An ‘understanding’ with Iran will jeopardize expanding the Abraham Accords

The Biden administration initially took little interest in the Abraham Accords, the joint normalization agreements among Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco, no doubt because the Trump administration brought them into being. But faced with China’s growing influence in the Middle East, the White House has realized that the Accords could be a major vehicle for Washington’s retaining influence in the region. Accordingly, the administration has devoted increased attention not only to the current arrangement, but both to expand it to include Saudi Arabia and to designate a senior official to handle issues arising from the Accords.

Congress appears prepared to go even further; the House Foreign Affairs Committee has advanced bipartisan-sponsored legislation to create an ambassadorial-level special envoy for the Accords. The bill, which is likely to pass both houses of Congress, would also require the administration to report to Congress on the status of its efforts to expand the Accords to additional states.

The White House is reportedly considering naming Dan Shapiro, a former ambassador to Israel in the Obama administration, to the position. Shapiro, who has led the Atlantic Council’s support for the Negev Forum Initiative, an offshoot of the Accords, is respected both within the administration and in the region. He will, however, have his work cut out for him.

The administration’s primary target for signing onto the Accords is Saudi Arabia. Prior to his visit to the kingdom two weeks ago, Secretary of State Antony Blinken had stated that normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia was one of the Biden administration’s top priorities. In fact, the two countries already have informal security and, increasingly, business relations.

Formal Saudi recognition proved to be a bridge too far for Blinken, however. Saudi King Salman has remained adamant that Saudi Arabia would not advance its ties with Israel as long as there is no progress in the stalled peace process with the Palestinians, and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan reiterated that position in his joint press conference with Blinken on June 8. That the Netanyahu cabinet has approved construction of thousands of new homes on the West Bank is likely to render any such progress moot.

The restoration of diplomatic relations between Tehran and Riyadh after a seven-year hiatus adds yet another complication to efforts to bring Saudi into the Abraham Accords. Iran will surely press the Saudis not to go any further in their dealings with the Jewish State. Moreover, if there is any truth to Iran’s thus-far unsubstantiated claim that it would soon establish a naval alliance with the Saudis, the UAE, and other Gulf states, Tehran would have another way to dissuade the Saudis from joining the Accords.

Finally, it is difficult to see how the administration’s current efforts to reach an understanding with Iran would enhance the prospect of expanding the Abraham Accords. Deterring Iran has been a major driver of cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, it was the Obama administration’s decision not to keep its regional allies fully informed of its efforts to reach the agreement with Iran that brought the Saudis and Israelis together in the first place.

Washington does not seem to be seeking the revival of the original 2015 nuclear deal, instead, hoping to reach an informal understanding with Iran that would bring an end to Iranian targeting of American forces, as well as the release of Americans in Iranian captivity. In exchange, the Tehran could enrich uranium at the 60 percent level and the U.S. would allow South Korean banks to release $7 billion to be spent on humanitarian programs. Yet if Iran were to retain its enriched fuel at the 60 percent level, it still would be positioned to develop a bomb within weeks. As for the $7 billion, since money is fungible, Tehran could divert funds it otherwise would have spent on to improve the lives of its people and instead employ the released monies to support insurgents of all kinds throughout the region.

Should such a deal be struck, the Saudis may conclude that Washington cannot be relied upon as a security guarantor. They would likely maintain their current semi-secret relationship with Israel as a hedge against possible Iranian aggression, while avoiding further tension with Tehran by fully not normalizing relations with the Jewish State.

For his part, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, while privately asserting he could live with the proposed American-Iranian arrangement, has nevertheless publicly stated that Israel would not be bound by any new agreement between the U.S. and Iran and would reserve the right to act against Iran if necessary. Any such Israeli military strike would destabilize the entire region, enmesh the U.S., and provide Iran with the excuse to go full bore with its nuclear weapons program.

Washington is trying to have it both ways. It wants the Saudis and Israelis to be the fulcrum of a Gulf-wide effort to deter Iranian aggression through the vehicle of the Abraham Accords. Yet it is prepared to cut a deal with Iran that would allow Tehran to remain but a short step away from producing a bomb that could threaten both countries. Such a policy is likely to alienate the Israelis, the Saudis and indeed the other Gulf states, and could lead to even greater Iranian influence in the region, to the ultimate detriment of the United States and its Israeli and Arab allies.

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.