The authoritarian wave is rising — Venezuela’s María Corina Machado needs explicit US support, before it’s too late 

Alexei Navalny’s imprisonment in Siberia and tragic death on Feb. 16 may be the most extreme recent case of authoritarian governments using courts and worse to shut down and eliminate prominent democratic opponents.  

But Russia is far from alone.  

In the Western Hemisphere, President Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua has set a new standard for repression, killing and arresting with impunity, expelling hundreds of his opponents, and robbing them of their nationality. Venezuela is looking more and more likely to follow in Nicaragua’s footsteps.  

On Feb. 20, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro to reaffirm their “strategic relationship,” just as the latter intensifies his campaign of repression against the opposition in his country. Maduro has effectively discarded the October 2023 Barbados agreement he negotiated with the opposition, which was supposed to lead to democratic presidential elections in 2024 in return for the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Venezuela.  

Since late January, Maduro’s government has accused Washington and key opposition figures of conspiring to assassinate him, leading to the arrest of dozens of people. He expelled the staff of the United Nations Office of the Human Rights Commissioner on Feb. 15; on Feb. 19, human rights lawyer Rocio San Miguel was charged with espionage. On Feb. 28, and without the required consultations with the opposition, the government announced new electoral arrangements that they said superseded Barbados. 

Maduro’s ultimate target is the opposition’s presidential candidate, María Corina Machado, whose candidacy the regime has banned. Maduro will be emboldened by developments in Russia to end any pretense that there will be contested presidential elections in Venezuela this year. If there is no change by April 18, the U.S. has stated that it will reimpose sanctions.  

There is little reason to wait. The process of negotiations that led to Barbados, and included the U.S., was a justifiable gamble to promote transition. It is time, however, to acknowledge that the agreement is dead without Machado’s participation, and before Maduro opts out on his terms and further blurs for a distracted world the rapidly deteriorating political environment in Venezuela.  

It is striking how much has changed since the opposition held presidential primaries in October. More than 2 million Venezuelans overcame obstacles placed by the government and voted overwhelmingly for Machado as their candidate to oppose Maduro. The fact that they had taken place at all was seen as a sign a democratic opening was possible. 

Since then, Venezuela’s Supreme Court has reaffirmed the election ban on Machado and other presidential candidates. Maduro carried out a referendum in early December authorizing the annexation of neighboring Guyana’s Essequibo region, stoking an international crisis that has deflected from internal developments. Not surprisingly, regional attention shifted to lowering tensions between Guyana and Venezuela, rather than implementation of Barbados.  

The prospect of the imminent release of jailed Americans has also kept U.S. pressure at bay. On Dec. 21, and in return for the release of 10 Americans, Washington freed senior Maduro ally and money-man Alex Saab. Meanwhile, international oil firms began to revive commercial ties with Venezuela. 

By January, Maduro was confident enough to play even harder ball with the opposition, going so far as to encourage attacks on opposition rallies. On Jan. 24, using specious assassination plot claims, the government launched the “Bolivarian Fury” campaign arresting opposition activists, journalists, and human rights defenders. On Feb. 4, Maduro stated he would win the elections by fair means or foul — “por las buenas o las malas.” Repression will likely intensify in the coming weeks.  

The international reaction to Maduro’s abrogation of the Barbados agreement has been cautious. The assumption was that the path to a democratic transition would be difficult, but that economic inducements and greater international recognition would moderate his behavior. There was also a reluctance to single out Machado as the standard bearer for the opposition. That hesitancy is ending.  

On Feb. 7, the European Parliament rejected the legitimacy of elections without Machado; congressional voices in Washington have as well, as did the Biden administration, albeit in the context of Maduro’s responsibility to uphold the terms of Barbados.  

As Eric Farnsworth of the Council of the Americas has noted, however, “at this point in Venezuela, it really is about the person (Maria Corina Machado) not process.” This reality needs to be more forcefully acknowledged. Efforts to suggest Barbados can be kept alive by selecting a candidate other than Machado have been rejected by the opposition.  

In this context, the measures that the U.S. could consider to raise Machado’s profile include:   

1. Issuing high-level White House and State Department statements formally recognizing that Machado is the opposition’s candidate and that there is no legitimacy to Barbados or an election without her. 
    

2. Calling for a United Nations Security Council debate on developments in Venezuela and a special session of the Organization of American States with regional foreign ministers to support Machado and censure Venezuela’s actions. Doing so would have the virtue of uniting the voice of concerned governments throughout the Americas and beyond. 
    

3. Reimposing U.S. sanctions in their totality without further delay. Contrary to what was expected in negotiating Barbados, Venezuelan oil is years away from becoming an alternative source for global oil supplies affected by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Lifting sanctions has also not made enough of a difference to the country’s miserable economic outlook to dent the flow of migrants to the United States; it follows that reimposing sanctions will not measurably worsen the situation.  

It is important to acknowledge that there is a wider debate underway about the efficacy of sanctions as a policy tool in today’s world. The fact is, however, that the U.S. conditioned lifting them on a process. Leaving Maduro with the impression that he faces no repercussions for jettisoning Barbados sends a message to autocrats in the region that they are free to ignore the United States, whatever they do.  

Circumstances have changed in Venezuela, the region, and the world since 2019, when a policy of “maximum pressure” by the United States failed to produce a democratic transition. The prospects for one now remain bleak. They do not justify tacitly accepting the consolidation of another full-fledged dictatorship in the Americas. The desire for change is overwhelming among the Venezuelan people and they have chosen Machado as their candidate; the least the international community can do at this critical moment is offer them and her — by name — our unalloyed support. 

P. Michael McKinley is a former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, Brazil, Peru and Afghanistan.