.S. defense manufacturing capacity across the board, making America again “the arsenal of democracy” that decisively fortified the Allied cause in World War II. The need is urgent and the solution is necessary but insufficient to confront China’s challenge.
While an increase in the delivery of high-end Western arms eventually will help the valiant Ukrainians defeat Russia and expel Russian troops from all of Ukraine’s territory, Taiwan’s situation is far more precarious. The island state is not well-positioned to withstand a protracted war of attrition — by itself, or even with constrained American involvement.
America’s “We don’t know what we would do and neither do you” policy of strategic ambiguity on defending Taiwan outlived its usefulness long ago. That was the response to China’s query by Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye during the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, affirmed verbatim by William Perry, President Clinton’s defense secretary, and left unrepudiated by subsequent administrations. It has encouraged Beijing to create “the circumstances” (Nye’s term) that will deter American intervention when China finally launches its attack on Taiwan.
The policy recently failed a crucial test. When China reacted to the August visit to Taiwan by then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) by firing more munitions and missiles than during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and temporarily blockading the island, the U.S. response to the fourth such crisis was even weaker than in 1996. Then, it sent two aircraft carriers toward the Strait but turned them back after Beijing threatened a “sea of fire.” Only one carrier has made the transit since. This time, Washington didn’t even assume a posture of defensive action.
The all but imminent Fifth Taiwan Strait Crisis might well be the decisive one. Beijing threatens “resolute countermeasures” if Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) meets with Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen in Los Angeles this week. Biden should directly warn Xi Jinping that if China takes any threatening military action, similar to what it did after Pelosi’s visit, the U.S. will send a carrier battle group through the Taiwan Strait for the first time since 2007.
Although smaller U.S. Navy ships conducted frequent Freedom of Navigation Operations through the Strait during the Trump administration, and monthly FONOPS were regularized under Biden, the transits have fallen off somewhat over the past six months.
While many of us who worked on national security in the federal government do not doubt that the United States would directly intervene if China attacks Taiwan, at least initially, the evidence over four decades does not indicate that Beijing is convinced. Hence, the danger of strategic miscalculation, the kind that led to the Korean War. As Henry Kissinger has written, “We did not expect the invasion; China did not expect our response.” The implications are more ominous this time.
The sooner Washington scraps its counter-productive vagueness on defending Taiwan and incorporates Biden’s impromptu pledges as formal declared policy, the sooner the scale of deterrence will tip in Taiwan’s — and the world’s — favor.
Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in Department of Defense discussions about the U.S. response. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA.