Is Hezbollah about to go to war with Israel?  

A rocket attack from Lebanon that killed at least 12 people, mostly children, on a soccer field Saturday in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights has brought Hezbollah and Israel closer to full-scale war.  

In retaliating strikes close to the border, surrounding the southern port of Tyre and in the Bekaa Valley, Israeli officials accused Hezbollah, which denied responsibility. The exchange comes just a week after Israel’s strike against oil storage facilities at Yemen’s Hodeida Port in response to a long-range Iranian-made drone that hit Tel Aviv near the U.S. consulate, for which the Houthis claimed responsibility.  

Israel appears to be preparing for the worst still yet to come. 

In 2012, Hezbollah went to war to stop rebels from unseating Syrian President Bashar Assad and the Islamic State from spilling over into Lebanon. Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s decision to intervene militarily in Syria seemed grounded in strategic logic. Today, his offensive against Israel in support of Hamas in Gaza and response to Tel Aviv’s retaliation is more controversial, precarious and unpredictable.  

Hezbollah’s attacks haven’t been fruitless or without purpose. Perhaps its biggest achievement is introducing a new strategic reality, reenforced by the Houthis, that Israel can no longer expect to fight only one member of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” at a time — it must fight all of them.  

Hezbollah’s attacks have forced Israel to allocate a significant number of military resources to the northern front, away from the fight against Hamas. This was a more significant drain in the earlier stages of Israel’s campaign, however, which required more firepower than at present. The Israel Defense Forces have since accomplished most of their tactical objectives in Gaza, freeing up forces for the north.

Hezbollah (and Iran) might see the threat of a multi-front war as a means of deterring Israel. But although Israel does not want to fight a two (or multi)-front, war, it has done so in the past when it had to, and it prevailed against Soviet-equipped Arab armies. And while coming short of a full-scale conflict, Hezbollah’s attacks and the prospects of escalation have brought sizable economic costs to Israel due to the evacuation of tens of thousands of its northern residents. In April, the Israeli Ministry of Tourism put the economic cost of housing evacuees at roughly $1 billion. And that doesn’t include the loss of business, nor the psychological impact and enduring strain on its citizens or its military readiness.  

But that door swings both ways. 

The escalating hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah have been deadly, although more so for the latter. The Lebanese Health Ministry reports at least 435 deaths as of June 26, compared to 27, according to the Israeli government. Hezbollah’s roughly 350 fatalities since Oct. 7have already exceeded its 250 fighters killed during the 34-day war with Israel in 2006, according to estimates.

In historical context, today’s violence has been relatively contained to the approximately 3.5 miles of the United Nations-demarcated Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel. In the 2006 war, Israel destroyed extensive parts of Lebanon’s infrastructure — a memory not lost on Lebanese — and lately it has threatened to bomb the country into the “stone age” in the event of renewed conflict. But Hezbollah has also lost a staggering number of top commanders. 

Israel has successfully targeted Hezbollah leadership meetings and movements, based on the public evidence, suggesting intelligence that is sufficiently robust, timely and reliable. Hezbollah leaders appreciate Israel’s capabilities and take precautions but must manage laterally, downward and, likewise, upward, leaving them vulnerable. And Israel’s tactical successes are not likely to end.

In contrast to Gaza, Lebanon offers working infrastructure, greater diversity within which to identify sources and conceal operatives, and exploitable ethnic divisions and political rivalries. Hezbollah might have a deep bench, but such seasoned commanders take to the grave not only their experience and capabilities, but also their personal relationships and political influence.  

Hezbollah has also become more bureaucratic since the loss of iconic military commanders such as Imad Mughniyeh and Mustafa Badreddine, who operated with greater autonomy, agility and, arguably, more independence from Iran. Like any mature institution, Hezbollah has management layers and administrative requirements that offer exploitable breadcrumbs and slow it down.  

The group has more to lose in 2024 versus 2006. Hezbollah is a highly functioning organization with elected officials and political equities. It answers to a vocal and social media-savvy constituency and manages complicated relationships with Lebanon’s other sectarian factions. And, as past domestic protests have shown, the Lebanese have not suffered in silence.  

Hezbollah is well positioned to do extensive damage to Israel — its stockpile is estimated to include 120,000 to 200,000 missiles and rockets that could overwhelm Israel’s air defense capabilities. But it has long since wasted the possible advantages of going all in at the outset of Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack. Whether it was reticence to spark a full-fledged war that could cripple it and destroy Lebanon, or Iranian concern for its own equities, that strategic opportunity has passed. 

Iran’s own vulnerability to Israeli or U.S. attack in the event of a conflict has significantly contributed to Hezbollah’s restraint. With the group’s missile and rocket deterrent value against U.S. and Israeli attacks possibly spent by such a war, Iran’s asymmetrical and fifth column defenses would be severely weakened.  

Washington is limited in its ability to prevent a new Israel-Hezbollah war. President Biden’s point man, Amos Hochstein, is well received by Israeli and Lebanese officials alike, including Nabih Berri, the longtime speaker of Lebanon’s parliament and founder of the Shi’a Amal party-cum-militia from which some of Hezbollah’s founding members began. And it is through Berri that Hochstein communicates indirectly with Hezbollah.  

The U.S. is proposing that Hezbollah pull back several miles from Israel’s border in return for economic assistance to southern Lebanon (most likely infrastructure support) and changes to Israeli military positions. But the window for negotiation may be closing. Hochstein’s message to Hezbollah via Berri during his mid-June travel through the region was reportedly that Washington won’t be able to hold Israel back if the situation continues to worsen.

When it comes to forecasting in the Middle East, logic and pragmatism are often subordinate to the history, emotion and generational blood feuds that increase the likelihood of imprudent risks and catastrophic miscalculations. But if past is prologue, it won’t be material assistance to Lebanon, threats or cautions over America’s inability to restrain Israel that make the difference in Hezbollah’s planning. Rather, it will be whether and how the organization can compromise and still save face with its own support-base while retaining confidence in its deterrent against Israel, which Iran values the most.  

Bilal Y. Saab is the head of the U.S.-Middle East Practice of TRENDS Research & Advisory and the author of “Rebuilding Arab Defense.” Douglas London served 34 years as a CIA operations officer, including as chief of station in multiple countries and counterterrorism chief for South and Southwest Asia. He is the author of “The Recruiter: Spying and the Lost Art of American Intelligence.”