Make no mistake: China and the U.S. viewing each other increasingly as adversaries is not only Beijing’s fault. Since late 2011, a series of White Houses bear considerable responsibility for the growing hostility between the two superpowers, as does China.
With the forthcoming meeting between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping and preliminary discussions on nuclear arms control reportedly underway, the opportunity to relieve some of these tensions and improve relations is clear and present.
But will both sides exploit this chance to reverse this increasingly precarious relationship that some Americans fear could lead to conflict over Taiwan? The answer is they must. Yet, “must” is not always a sufficient reason to negotiate.
How did this mutual animus arise?
Some basic history: The U.S. “lost China,” or so it mistakenly believed it did when Mao Zedong drove Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang Party from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949. Since then, Taiwan has been Beijing’s most volatile, visible and vocal issue — it seeks to reunite the island although it was officially occupied by the Japanese after the one-sided Sino-Japanese War of 1894.
Both the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China fought a bloody war in Korea to a standstill in 1953. Until Richard Nixon made the brilliant opening to China in 1972, Communist China was a U.S. enemy second only to the Soviet Union. Then began a warming. China was never an ally. Relations were very friendly, and China became a major trading partner.
After Nixon’s opening, subsequent U.S. administrations believed that as China’s economy grew, China would become a more liberal society. That did not happen. Worse, Chinese resentment intensified as it believed the U.S. was increasingly trying to isolate it.
November 2011 was an inflection point dramatically worsening relations. Without much warning, the Obama administration suddenly announced a strategic “pivot” to Asia. Allies in Europe were taken aback. Was the U.S. abandoning its Eurocentric and NATO priorities for the Pacific?
Friends and partners in Asia were surprised, shocked and fearful that this policy shift would alienate China. China was outraged believing this was the beginning of a new phase of American anti-Chinese policies. And the Obama administration did not anticipate the backlash. But it was too late.
The release of the National Defense Strategy in 2015 made matters worse. I was attending the annual British Army’s Land Warfare Conference in London as it was released and I had not had a chance to read it. During one of the briefings, an American general told the audience that the U.S. was adopting a “four plus one” military strategy. The aim was to “contain, deter and, if war occurred, defeat China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and deal with violent extremism.”
Surprised, I challenged the general. Not satisfied with his answer, I emailed then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, expressing my concern. Carter responded that the general was correct.
Beijing saw the “pivot” as being aimed directly at it. Being designated as a U.S. enemy was clearly a further provocation. And relations were never made easy over competing economic and trade issues as well as Chinese theft of intellectual property, spying and human rights abuses.
The final outrage as China perceived it was Donald Trump’s imposition of tariffs. Trump was infuriated by the large trade imbalance in the current account the U.S. had with China. The capital account in which China was hugely in deficit, having invested about $1 trillion in the U.S., was entirely ignored.
China was furious as were U.S. consumers. Tariffs raised the prices of Chinese goods having little effect on the trade imbalance. The Biden administration continued the tariffs.
It has also expanded prior diplomatic initiatives using so-called “mini” agreements. The Quad with Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. is one. And AUKUS, the tripartite agreement to provide Australia with nuclear attack submarines from the United Kingdom and the U.S. has certainly aroused China. Many other of these mini arrangements convinced China that the U.S. was determined to contain and isolate it.
Threats to invade Taiwan, expanding its Belt and Road Initiative globally, flying spy balloons over America, opening “police stations” inside the U.S., harassing U.S. warships and aircraft and other objectionable actions have exacerbated U.S. perceptions of China’s malign intent. Perhaps the only area in which Democrats and Republicans in Congress agree is that China is the enemy and a “pacing threat.” China’s growing military power is a further indication that it, along with other autocratic powers, is challenging America’s imposed rules-based order.
All these reinforce the need for urgent course corrections by both sides. The question is, will that happen? We may find out sooner rather than later.
Harlan Ullman Ph.D. is senior advisor at the Atlantic Council and the prime author of the “shock and awe” military doctrine. His 12th book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large,” is available on Amazon. He can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman.