Why China cannot be trusted on Ukraine

Last month, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Russian President Vladimir Putin, his proclaimed “no-limits strategic partner,” to discuss Putin’s war in Ukraine, among other things.  While Xi was on his way to Moscow, he let it be known that he was also considering having a conversation, virtually, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. 

The diplomatic gambit launched a wave of hopeful speculation that Xi would use his growing influence with Putin to facilitate Russia-Ukraine negotiations to end what Xi calls “the Ukraine crisis” and Putin hygienically terms his “special military operation.” (It more accurately could be described as his special war crimes operation.)  

The Biden administration expressed hope that, as national security advisor Jake Sullivan put it, the call “would continue to dissuade them from choosing to provide lethal assistance to Russia, which is obviously something that we have warned about.” It is not clear what superior persuasive leverage over China Zelensky would have compared to Biden’s “warning” about what United Nations Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield called a U.S. “red line.”

Zelensky became taken with the prospect of talking with Xi and publicly conveyed the impression that he was eagerly awaiting his call. Ursula von Leyden, president of the European Commission, pushed the idea during a meeting with Xi in Beijing, but he would only say the call would take place “when the time and conditions are right.”

Zelensky’s hoped-for conversation did not occur while Xi was in Moscow or for several weeks afterward. Beijing was now in its preferred position of receiving supplicants seeking the favor of its attention, just as President Biden and Secretary of State Blinken were maneuvered into the posture of eagerly seeking meetings and calls with their ostensibly aloof Chinese counterparts.  

The underlying first premise of all the hopeful speculation is that China has special leverage over Putin because its economic support is critical to keeping the Russian economy afloat, a statement of fact. The far more dubious assumption is that Xi would be at all inclined to extract significant territorial or sovereignty concessions from Putin that would be more than illusory.

On the surface, the combatants’ positions appear irreconcilable. Putin seeks all or a substantial part of Ukraine – specifically Crimea – under permanent Russian sovereignty.  

Zelensky has repeatedly declared that his government and people want every square mile of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory liberated and returned. A negotiated settlement would require at least a partial retreat by one or both sides.

It is difficult to see what Putin concession Zelensky could reasonably expect Xi to produce. It is conceivable that Zelensky is prepared to offer Putin a face-saving end to the fighting, meaning Russia would keep some part of sovereign Ukrainian territory — though Crimea would seem to be nonnegotiable for both sides.

Zelensky might be considering another option. Rather than negotiating over the heads of the people, he might be willing to accept an internationally-supervised referendum on the future status of the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine — specifically the Donbas and Crimea, unlike the deeply-flawed charade Putin arranged in 2022.

Given the record of war crimes in areas of Ukraine Russian occupied over the past year, it is highly unlikely many Ukrainians would choose to live under Putin’s rule.

Another possible explanation for Zelensky’s apparent willingness to accept Xi as a good-faith mediator might be Zelensky’s high expectations, realistic or inflated, for the success of the imminent Ukrainian counteroffensive. He may reason that he can convince Xi to warn Putin of his last chance to avoid a humiliating Russian defeat.

The converse of that hypothesis is also possible. Zelensky may fear the failure of the counteroffensive because of inordinate delays in the delivery of Western tanks and President Biden’s refusal to provide fighter aircraft and longer-range weapons systems. Zelensky might want to strike the best deal he can now.

In any event, Xi’s role as an honest broker is highly suspect. While professing allegiance to international norms such as national sovereignty and peaceful resolution of disputes, China has provided significant political and material support for Putin. Xi has blamed the West for the war, increased China’s purchase of Russian oil to keep Russia’s war financed and provided “non-lethal” dual-use technology that can be used to kill Ukrainians and destroy their cities and infrastructure.

It is a brazen flouting of the lecture China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang gave the other day to U.S. Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns, accusing Washington of “saying one thing and doing another.”

An example of how well China adheres to the principle of nations keeping their word was Xi’s solemn face-to-face promise to President Obama during their 2013 summit that China would not militarize the artificial islands it built in the South China Sea. 

The Qin-Burns meeting highlighted the overriding reason China’s good faith on Ukraine cannot be trusted. Qin said, “[The U.S.] can’t talk about communication on the one hand, but keep suppressing and containing China on the other hand.”

Beijing’s idea of America “suppressing and containing China” is the U.S. commitment to help China’s neighbors, especially Taiwan, defend themselves against Chinese expansionism in the region.

Qin’s spokesperson emphasized that if Washington expects China’s cooperation on other issues, it “must correctly handle the Taiwan question.”

Putin’s assault on Ukraine parallels the aggression China is vigorously planning for Taiwan. So, any concession Xi would press on Putin would potentially undermine China’s own hardline position on Taiwan.

Allowing, for example, a legitimate plebiscite or referendum on Taiwan’s future would ensure a popular declaration of independence, since the Taiwanese population has no desire to return to life under a dictatorship. Having rid themselves of one authoritarian system, the Chinese communist variety holds no appeal.

Nor would Xi be any more willing to settle for an outlying Taiwanese island than Putin is likely to accept Crimea or part of Eastern Ukraine except as a base of operations for further aggression at a later date.

The most helpful thing Xi could do to bring a just end to the war in Ukraine would be to set a good example for Putin by abjuring any use of force against Taiwan and recommending that he do the same for Ukraine.

While not holding its breath for that to happen or getting distracted by phony peace initiatives, the West should expedite delivery of all needed weapons to both Ukraine and Taiwan. 

Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in Department of Defense discussions about the U.S. response. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA