Prepare for an indefinite future across the Taiwan Strait

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has made the Western world aware of the perils of a conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Some observers worry that a crisis will occur as early as 2027, while others speculate about later dates as far off as 2049, the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, by which time China’s leaders surely hope to restore the nation’s territorial integrity. In the interim, of course, a tragic accident could trigger unscheduled kinetic action.

Uncertainty prevails, particularly when one takes into account changing domestic circumstances in Taiwan, China and the United States. Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election in January is only the most obvious immediate example.

Cross-strait relations are likely to remain tense for the foreseeable future, but steps ought to be taken to improve the situation to the extent possible for the indefinite period that lies ahead. Many new scenarios have been proposed but one that has received too little attention would build upon the experience of the past, namely the era of Ma Ying-jeou’s years as Taiwan’s president (2008-2016).

Despite Beijing’s longstanding formal position that it would never negotiate on an equal footing with the allegedly illegitimate authorities that rule Taiwan, Ma’s Kuomintang administration (KMT) and the PRC, by resorting to a technique that the scholar Holmes Welch long ago called “the Chinese art of make believe,” managed to conclude over 20 useful cross-strait agreements that forged cooperation in trade, investment, tourism, transportation and even joint crime fighting and mutual judicial assistance.

While these agreements were rightly criticized in Taiwan for lacking democratic oversight and transparency before conclusion — a problem that triggered Taiwan’s 2014 Sunflower Movement, it’s undeniable they improved relations between Taipei and Beijing. For Taipei, the challenge again today lies in safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereignty and autonomy while maintaining less hostile relations with China. It is crucial that these accords closely align with Taiwan’s rigorous democratic values and expectations.

After Tsai Ing-wen and her Democratic Progressive Party succeeded Ma to the presidency, Beijing endeavored, albeit unsuccessfully, to compel her administration to acknowledge Beijing’s One China stance, which claims Taiwan to be part of China. 

In a bid to exert political and economic leverage over Tsai’s government, Xi Jinping ceased implementation of some important agreements and suspended communications between Beijing’s “semi-official” organization and the Taiwan counterpart responsible for concluding these agreements. However, despite these blatant violations, several agreements of great practical utility continue to be quietly implemented.

Can China be persuaded to renew cross-strait communications and its commitment to the binding agreements that it has reneged on for the past seven years? Much may depend on the outcome of Taiwan’s forthcoming presidential election.

The KMT candidate, Mayor Hou Yu-ih, who recently concluded a visit to the U.S., promises to reaffirm Ma’s adherence to the so-called “1992 Consensus” that the PRC has deemed equivalent to its own One China principle. Beijing sees Taipei’s acceptance of One China as the indispensable prerequisite to its renewed cooperation with Taiwan. Hou, as a former police officer, has strongly urged the renewal of cross-strait communications and revival, in particular, of the crime fighting and mutual judicial assistance agreement that brought back to Taiwan many alleged offenders wanted for prosecution.

Will Hou’s position win public support? Taiwanese society has been stunned by the PRC’s overt violations of human rights in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, coupled with escalating attempts to intimidate the island into submission. Hou is keenly aware of the prevailing sentiments in Taiwan and has made clear that he would not accept Beijing’s “one country, two systems” proposition.

At most, what Beijing can hope for from the KMT is a willingness to maintain ambiguity about notions of one China, mirroring the approach under Ma Ying-jeou’s leadership. 

However, thus far, the KMT’s inability to terminate the third-party candidacy of Dr. Ko Wen-je that currently pulls voters away from it puts William Lai of the Democratic Progressive Party in a favorable position to win the election. There is no prospect that Lai’s party might belatedly embrace any beliefs that might imply acquiescence to the PRC’s sovereign claim over Taiwan. The most that can be expected is a formulation similar to that developed in 2016 by President Tsai in an unsuccessful effort to maintain post-Ma cooperation across the strait. Lai is open to resuming dialogues with China but he won’t entertain any one China preconditions. 

The ball would then be in Beijing’s court to consider whether, in view of the failure of its anti-Tsai policies, it makes more sense to react more flexibly to the new Democratic Progressive Party regime in the hope that honey will yield better results than poison. Xi Jinping faces an array of challenges threatening his rule’s legitimacy, with a sluggish economy at the forefront. It behooves him to abandon the rigidity that has distinguished him from Deng Xiaoping and Deng’s successors. The continuing failure of his Taiwan policy will only magnify Xi’s many quandaries.

Jerome A. Cohen is an adjunct senior fellow for Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Yu-Jie Chen is an assistant research professor at Taiwan’s Academia Sinica.