Speculation regarding the aftereffects of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s attempted putsch will continue for some time, if only because Vladimir Putin’s term as president of Russia comes to an end next year. It is not at all clear whether Putin will choose to seek another term, which the Russian constitution enables him to do, or instead retire to his reported palace on the Black Sea (assuming he is still in office when the March 17, 2024, presidential election takes place).
The role of the military will be central to any decision Putin makes either to withdraw his candidacy in 2024 or resign before then. The Russian army — mismanaged by its senior leadership, riddled by corruption and demoralized by the fighting in Ukraine — sat on its hands (at a minimum) not only as Prigozhin’s Wagner Group forces took Rostov-on-Don but even as they shot down six helicopters and a transport aircraft. What is unclear is who in the upper ranks of the military sympathized with Prigozhin and may have spread the word not to interfere with his march on Moscow.
Much of the uncertainty about the military’s lack of a serious response to the coup centers around Army General Sergei Surovikin, who reportedly is close to Prigozhin. In many ways the men are two peas in a pod. If the Wagner Group leader has a checkered past, it pales next to Surovikin’s record. The man known as “General Armageddon” has been in and out of trouble, barely avoiding prison, since he was a young captain. During the failed coup of 1991, he ordered his battalion to drive its vehicles through a crowd of protesters, killing three of them. He was prosecuted but somehow managed to get the charges dropped. Four years later, a military court sentenced him to a year’s probation for illegally selling a firearm to a classmate. Again the charges were dropped and his record wiped clean.
In 2004, while serving as a division commander in the Chechen War, he was condemned as a war criminal for ordering his forces to carry out brutal reprisals against the civilian population. And he earned his “Armageddon” sobriquet as commander of Russian forces in Syria, when, as in Chechnya, he ordered the bombing of civilian centers and infrastructure.
Surovikin reprised his brutal tactics when he served in the invasion of Ukraine, initially as commander in southern Ukraine, where his forces achieved some degree of success, and then when Putin named him commander of all Russian forces in the country. Soon after he took charge, he ordered attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which left millions of Ukrainians without power or running water during the depths of winter.
Surovikin’s terror campaign did not succeed in cowing, much less defeating, the Ukrainians. His troops were forced to retreat from Kherson, and Putin demoted him in January 2023, only a few months after he had taken command. No wonder, then, that given his supposed relationship with Prigozhin, and his undoubted resentment at being placed under the command of the widely criticized Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov, American officials reportedly believe that he was at least aware of the Wagner leader’s plans, if not an active supporter of the attempted coup.
Surovikin publicly supported Putin, urging the rebels to “stop” and adding that their efforts were only benefiting “the enemy.” He may have issued his statement on Russia’s Telegram app in order to remain a candidate, perhaps the leading candidate, to replace Gerasimov and return to his previous short-lived position as commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine. Putin would be wise to do so, and not only because Surovikin is probably his most capable senior officer. The Russian president is surely aware that Surovikin, who is popular with the troops, resents having been demoted and therefore is himself a potent threat to Putin’s remaining in power.
Surovikin may not have been involved in Progozhin’s putsch, beyond knowing that it was imminent. He may have calculated that Prigozhin was acting too soon and would not succeed. That does not necessarily mean that the general is entirely abandoning the erstwhile mercenary leader. Should Surovikin not get the job, he may yet back another coup attempt by Prigozhin, if the latter manages to remain alive and in contact with his Wagner subordinates. And if not Prigozhin, Surovikin may align himself with other disgruntled yet powerful generals and oligarchs.
Surovikin reportedly has been arrested for his links to Prigozhin. Given his past record, he is likely once again to avoid punishment. In any event, it is highly unlikely that Moscow, or the West, has heard the last of General Armageddon.
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.