The US-UK ‘special relationship’ requires more personal relationships
The last year has drawn America’s eyes across the pond to the United Kingdom. The quick succession of three British prime ministers last fall sparked political intrigue to rival our own, while the first coronation in 70 years this spring captured the attention of American royal-watchers.
And as always, Netflix has a way of eclipsing the real world, with the success of its new show “The Diplomat,” featuring a fictitious American ambassador in London, putting U.S.-U.K. relations center stage. So with U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s visit to Washington this month, there was lots of talk about the “special relationship” between our two allied nations. With threats to the free world unlike any since former President Reagan and former U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher together stared down the Soviets to end the Cold War, the U.S.-U.K. special relationship will be as crucial in this century as it was in the last.
The threat posed by China animates debates on both sides of the Atlantic about how to safeguard peace and security without sacrificing prosperity. The level, and the benefits, of economic engagement with China is the single greatest distinction between today’s geopolitical challenge and the Cold War. The Biden administration calls China a “strategic competitor” but still seeks to “cooperate” with Chinese leaders on transnational issues like climate change. Likewise, the Sunak government recently referred to China as an “epoch-defining” challenge yet claimed that its approach to that challenge would be “robust pragmatism.”
Despite parallel policy discussions in Washington and London, however, U.S. and U.K. policymakers do not always conceive of our shared national security challenges in the same way nor do we implicitly agree on the best response. This makes it all the more important that we foster real ties between American and British leaders rather than rest on the laurels of the much-vaunted alliance. The special relationship, it turns out, requires relationships.
This is why we at the Ronald Reagan Institute partnered with the U.K.-based Henry Jackson Society to host the inaugural Reagan-Jackson Security Dialogue recently in Cambridge. The conference brought together a bipartisan, bicameral U.S. congressional delegation, cross-partisan members of Parliament from the Houses of Commons and Lords, and key stakeholders from the U.S. and U.K. national security communities. Discussions focused on strengthening allied defense in the context of the global threat environment, including the challenges to international order and stability posed by China and Russia, and exploring opportunities for deeper transatlantic cooperation, especially between our innovation and industrial bases.
Greater connections between members of Congress and members of Parliament allow for either side to share their perspectives and best practices as well as to coordinate joint approaches to common challenges. Yet a key takeaway from our conference was how few such connections seem to exist. One step in the right direction would be for more congressional delegations to visit the U.K., and likewise, more parliamentary delegations to visit the U.S. Without these types of interactions, we risk taking the special relationship for granted.
History tells the story of how important transatlantic relationships can be. Reagan and Thatcher first met in 1975. Reagan’s tenure as governor of California had recently concluded, and Thatcher had just been elected leader of the opposition Conservative Party. It was through this personal relationship, forged before coming to power, that they were able to work together so closely once in office and with such deep trust in one another. Friendship is a helpful supplement to even our strongest alliances.
Beyond fostering relationships, there are a number of policy steps that Congress should take to strengthen the U.S.-U.K. partnership, particularly with regard to integrating our industrial and innovation bases.
The foundations of the alliance run deep, extended even to the realms of intelligence and nuclear-technology sharing. Our two countries entrust one another with some of our most sensitive information and secrets. It is therefore nonsensical that we would establish barriers to cooperation between our industrial bases.
Each year, defense businesses in the U.K. spend more than $500 million just to navigate the compliance obligations of doing business with the U.S., particularly with trade controls. That equates to roughly 1 percent of the U.K.’s annual defense budget. Our Congress should apply the Canadian ITAR exemption to the United Kingdom, which would ease trade in defense articles between our two countries and enhance the success of the AUKUS pact.
Congress should also broaden that exemption to include currently-excluded critical technologies, like those related to cybersecurity. This would allow innovative technologies and defense materials to move between our borders without licenses and thereby enhance technological collaboration. The U.S. and U.K. must also work together in generating norms and standards for data privacy and for new emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and advanced wireless communications.
It was in part from the U.S.-U.K. relationship that the global rules and norms came to be that provide the basis for the security and prosperity of the free world. And the “special relationship” is as important to success in the competition against China today as it was in overcoming our 20th century challenges.
At a 1981 state dinner featuring Thatcher, Reagan said, “It’s my deep hope that as the leaders of two nations whose relationship is vital for the preservation of human freedom that we’ll be in close and frequent consultation in the years ahead.” The looming threat is a different one, but our partnership must remain.
Rachel Hoff is the policy director at the Ronald Reagan Institute, and Thomas Kenna is the policy associate at the Ronald Reagan Institute.
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