The diplomatic challenges of China’s global expansion
President Joe Biden announced this week his intention to nominate Kurt M. Campbell, currently the National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, to replace Wendy Sherman as Deputy Secretary of State. Given America’s fraught relationship with China, this is an important appointment. Campbell not only is an experienced Asia hand, he is a strategic thinker who has led the administration’s efforts to strengthen Washington’s ties with key Asian allies.
These efforts include: reinforcing the bilateral relationship with South Korea; bringing about a new degree of cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul after years of an often tense relations between America’s two allies; spearheading the AUKUS submarine and technology agreement among the U.S., the UK and Australia; deepening cooperation with allies such as the Philippines and friends such as Vietnam; pressing for more American support for Taiwan; and convincing other European allies that their interests lie in a stable East Asia.
As Biden’s key deputy on Asian matters at the National Security Council, Campbell will play the leading role in managing America’s posture at the Biden-Xi meeting on the margins of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, scheduled to be held in San Francisco later this month.
How Xi and Biden will interact at the summit is far from clear. Despite its flagging economy, China has given no indication that it will ratchet down its aggressive tactics in both the South China and East China Seas. On October 17, Chinese and Japanese coast guard ships confronted each other off the East China Sea’s Senkaku islands, which Japan administers. Beijing asserted that it had driven off the Japanese ships, which it claimed had illegally entered its territorial waters.
Four days later, a Chinese Coast Guard ship and another boat deliberately collided with a Philippine Coast Guard ship and a boat carrying supplies to troops stationed in the Spratly Islands’ Second Thomas Shoal. The incidents prompted President Biden to state that America would abide by its treaty commitments to Manila if the Philippines were attacked.
Three days after that incident, on October 24, a Chinese J-11 fighter flew within ten feet of an American B-52 bomber on a routine patrol in international waters over the South China Sea. The fighter passed beneath the bomber’s large wing, and for a brief period could not be seen. The two aircraft narrowly avoided a crash like the April 2001 collision between a Chinese J-8 fighter and an American EP-3 aircraft, whose forced landing on China’s on Hainan Island led to a major diplomatic crisis between the two countries.
Even as China continues to assert itself in East Asia, it has also continued to expand its reach elsewhere in the world. The only country to send an ambassador to Afghanistan since the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, China is now entertaining a request from the Taliban government to join its Belt-and-Road Initiative. The Kabul regime will be sending what it terms a technical team for talks in Beijing.
Of far greater, concern, however, are Beijing’s inroads into Latin America. Long friendly to Nicolas Maduro’s Venezuela, China continues to evade sanctions on the importation of Venezuelan oil by using third party traders. China also is Venezuela’s largest creditor; Chinese state loans, primarily for energy and infrastructure, total some $60 billion. In September, Xi Jinping hosted the Venezuelan autocrat, and the two men signed numerous agreements, including on trade, tourism, science and technology, civil aviation and aerospace.
Venezuela has long been a major source of American concern. But Chinese influence extends into other Latin American states as well. China is South America’s largest trading partner and has free trade agreements with Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Peru. Twenty-one Latin American countries have so far signed on to the Belt-and-Road Initiative.
Even more troubling has been Colombia’s growing partnership with Beijing. Colombia has long been a close American ally; Plan Colombia, which was launched in 2000, saved the country from the chaos of narco-terrorist insurrection. However, with the election of Gustavo Petro in 2022, a former member of the M19 guerrilla movement, Colombia has veered sharply to the left. Petro’s government quickly opened its borders with Venezuela, leading to an estimated upswing in bilateral trade of approximately $1 billion in 2023.
Though his April meetings with Joe Biden in Washington were cordial, Petro failed to convince Biden to ease sanctions that America had imposed on Venezuela. When Petro visited Beijing in late October, he and Xi signed a series of agreements establishing a strategic partnership in addition to cooperation in the energy, agriculture, manufacturing, health and aerospace sectors. Petro also used the occasion of his visit to discuss ongoing Chinese construction of a metro in Bogota and the possible construction of a railroad to connect Colombia’s Pacific and Caribbean coasts. The new strategic partnership represents China’s tenth such agreement with South American states. As such, it poses a major challenge to America’s long-standing leadership of the region.
Though he has decades of experience working on China-related issues, should Kurt Campbell be confirmed by the Senate as the State Department’s number two official, his new position will guarantee that he will have far more on his plate than just relations with China. Nevertheless, his longstanding dealings with China should prove exceedingly valuable as Beijing continues to extend its influence not only in East Asia and the Middle East, but also and increasingly in America’s own backyard.
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.
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