As tough cases often make for bad law, paradoxes make for bad policies. The China paradox is one. Americans in general, and elected leaders in Washington in particular, increasingly regard China not only as a threat but as an existential economic, ideological, geostrategic and military threat. The solution or appropriate response has become largely a geostrategic and military one.
U.S. defense strategy is to contain, deter and, if war arises, prevail over China and other top adversaries. The paradox is that the multidimensional nature of Chinese threats cannot be countered with only the military. No doubt, the U.S. government believes it has deployed a complimentary diplomatic, economic and ideological strategy. In fact, that strategy more resembles a lobster’s claws. One is massive – the military – while the other is tiny.
Last week, the Atlantic Council (where I am a senior adviser) released a preliminary report by its Commission On Defense Innovation Adoption. The commission is co-chaired by former secretaries of defense and the Air Force, Mark Esper and Deborah James, and has a distinguished panel of experts, including two former undersecretaries of defense. In addition to offering 10 sensible recommendations that would resolve some of the many problems plaguing how the U.S. buys its weapons, the report stressed urgency. This was not quite a current day Paul Revere crying “the Chinese are coming!” But it was close.
The forcing function was Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s order to the Chinese military to be prepared to seize Taiwan by 2027. The implication was that because of the inherent and severe constraints in the defense procurement process (which, for example, takes 25 years from initial planning to initial operations for a nuclear aircraft carrier that still does not fully work or nine years for the Army to field a new pistol), urgent change is needed. The Commission accurately states the problem and offers corrective action.
There is a further wrinkle. Former Sec. of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously observed that: “you go to war with the army you have, not the army you would like to have.” The best case is that the U.S. military in 2027 will be no less capable and ready than it is today. On the current trajectory, however, the costs of maintaining the current force exceed by a goodly amount a defense budget that is approaching $900 billion for Fiscal Year 2024.
How then is the China paradox of emphasizing a military solution that is almost certain to be insufficiently broad enough to work to be resolved? The House of Representatives has answered this question, in part by establishing the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party. And the question is how this important committee will be able to conduct a fully impartial and objective analysis when opinion on Capitol Hill is or has hardened to the extent that members of both parties accept the threat and danger emanating from an autocratic China.
The U.S. record in its threat analyses – beginning with the Vietnam War through Afghanistan and Iraq – has not been distinguished. Of the reasons for these failures, the absence of knowledge and understanding accelerated by group think was persistent. Will the Committee repeat these errors? And at the same time, what is the White House doing to carry out its China policy in the Indo-Pacific?
Thus, it is vital to understand why the U.S. succeeded or failed. The big one was the Cold War in which the number one enemy, the USSR, imploded. The reason was not that the U.S. defense buildup bankrupted the Soviets. The Soviet system was irrational and unworkable.
The emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev and his perestroika(reconstruction) and glasnost (openness) could not be tolerated by this system and central planning. It was the fundamental weakness of the USSR that ended the Cold War. What are the major weaknesses of China and the Chinese Communist Party? These must be closely examined and understood.
The U.S., as the more responsible party in this battle, should move without concession to end the Trump tariffs. The reason is to restart a dialogue with China, ultimately at the highest level, to work out areas of possible cooperation and means to limit, contain or prevent unwanted conflict, especially military. Otherwise, it is difficult to find other means to prevent relations from growing more hostile.
Resolving the China paradox will not resolve all the tensions. But failing to understand it will not lead to a happy outcome.
Harlan Ullman is senior adviser at the Atlantic Council and the prime author of “shock and awe.” His latest book is “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large.” Follow him on Twitter @harlankullman.