Qatar and Hamas: When a mediator negotiates itself out of a job

Since the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Hamas, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has been in contact with the Prime Minister of Qatar on an ongoing basis. This level of contact and coordination highlights the pivotal role that the small Gulf state plays in the Holy Land’s unfolding drama. 

Qatar is far from being the only Gas Exporting Countries Forum headquarters, the closest thing gas exporters have to OPEC. Qatar practically replaced Russia as a source of liquefied natural gas for Europe, supporting America’s allies. However, its diplomacy, buoyed by its gas revenues, is in a league of its own.

For decades, Israel and the United States have found it useful to have Qatar as an intermediary between them and Hamas. In 2005, the Bush administration asked Qatar to persuade Hamas to participate in Gaza’s 2006 municipal elections, in the vain hope that electoral politics would moderate the group. This horse may now be at the end of its race.

Hamas won the vote, but the U.S. was proved wrong. Hamas quickly moved to seize all power by ousting its political rivals from the territory and began what would prove to be a never-ending series of terrorist attacks against Israel. Interestingly, at the time then-Sen. Joe Biden responded to Hamas’s ascendance by pushing for a total cutoff of U.S. aid to the Palestinians but was dissuaded by the Israeli government, which feared that the measure would hurt ordinary Palestinians. 

From 2006 until last month, the United States and Israel have relied on Qatar to serve as their channel for helping the Palestinians of Gaza, but without empowering the terrorist organization that is Hamas. Hostilities between Israel and Hamas erupted more than half a dozen times during this period and included the kidnapping of Israelis, rocket fire against Israeli civilians and devastating Israeli retaliation against Hamas and Palestinians in Gaza. Wash, rinse, repeat. 

On virtually every one of these past occasions, the United States and Israel called upon Qatar to negotiate with Hamas on their behalf and to secure terms that would end the hostilities. In recognition of the utility of this arrangement, the U.S. and Qatar agreed in 2012 on the establishment of a Hamas political office in Doha to facilitate the complex diplomacy that was proving critical to containing the violence. 

Meanwhile, at Israel’s request, Qatar agreed to pay for Gaza’s fuel supplies, reconstruction costs, civil service salaries and cost-of-living stipends for the neediest Gazans. Qatari and Israeli government agencies established detailed modalities for the transfer and oversight of these funds to ensure that they were not diverted by Hamas’s military wing. 

All that changed on Oct. 7. Hamas went from being a troublesome actor requiring containment to a lethal aggressor that must be eliminated. For Israel and the United States, it became a “you’re either with us or against us” moment. Not surprisingly, countries like Turkey, Russia and Iran chose Hamas. The European Union and most of its member states have come down firmly on the side of Israel. 

Occupying the mushy middle are most of the Arab states, which while privately critical of Hamas, are loathe to join the chorus of full-throated condemnation. The distinction of being anti-Hamas but pro-Palestinian is a nuance lost on much of their populations and one that they cannot afford to make publicly. So, they tread the safe path of denouncing violence by all sides and calling for a ceasefire. 

Qatar’s penchant for the limelight has made this balancing act untenable. Doha’s close association with Hamas over the years has raised doubts — rightly or wrongly — about the strength of its commitment to fighting terror. Blinken alluded to such ambivalence during a recent trip to Qatar, when he told reporters there could be “no more business as usual” with Hamas and pressed the Qataris to shut down Hamas’s office in their capital.

There’s just one problem: the 200-plus hostages still being held in Gaza by Hamas, including 20 or so Americans. Qatar has shown itself to be unusually adept at negotiating hostage releases. Qatari mediation has helped liberate five Americans held by Iran, an American servicemember captured by the Taliban, four Ukrainians seized by Russia, and most recently, four Israelis taken by Hamas. The United States and Israel are therefore counting on Doha to secure their citizens’ freedom. Like it or not, the Qatar-Hamas channel remains a wartime necessity. 

However, Qatar will soon discover that it has worked itself out of a job. Third-party mediation is only viable if there are at least two other parties in search of an agreement. But there are no third parties doing so. Russia and Turkey are vying to become Hamas’s patron. Hamas will try to drag out this prisoner drama for as long as possible. The hostages are their best leverage to forestall an unrestrained Israeli onslaught, but the Israel Defense Force will not be put off indefinitely. 

The stand-off over the hostages will end by release, rescue or death. Israel will close the Hamas channel and pursue its military campaign without reservation and Joe Biden, for his own political sake, will pressure Qatar to disavow Hamas clearly and unambiguously.

The presumptive Democratic presidential nominee is already suffering in the polls and being blamed by the right for going soft on Hamas’s number one ally, Iran. He cannot afford to look weak when it comes to America’s preferred terrorist whisperers in Doha. Qatar will be forced to choose — cut off Hamas or lose American support. Qatar will resist taking sides publicly, but realistically it has no choice. Its security and economy are too reliant on the United States and Europe. 

Meanwhile, Qatar’s relationships with Russia, Turkey and Iran — all of whom have thrown a lifeline to Hamas — will give Doha continued relevance and influence.

Stephen Blank, Ph.D. is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is a former professor of Russian national security studies and national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and a former MacArthur fellow at the U.S. Army War College. Blank is an independent consultant focused on the geopolitics and geostrategy of the former Soviet Union, Russia and Eurasia.