A hallmark of the so-called realist opposition to aiding Ukraine further is that Ukraine cannot win the war. At best this war of attrition will not end with anyone‘s conclusive victory.
However, here again, as I’ve previously argued, the facts contradict these unfounded assertions. At present, Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet are scoring tactical victories one after another; degrading the force, undermining Russia’s Black Sea blockade and making Russia’s occupation of Crimea increasingly untenable. It is no coincidence that these outcomes correspond to Ukraine’s tactical, operational and strategic maritime objectives.
Ignorance of this critical theater of military operations is reflected in the lack of commentary about it. There’s a distinctively Western tendency to downgrade the role of navies in contemporary warfare. Supposedly navies play a secondary or even tertiary role relative to land and air forces in bringing about decisive victory. Nevertheless, maritime threats and the use of navies to accomplish strategic missions are actually increasing. Ignorance cannot absolve observers of a failure to address the facts.
Ukrainian missiles, drones and raiding groups have repeatedly struck Russian naval targets, damaging ships, repair and drydock facilities, air defense systems and airfields. Most recently, Ukraine struck the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, killing its commander and many senior officers. Ukrainian forces have also raided the Crimean coast, recapturing energy rigs seized previously by Russia. These are not sideshow operations, as critics have charged.
Indeed, they highlight the ongoing failure of Moscow’s naval strategy and air defenses. But more importantly, considering the offensive gains made without sufficient air power, they underscore a reality significantly at odds with the supposedly realist account of the war. They reveal Ukraine’s strategic intelligence in coordinating military operations to fit its available capabilities and economic and political objectives. Its ultimate goal is to eject Russia from Crimea and unravel its capabilities to blockade it, strangle its economy, launch missile, air or amphibious attacks against it or provide logistical support for the Russian army.
These operations merit continued large-scale European support. As one writer wrote for The Economist, the West’s support for breaking the illegal blockade on Ukraine’s grain exports is vital to sustaining Ukraine’s economy, which also underpins its military effort. Therefore, in order to rebuff Moscow’s claims of exclusive dominion over the Black Sea and the blockade, NATO must go beyond current efforts to help find alternatives to secure Kyiv’s exports.
While exports through Balkan states like Greece, Romania, possibly Bulgaria and even Croatia are necessary to avert disaster in Ukraine; it is essential that the principles of freedom of navigation and the Montreux Treaty be upheld so that Moscow cannot act again in the expectation of impunity and immunity from retaliation. Thus, I and others, including former Supreme Allied Command Europe Admiral James Stavridis have argued on behalf of armed NATO escorts with purely defensive rules of engagement to escort Ukrainian and other international commercial shipping through the Black Sea.
Moreover, Rene Kofod-Olsen, CEO of V. group, the world’s largest shipping management firm, has reportedly advocated NATO intervention along these lines due to the global need for secure food imports. These escorts would comprise NATO air, air defense, electronic, intelligence and communications assets in the littoral states to preserve the Montreux Treaty rules pertaining to commercial vessels. For example, the United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force reconnaissance aircraft are now guarding grain ships traversing the Black Sea to deter Russian attacks.
Still, much more needs to be done. We need to understand that the naval war is profoundly linked to the conduct of the land war. The connection between the urgency of breaking the blockade and providing for Ukraine’s economic sustainment has long been evident to external observers. And that understanding must become clear to policymakers in both Washington. If the blockade can be broken and Ukraine can be provided with the weapons it needs for land warfare and maritime operations, it will gain the strength to make Russia’s occupation of Crimea unsustainable.
Already, Ukraine’s maritime successes have attenuated Russia’s capabilities in the Black Sea, curtailed its naval operations and demolished its previous maritime strategy. It is clear that much more will need to be done for months, if not years. This already is a long war and despite realist arguments, neither side will negotiate. Ukrainian determination to survive and prevail here confronts Putin’s awareness that negotiations entail a lasting threat to his power.
So we must build our long-term support and strategy on the reality that it is in our and our allies’ vital interest that Ukraine wins the war and on the proven facts that it can formulate and execute a winning strategy. If Western support is diminished or given without sufficient strategic purpose, then, as President Zelensky told Congress, we lose the war. And that is an intolerable outcome.
Stephen Blank, Ph.D. is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is a former professor of Russian national security studies and national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and a former MacArthur fellow at the U.S. Army War College. Blank is an independent consultant focused on the geopolitics and geostrategy of the former Soviet Union, Russia and Eurasia.