Everyone wants the Russo-Ukrainian War to end, but exactly how peace is to be achieved is rather less clear. Easy solutions rest on unrealistic assumptions and are impossible, while difficult solutions rest on realistic assumptions and are possible. Understandably, the former are more appealing, because they promise fabulous results with little effort.
There are two types of impossible solutions to the war. The first assumes that the war was caused by NATO’s enlargement and desire to include Ukraine as a member state. The second assumes that Russian strongman and accused war criminal Vladimir Putin is willing to compromise.
If NATO’s enlargement caused the war, then the solution is obvious. All NATO must do to end the war is declare that Ukraine will never be a member. Relieved to know that Ukraine’s joining NATO cannot take place, the grateful Russians will withdraw their troops, cease firing missiles at Ukrainian civilians, and agree to a peace.
Unfortunately, the war was not and is not about NATO: neither is it about its enlargement, nor about the supposed threat it poses to Russia, nor about NATO membership for Ukraine. If enlargement were the issue, the Kremlin would have long since taken serious measures against the Alliance’s latest member, formerly Finlandized Finland. If NATO were a threat, the national armies under its umbrella wouldn’t be underfunded, undersupplied and undertrained and, thus, “under-capable” of being deployed against Russia’s self-styled, second-most-powerful army in the world. And if Ukraine’s membership were imminent, European, American and Russian policymakers wouldn’t have stated consistently that it couldn’t happen for decades. Not only did Russia have no rational, non-paranoid reason to fear NATO or Ukraine in 2022, it also had none in 2014, when it actually started the war by invading Ukraine’s southeast.
Since the case for NATO’s culpability is flimsy at best and non-existent at worst, it makes no sense to expect formal statements of NATO’s non-interest in Ukraine to make any difference to Russia. Just as NATO didn’t start or provoke the war, so, too, it cannot end it with declarations of peaceful intent.
The case for reaching a compromise with Putin rests on the assumption that he wants and needs peace and that he isn’t really committed to destroying Ukraine and Ukrainians. Some analysts have proposed that Ukraine give up parts of its territory to Russia; others have suggested it sell the provinces Russia covets; still others have argued that referendums be held in the contested territories to determine who gets what.
All these solutions became impossible on Sept. 30, 2022, when Russia officially annexed Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk provinces. Since there is no provision in the Russian Constitution for de-annexing territories, it follows that, from Moscow’s point of view, these four provinces are occupied — not by Russia, but by Ukraine. Hence, Ukraine, and not Russia, would have to concede that its “occupation” is illegal and withdraw from all four regions. To make matters worse, although Putin routinely violates the rule of law, he cannot ignore constitutional procedures; his legitimacy rests on his claim to be playing by the rules.
Neither does Putin want or need peace. Given the disastrous consequences of the war — for Russia, its military, economy and people — Putin knows that his political and physical survival directly depends on either a Russian victory (which is close to impossible) or a drawn-out continuation of the bloodletting (which appears to be his strategy now).
Equally impossible is Putin’s willingness to abandon his animus for Ukraine — both the state and the people — and his longstanding determination to resolve the Ukrainian “problem” once and for all. Such an about-face would be tantamount to rejecting everything he believes in and values. In effect, Putin would have to deny himself — a prospect that is so unlikely as to be impossible. People do have Pauline conversions, but Putin isn’t exactly made of saintly material.
So, how can the war end? Only by pursuing policies that are possible. Specifically, this means realizing that the major obstacle to any kind of legitimate peace is Putin. If Putin goes, either willingly or not, then solutions become possible. He could be replaced with people inclined to change the Constitution, blame him for the disastrous war, and seek peace and a restoration of Russia’s ties with the West. At the very least, the power struggle that is certain to succeed Putin’s departure will distract the Kremlin from the war and may encourage it to end the fighting — especially if Russian fascists join the fray and thereby galvanize the democratic opposition.
In turn, Putin will go only if Ukraine continues to do well on the battlefield and drives out the Russians from all or most of its territory. As long as the war looks like or is a stalemate, Putin will argue that his continued leadership is indispensable to Russia’s ability to defend itself against Western “imperialists” and Ukrainian “neo-Nazis.” And without a convincing pretext for a coup — such as defeat in war — Putin’s opponents will lack the courage and determination to topple Russia’s malevolent dictator.
Peace, in other words, is possible only if Ukraine wins and Putin leaves. Even then, reaching a lasting settlement with a post-Putin Russia won’t be easy, but it will be possible. Anything else leads to dead ends that will drag out the war, kill civilians, and harm every state’s core interests.
Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as “Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires” and “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.”