Biden should rethink the Saudi Arabia-Israel normalization deal

The U.S. and Israel have been exploring with Saudi Arabia a package deal that aims to bring the kingdom back into the U.S. orbit while also normalizing its relationship with Israel. It remains uncertain whether the deal can ultimately be finalized. Yet intense negotiations are underway aiming to reach closure by early 2024. 

A veil of secrecy is imposed on the elaborate discussions taking place. Nevertheless, its key attributes are already emerging. 

In essence, the Saudis demand four conditions for going through with their side of the deal. Three are made of the U.S.: an ironclad security guarantee (equivalent to NATO Article V), an elaborate arms package comprising some of the U.S. most sophisticated armaments and civilian nuclear energy assistance that comprises indigenous uranium enrichment on Saudi soil. The fourth condition is aimed at Israel: some concrete steps (of omission as well as commission) toward the Palestinians. Word has it that MBS is also coveting another gain, to be granted role in the Muslim Holy Places in Jerusalem, presently co-managed between Joran and the Palestinians.

For its part, the Biden administration hopes to receive in return symbolic political gains as well as tangible benefits. The former comprises winning Saudi Arabia back from the embrace of China and to a lesser extent Russia and bringing the nation into the Abraham Peace Accords (a goal that eluded the Trump administration). The latter include expanded oil production and price stability, mega-billion arms sales and displacing Chinese technology acquisitions such as in the telecom arena. And not least, the export of nuclear power plants that could help revive the U.S. nuclear industry and enhance its global competitiveness. The U.S. is also tempted to leverage this arrangement to secure from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meaningful concessions to revive the hopes for a two-state solution with the Palestinians.   

Israel, for its share, seeks to gain a significant boost to its normalization efforts with the Arab nation with all the attendant security, economic and political benefits that could accompany it. And like President Biden, Netanyahu, deeply damaged politically by his pursuit of contentious constitutional revolution, hopes to reap from such accomplishment a boost to his sagging political fortunes. Perhaps also to secure US willingness to accord Israel as well some firmer security guarantees.

Yet the greatest winner will undoubtedly be Saudi Arabia, specifically, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. For him, a deal along these parameters will constitute final rehabilitation from the cloud hanging over him following journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s assassination, paving the way for his smooth rise to the throne, and boosting his ambition to transform and modernize the kingdom. Not the least by demonstrating his acumen in successfully blackmailing the U.S. with oil production cuts and a flirt with China to obtain a far better bargain across the board than the Emirati ruler, Mohammed bin Zayed, secured for originating the Abraham Accords.  

On the face of it, it’s a three-way win-win situation. Upon closer examination, though, the benefits that could accompany such a deal seem far less certain and the risks associated with them rather considerable.  

One risk is that each of the parties will fail to deliver on his side of the bargain. The U.S. might not be able to secure the necessary congressional imprimatur for one or more elements of the package. While Netanyahu may not be able to get his right-wing governing coalition to approve the U.S./Saudi ask on the Palestinians.  

But perhaps the greatest risk would materialize if this deal does go through along the parameters sought by Saudi Arabia. It will be difficult to rein in a triumphant and capricious Mohammed bin Salman from taking advantage of the U.S. security guarantees and arms supply to act recklessly against his foes, just as he has done in Yemen. 

The U.S. would also assume an open-ended commitment to defend Saudi Arabia which it would have to take seriously while already thinly spread between Taiwan and Ukraine. It would have to provide sensitive nuclear and military technology to an unstable political regime, with dubious nuclear track record that also faces domestic terrorism and foreign military threats. And delivering enrichment technology will seriously undermine the U.S. championship of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, breaking once again one of its core pillars. Which is bound to immediately unleash demands from U.S. allies and partners to receive no lesser treatment, and likely trigger retaliatory actions from its rivals and competitors. Finally, a dramatic expansion of the Abraham Accords would aid Netanyahu politically but hardly suffice to fundamentally transform the current Israeli government’s approach toward the Palestinians.  

Yet the core logic behind this three-way gambit is nonetheless compelling. As are some of its individual elements. While risks in its current composition are palpable and concrete, they might be manageable. To its credit, the Biden administration does not seem oblivious to them. 

Going forward, the Biden administration thus confronts two major challenges. First, to moderate the Saudi expectations in all areas they ask for while still offering them tangible benefits, albeit accompanied by safeguards and strict conditions on the parameters governing their deployment and use. Second, to directly condition any benefits to Israel on its government meeting crystal clear behavioral yardsticks on Palestinian issues. And toward both add enforcement mechanisms that would permit the US to walk back its commitments if either Saudi or Israel fails to live to its side of the deal.

Ariel (Eli) Levite is a senior fellow in the technology and International Affairs program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.