Stakes are high for Japanese PM’s address to Congress

On April 11, Fumio Kishida will address a joint meeting of Congress, becoming only the second Japanese prime minister to have this honor. 

In 2015, 70 years after the end of World War II, the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe spoke at length about the long history of Japan and the United States. He called upon the two nations to create an “alliance of hope,” and urged passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade accord. His speech received a standing ovation from the lawmakers.

Kishida is not the same kind of leader that Abe was, and his speech will be delivered in a very different geopolitical moment, in front of a transformed chamber. For the U.S.-Japan alliance, the stakes are much higher than they were in 2015. Can Kishida convey the critical value of the alliance to a more skeptical Congress?

When Abe spoke, he was on his way to becoming Japan’s longest-serving premier. Even after his resignation in 2020, he exerted a strong influence on Japan’s politics before he was assassinated in 2022. Abe presented himself as a new kind of Japanese leader, energetically engaged in foreign affairs and projecting a more assertive, muscular Japan. Under his leadership, Japan accelerated defense reforms, embraced free trade pacts and championed the concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” as a framework to respond to China’s expanding economic and military power.

Abe also yearned to unshackle Japan from its postwar pacifism, and his visit to Washington was laden with the theme of historical reconciliation. After visiting the World War II memorial, he expressed to the House chamber his “eternal condolences to the souls of all American people that were lost during World War II.” Later in Abe’s term, he hosted President Obama in Hiroshima and visited Pearl Harbor, providing more symbolic images of the reconciliation of erstwhile enemies.

Kishida’s address will likely not dwell on the past. Today’s threats to stability and democracy are too urgent. Wars in the Middle East and Europe, China’s military intimidation of Taiwan, the rise of authoritarianism, accelerating climate change and North Korea’s increased capabilities in missile and nuclear weapons technology have all heightened in the last few years. Japan has provided an important pillar of global stability, both during the unpredictable foreign policy of the Trump Administration and amidst the current crises.

The Biden administration has turned to Japan not just as the centerpiece of its Indo-Pacific strategy, but as a global partner in defending the international rules-based order now fraying under the pressure of these challenges.

Japan and the U.S. have moved largely in tandem to address the growing list of calamities. Renewed attention to mini-laterals such as “the Quad” (with Australia and India) and new trilateral initiatives (with South Korea and the Philippines) undergird both nations’ Indo-Pacific strategy.

After Russia invaded Ukraine, Kishida swiftly responded by applying harsh sanctions on Russia and providing Ukraine with $10 billion in aid, fracturing its relations with Moscow. In contrast, Abe had pursued a closer relationship with Putin, seeking a counterweight to China’s power and applying only limited sanctions in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

This time, the brazen invasion of Ukraine jolted the Japanese leadership and public, triggering fears that China could launch a similar attack on Taiwan, and that Japan’s security is tied to that of Taiwan. The shift in threat perception drove the announcement in late 2022 of a bold new security strategy from Tokyo, with pledges to increase defense spending far beyond previous levels and pursue a heretofore taboo offensive strike capability.

Although Japan has found an eager partner in the Biden administration, future support for the alliance is far from certain. Foremost is the possible election of Trump. His disdain for U.S. alliances, potential to demand a steep increase in Japan’s share of hosting U.S. troops and obsession with trade deficits are driving anxiety in Tokyo.

In addition, although Japan is currently well-regarded as an ally, growing strains of isolationism in Congress could portend a downgrade in engagement.

On trade, despite Tokyo’s pleas for the U.S. to re-join the TPP successor agreement that Japan has midwifed in the region, protectionism and a broad lack of appetite for trade deals are dominant. The transatlantic alliance appears vulnerable as NATO is disparaged by many on the right. At Trump’s behest, many Republicans have resisted sending more aid to Ukraine, dooming the supplemental budget bill that passed the Senate in February with limited GOP support.

In 2015, Abe faced a Congress far more enthusiastic about U.S. global engagement on a bipartisan basis. Abe’s message of bolstering the alliance and of Japan playing a more assertive role created a celebratory atmosphere in the chamber. Kishida may well face an audience less receptive to his global agenda.

Kishida’s speech is likely to reference the destabilizing threat from China, a message that could resonate with many U.S. lawmakers. However, Japan generally is cautious about hawkish remarks that could anger Beijing, and Kishida may try to make the case that the aperture on U.S. foreign policy should be wider than just the China challenge. His message may not land with those in Congress resistant to providing more aid to Ukraine, or by asserting U.S. leadership on trade in the Indo-Pacific.

Kishida may not have Abe’s staying power in office. But his message to the Congress will be urgent and indicative of Japan’s deep anxiety. Can the U.S. and Japan — bitter enemies in the last world war — together meet the equally dangerous global challenges of today?

Emma Chanlett-Avery is deputy director of the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Washington, D.C. office and director for political-security affairs.